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INTRODUCTION
The family serves as the quintessential symbol of localism. Through-

out the debate on federalism, family law emerges as the one clear case in
which federal involvement is inappropriate, an uncontested core rendered
* Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School (starting July 1998). B.A. 1994, J.D.
1997, Yale University. I am extremely grateful to Reva Siegel for the guidance and encouragement she has given me in pursuing this project. I would also like to thank Bruce Ackerman,
Akhil Amar, Lawrence Lessig, Jerry Mashaw, Martha Minow, and Judith Resnik.
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special precisely because almost everything else has been nationalized and
the limits on federal power elsewhere are so murky. In United States v.
Lopez,' for instance, the Supreme Court could agree on little else except
that Congress's commerce power does not reach "family law (including
marriage, divorce, and child custody);"2 in fact, the majority opinion
repeated this proposition no less than four times.' Yet courts and commentators, whether in Lopez or elsewhere, do not explain the singular
status of family law primarily in terms of public policy or institutional
design. Rather, they argue that regulation of the family has been wholly
local throughout American history and contend that this tradition
conclusively demonstrates the intrinsic nature of "family law," a category
that they leave highly ambiguous but expansive in scope. Indeed, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has claimed that it is actually inappropriate to rely on
reasoned analysis when determining family law's place in the federal
system, arguing for exclusive localism in family law on the ground that "[i]f
ever there were an area in which federal courts should heed the admonition
of Justice Holmes that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic,' it is in
the area of domestic relations."4 This Article challenges both the existence
of an exclusively local tradition in family law and the uncritical use of
historical claims in federalism discourse.
This Article does not advocate the nationalization of all of family law.
Instead, it analyzes the positive and normative structure of the argument
for exclusive localism, which contends that family law has always been
under exclusively local jurisdiction and that history should control the
family's present and future position in the federal system. It finds that
exclusive localism in family law simply misdescribes American history and
concludes that family law's actual historical record gives no weight to the
claim that tradition should count as a reason for exclusive federal noninvolvement. This is not a judgment about the ultimate wisdom of federal
regulation of the family; it is a conclusion that the ground on which the
argument for exclusive localism in family law now stands is entirely inadequate. If a cogent case can be made for why family law should be uniquely
impervious to federal involvement, it requires a better understanding of
what "family law" is and why exclusive localism is appropriate, one that is
1. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's authority under Commerce Clause).
2. Id.at 564; see also id.at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
3. See infra note 11.
4.

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting New

York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
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consistent with actual past practice and contemporary constitutional
norms.
Even if one accepts the historical paradigm currently shaping federalism discourse about family law, claims for exclusive localism do not survive
their own standard. The positive aspect of the localist argument from tradition could be analyzed from many different historical vantage points;
after all, actually establishing the proposition that family law has been
exclusively local throughout American history would require a complete
survey of our nation's past. But for several reasons, close scrutiny of Reconstruction is particularly appropriate and my focus here. During Reconstruction, the jurisdictional lines between state and nation began to take
their modern shape. Indeed, several historians have described Reconstruction as one of the defining moments in which family law remained
under exclusively local control even as the federal government increasingly
entered other areas of life.5 These accounts, however, have missed a crucial
aspect of Reconstruction. Rather than supporting claims for the exclusive
localism of family law, Reconstruction was actually the culmination of a
sustained national debate about the federal government's ability to intervene in family law, as both present-day and nineteenth-century Americans
would understand that term. In the nineteenth century, many Americans
defined slavery as a domestic relation and believed that the dispute over
federal intervention into slavery importantly turned on whether the federal
government could regulate family law. By abolishing slavery, the federal
government answered that question and fundamentally altered one of the
most significant domestic relations of the time. Yet one need not adopt
the popular nineteenth-century view that slavery is itself a domestic relation in order to understand that federal Reconstruction massively intervened into family law.
The legal disabilities that constituted slavery in America involved
profound restrictions on family formation, as we would understand that
term today. Slaves had no right to marry and no right to parent their children; slave families could be separated at their masters' will. And Reconstruction saw a broad consensus that the federal government could exercise
jurisdiction over this sort of family law, one extending from Reconstruction's supporters to a strong majority of its critics. Reconstruction's
advocates placed protecting family rights at the core of their project. The
far-reaching agreement that the federal government could involve itself in
family law was evident in the congressional debates over the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress's wildly popular
5. See infra note 142.
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campaign against polygamy, and even in judicial opinions evaluating prohibitions on interracial marriage in light of Reconstruction. Indeed, the
only significant argument that Reconstruction Congressmen offered against
federal involvement in family law reflected not a jurisdictional dispute, but
a policy concern that would now be considered constitutionally illegitimate: Reconstruction's opponents worried that extending the federal government's promise of equal protection to family law would unsettle social
segregation between the races and the legal subordination of women within
the household. These claims were unavailing, however, and the Reconstruction Congress concretely improved the familial conditions of the
freedmen. Reconstruction consequently belies the claim of exclusive localism in family law.
Moreover, localism's supporters will not find better evidence that
family law is exclusively for the states in the years since then. As the historiography of Reconstruction indicates, the authority of claims from
history for exclusive localism has obscured federal involvement in family
law. The failure of the localist argument to devise a coherent explanation
of what it means by family law has not helped matters. But armed with a
clear definition of family law, which this Article provides, a survey of just a
few prominent examples of modern federal regulation reveals that federal
family law is far-reaching, although it certainly does not exclusively occupy
the field. The historical case for localism fails on its own terms, as should
have been apparent long ago. Simply put, history does not demonstrate the
exclusive localism of family law.
At the same time, this historical paradigm, now dominant and
unquestioned, demands critical review in its own right. The place of history in federalism is radically undertheorized: Localism's advocates have
successfully maintained that history determines jurisdiction over family law
without ever explaining why it should. After bringing an important historical record of federal involvement to light, this Article then considers,
as current discussion generally does not, how to evaluate the weight that
tradition can legitimately exert on modern debate over federalism. Concluding that the actual record of federalism and family law adds almost
nothing to the case for exclusive localism, it suggests what this past can
teach us about the danger of foregoing critical inquiry to rely on trope; the
threat that arguments about federalism will mask and functionally protect
the sort of status relations that Reconstruction's critics defended; and the
need to be free enough from tradition that we are willing, like the Reconstruction Congressmen determined to protect family rights, to change the
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course of history when equality and freedom, core issues of principle and
national identity, are in question.
Parts II and III examine the historical claims for localism on their own
terms, making clear that the historical record simply does not support the
proposition that family law is exclusively for the states. Part IV questions
the implicit normative contention that history should control family
law's position in the federal system, offering a critical evaluation of history's place in federalism that is largely missing from contemporary debate
and suggesting how an appreciation of the examined past can redirect our
thinking. But first, Part I indicates what is at stake in this inquiry, revealing how arguments from tradition for exclusive localism dominate debate
over "family law," while leaving that term undefined but highly expansive.
I.

ARGUING FROM HISTORY FOR LOCALISM

Judges and commentators sometimes offer policy reasons for keeping
the federal government as far away from family law as possible, but they
clearly expect another argument to carry the day. Localists do not simply
rely on history for additional support; they absolutely depend on it to
establish family law as uniquely, inherently, and exclusively local, one
arena that the federal government categorically may not enter in an age in
which the boundaries of federal jurisdiction are otherwise ambiguous and
subject to change. Yet advocates contend that history should control family law's present and future position in the federal system without ever
explaining their reliance. In point of fact, the Supreme Court's localist
discourse on family law appears to have originated in a nineteenth-century
opinion that excluded some "domestic relations" cases from federal court
although they met the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. This decision
was little more than a direct expression of the coverture principles shaping
the law at that time, but the Supreme Court upheld the "domestic relations" exception to diversity jurisdiction as recently as 1992 without examining its origins. Family law has been singled out as the lodestar of localism
without any space given to the question of why and when history should
control. Indeed, family law's unique status has broader implications than
even that designation indicates because the operative scope of "family law"
in localist discourse is so loosely defined and highly expansive, extending
far beyond the confines of diversity jurisdiction. One of the most recent
major expressions of the argument for exclusive localism, for instance,
included all gender-motivated violence within the definition of family law,
successfully limiting a federal statute that in no way turned on familial
status or familial relationships.
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History Marks Family Law as the Lodestar of Localism

Throughout the Supreme Court's case law, the simple fact of
(supposed) history appears as the primary explanation for the inherent
localism of family law. As this Article will make clear, noninvolvement in
family matters has hardly been the federal government's-or the Supreme
Court's-consistent regulatory practice.' Indeed, a quick glance at the
Court's constitutional decisions alone reveals far-reaching intervention

into the regulation of family life.7 But claims from tradition for federal
noninvolvement abound in the Court's jurisprudence on family law, rendering every other consideration distinctly secondary.
Family law's function as the epitome of localism for the Supreme

Court is perhaps most clear in United States v. Lopez,' which held that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause. 9 In that case, the Court insisted-after decades of
liberal interpretation-on limits to the federal commerce power, while
(implicitly) acknowledging that these boundaries are extremely difficult to
identify. In this sea of uncertainty, the Justices reached out to what they
6. See infra Parts II-III.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 297-305; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
118-32 (1989) (plurality opinion) (upholding state statute creating presumption that child born
to married woman living with her husband is husband's child and allowing only husband or wife
to rebut that presumption); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431-34 (1984) (holding that race
cannot be factor in resolving custody dispute between biological parents); Mills v. Habluetzel,
456 U.S. 91, 99-102 (1982) (striking down state statute providing that paternity suit for
purposes of obtaining child support for illegitimate child must be brought within year of birth);
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that state may terminate rights
of natural parents only on clear and convincing evidence); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
388-94 (1979) (striking down state statute permitting unwed mother, but not unwed
father, to block adoption of their child by simply withholding consent); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259, 266-76 (1978) (upholding state statute conditioning inheritance of illegitimate children
from their father on filiation order made during father's lifetime); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 375-77 (1978) (striking down state statute requiring residents subject to child support
orders to obtain court approval before marrying and conditioning such approval on ability to
support existing children financially); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1978)
(holding that equal protection does not require that unwed father of illegitimate child have same
authority as married or divorced father to veto adoption); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 498-506 (1977) (striking down city housing ordinance barring extended family
members from living together); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13-17 (1975) (striking down
state child support statute providing that daughters attain majority at 18 but sons attain majority
at 21); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649-59 (1972) (holding that state was barred from
taking custody of children of unwed father, absent hearing and particularized finding that father
was unfit parent); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7-12 (1967) (striking down state laws
prohibiting interracial marriage).
8. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. Seeid.at551.
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knew was certain-and certainly off-limits to the national government.
The strongest image that the Court could summon to suggest the overbreadth of the United States' view of its authority was to posit that the
federal government's interpretation of the Commerce Clause would permit
Congress to regulate "family law (including marriage, divorce, and child
custody)."'0 Indeed, the Court was so sure that the Commerce Clause
leaves family law untouched that it repeated this accusation about the government's position four times." In dissent, Justice Breyer, otherwise deeply
at odds with the majority, agreed that the Commerce Clause clearly stops
short of 'marriage, divorce, and child custody."' He simply claimed that
upholding the Gun-Free School Zones Act, and the government's underlying theory of the federal commerce power, would not threaten exclusive
state jurisdiction over family law.'
10. Id. at 564.
11. See id. ("[U]nder the Government's 'national productivity' reasoning, Congress could
regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity of individual citizens:
family law (including marriage, divorce, and child custody), for example."); id. at 564-65
("Justice Breyer posits that there might be some limitations on Congress' commerce power, such
as family law or certain aspects of education. These suggested limitations, when viewed in light
dissentof the dissent's expansive analysis, are devoid of substance." (citing id. at 624 (Breyer, J.,
ing))); id. at 565 ("This analysis [by the dissent in support of the Gun-Free School
Zones Act] would be equally applicable, if not more so, to subjects such as family law and direct
regulation .of education."); id. ("Under the dissent's rationale, Congress could just as easily look
at child rearing as 'fall[ing] on the commercial side of the line' because it provides a 'valuable
service-namely, to equip [children] with the skills they need to survive in life and, more
dissenting))).
specifically, in the workplace."' (quoting id. at 629 (Breyer, J.,
Justice Thomas's concurrence made the majority's point yet again. See id. at 585 (Thomas,
J.,
concurring) ("[lit seems to me that the power to regulate 'commerce' can by no means encompass authority over mere gun possession, any more than it empowers the Federal Government
to regulate marriage ....
Any interpretation of the Commerce Clause that even suggests that
Congress could regulate such matters is in need of reexamination.").
12. Id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 564).
With less emphasis, the Lopez Court also identified "criminal law enforcement" as another
realm in which federal activity was troubling because "States historically have been sovereign."
Id. at 564. Given the long tradition of far-reaching federal criminal statutes, this historical claim
about localism is, to say the least, problematic. Judith Resnik observes:
As Professor Rory Little has summarized it, by 1790 federal criminal jurisdiction reached
bribery, false statements, "murder, maiming, theft, fraud, and even receiving stolen
property." Scanning the last two centuries, Professor John Jeffries and Judge John
Gleeson conclude that, even before the 1994 crime bill, "federal law reached virtually
all robberies, most schemes to defraud, many firearms offenses, all loansharking, most
illegal gambling operations, most briberies, and every drug deal, no matter how
small ..."
Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism's Options, 14 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 465, 495 (1996)
(quoting Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029, 1063
(1995), and John C. Jeffries Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime: Advantages of Federal Prosecution, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1095-97 (1995)).
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But how was the Court so confident that the Commerce Clause leaves
family law for the states alone, when the potential reach of federal authority was otherwise the subject of such fundamental dispute in Lopez? The
only rationale the Court offered for singling family law out was tradition.
The government's theory of the Commerce Clause, the majority claimed,
would allow federal power into realms "where States historically have been
sovereign."' 3 The Court's explanation for the unique status of family law
ended there, without ever suggesting why this (asserted) historical position
should be controlling. Only Justice Souter's dissent made any observations
on the role that history had assumed in the majority opinion. He alone
noted-and rejected-what he described as the majority's "suggestion.., either that a connection between commerce and [traditionally
state] subjects is remote, or that the commerce power is simply weaker
when it touches subjects on which the States have historically been the
primary legislators."' 4
Ultimately, however, the other Lopez Justices were much more firmly
in line with the Court's jurisprudence. Rather than an anomaly, Lopez is
merely the most recent and dramatic example of a strong theme. Again
and again, the Justices observe that the "regulation of domestic relations.., has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States" 5 or (in more extreme form) that .'[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to
'6
the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.""

Only some of these opinions offer any normative rationale for the
claimed exclusive localism of family law, and those justifications are clearly
put forth as secondary support. When the Court upheld Iowa's one-year
residency requirement for divorce in Sosna v. Iowa" 7-the case that
declared family law "a virtually exclusive" state domain' 8-it cited Iowa's
interest in requiring people seeking a divorce to be attached to the state
13. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
14. Id.at 609 (Sourer, J., dissenting).
15. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,

398 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("In my view, analysis must start from the recognition of
domestic relations as 'an area that has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States."' (quoting Sosna, 419 U.S. at 404)).

16. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S.
586, 593-94 (1890)); see also Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (same); McCarty v.

McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981) ("This Court repeatedly has recognized that "[tihe whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife ... belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States."" (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581) (citation omitted)).

17. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 396.
18. Id.at 404.
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and in insulating its divorce decrees from collateral attack.' 9 But this reasoning only served to bolster the localism that the Court's argument from
history had already established, and Justice Marshall's dissent was only
slightly overstating when it chided the majority for having done no more
than "recite the State's traditionally exclusive responsibility for regulating
family law matters."20 In turn, Justice Marshall's own majority opinion in
Thompson v. Thompson' also adopted the guiding premise that federal
judicial involvement "in substantive domestic relations determinations"
was inappropriate, given "the longstanding tradition of reserving domestic
relations matters to the States."" The influence of Marshall's assumption
of federal inexperience was clearly apparent in his holding that the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 3 does not create a private federal cause of
action; Marshall contended that "fi]nstructing the federal courts to play
Solomon where two state courts have issued conflicting custody orders
would entangle them in traditional state-law questions that they have little
expertise to resolve." 4
Chief Justice Rehnquist has adopted a still stronger version of such
arguments from history, perhaps their logical end point. His dissent in
Santosky v. Kramer, 5 which required that parental termination proceedings
adopt at least a "clear and convincing" standard of proof, 6 purported to
offer several policy justifications for federal noninvolvement in family law,
contending "that few of us would care to live in a society where every
aspect of life was regulated by a single source of law"2 7 and extolling the
states as laboratories that, left "free to experiment with various remedies
'
[,have] produced novel approaches and promising progress." But these
arguments simply supported the federalist system as a general proposition,
rather than explaining why family law in particular should be under
exclusively local control. Indeed, Rehnquist's fundamental claim was that
a reasonable federal judiciary reviewing state family law should not be
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. at 406-07.
dissenting).
Id. at 423 (Marshall, J.,
484 U.S. 174 (1988).
Id. at 186 n.4.
Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994)).
Thompson, 484 U.S. at 186.

25. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
26. Id. at 747-48.
27. Id. at 770 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 771 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 773 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(making same point).
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guided by reason, but by tradition explicitly disconnected from logic. As
Rehnquist articulated the nature of the deference he endorsed,
[i]f ever there were an area in which federal courts should heed the
admonition of Justice Holmes that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic," it is in the area of domestic relations. This area has
been left to the States from time immemorial, and not without good
29
reason.
Rehnquist never identified the "good reason" behind the supposed historical localism in family law. This failure is striking and powerfully embodies
much of the argument from history for exclusive localism in family law.
Whether by implication or express statement, the Justices of the Supreme
Court have often indicated their willingness to subordinate policy considerations when family law is at issue. Claims from tradition, not contempo-

raneous reason, have made family law the lodestar of localism.
B.

The Unexplained Elevation of History

In so powerfully privileging the past, the Supreme Court has never
explained why its historical claims, even if accurate, should control family
law's place in federalism. Ankenbrandt v. Richards,0 the Court's 1992
decision sustaining the domestic relations exception to federal diversity
jurisdiction, exemplifies this phenomenon and begins to suggest its perils.
Ankenbrandt offers virtually no basis for upholding the exception, which
excludes "domestic relations" cases meeting the requirements of diversity
jurisdiction from federal court, beyond citing the asserted tradition of
keeping family law exclusively local.3 The opinion states little more than
that the Court was "unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has
been recognized for nearly a century and a half."32 In fact, the Court's
29. Id. at 770 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S.
345, 349 (1921)).
30. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
31. The only policy contention the Court put forward was itself rooted in the historical
existence of the exception, which meant that the states had developed "specific proficiency" in
family law. Id. at 704.
32. Id. at 694-95; see also id. at 703 ("[Olur conclusion [is] rooted in respect for this longheld understanding."); id. at 715 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (contending, without explanation,
that "the unbroken and unchallenged practice of the federal courts since before the War
Between the States of declining to hear certain domestic relations cases" justified federal
abstention).
The paucity of policy discussion in Ankenbrandt notably distinguishes the domestic relations
exception from many other legal rules that were originally justified in terms that would not survive modem constitutional scrutiny. Consider Sunday closing laws. These statutes were first
enacted in order to promote and enforce Christianity, a motivation now unconstitutional under
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localist discourse on family law does appear to have first surfaced in the
context of the domestic relations exception. But the history of this
exception, and its very reason for coming into being in the nineteenth
century, are inextricably connected to a legal view of women that is
unconstitutional under modem equal protection doctrine. Indeed, the
decision that first established the domestic relations exception to diversity
jurisdiction makes no sense at all outside the context of coverture rules.
The weight of the argument from tradition for exclusive localism in family
law was so strong, and the dominance of its historical paradigm so
unchallenged, that the Ankenbrandt Court felt that, even here, it could rely
on history while leaving the normative implications of the exception's
origins unaddressed. The case starkly suggests the need to explain why and
when the past should control and the danger that relying on history will
functionally preserve the unequal status relations that underlay and
motivated now-traditional practices.
The Supreme Court first announced the domestic relations exception
in Barber v. Barber,34 a nineteenth-century case entangled in the common
law doctrine of marital unity. Both Barber's majority and its dissent fully
endorsed the doctrine, which held that a woman's civil identity merged
into her husband's at marriage and disappeared. 35 For jurisdictional purposes, this tenet of marital status law meant that a wife's legal domicile was
the First Amendment. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431-33, 446-47 (1961); Two
Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592-94 (1961); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617, 624-26 (1961). Over the last two hundred years,
however, many state legislatures have recognized this constitutional problem and defended
Sunday closing laws in wholly secular terms. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 434-35; Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc., 366 U.S. at 595; Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 626-28. The Supreme
Court, in turn, has upheld these laws precisely on the ground that they have lost their religious
flavor. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 444-45, 448-49; Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., 366
U.S. at 598; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 602-03, 607 (1961); Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 630.
Whether or not the Court is right about that, these statutes, like most other aspects of public
life, are now debated on the basis of contemporary policy arguments that are meant to be
dispositive. This is quite different from Ankenbrandt, in which the Court assumed that the bare
fact of history alone was controlling, without considering whether the origins of the domestic
relations exception were in accord with modem constitutional norms.

33.

See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking down gender-based alimony

law under Equal Protection Clause on ground that statute preserved common law status relations,
"reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special
protection").

34. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859).
35. As Blackstone explained: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person
in law: that is; the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage,
or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs every thing ....

*442.

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
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always identical to her husband's, no matter where she actually lived;
diversity jurisdiction in litigation between man and wife was therefore
impossible per se. The general proposition that a wife could not maintain a
domicile separate from her husband was the foundation of the Barber case,
and its recognition of an exception to diversity jurisdiction for "domestic
relations" cases was nothing other than the expression of this domicile rule
in jurisdictional form. All disagreement in Barber was limited to whether
coverture permitted a special exemption for a wife living apart from her
husband under judicial order of separation. The Barber majority ultimately
found such an exemption and allowed the female plaintiff to invoke
diversity jurisdiction in order to enforce a state alimony award. 6 The
Supreme Court noted in dictum, however, that it "disclaim[ed] altogether
any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States" over the actual granting
of divorce or alimony decrees.37 The outraged dissent charged that the
majority's decision threatened the foundations of coverture and marital
unity.18

It was this concern that struck a chord.3 9

Throughout the

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court repeated
Barber's dictum and barred all federal litigation seeking divorce, alimony,
or (after an 1890 decision) child custody decrees that was brought outside
federal territorial courts.4° Barber, which reasoned inextricably within

36. See Barber, 62 U.S. at 592-94, 597-98.
37. Id. at 584.
38. As dissenting Justice Daniel argued:
By Coke and Blackstone it is said: "That by marriage, the husband and wife become
one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated or consolidated into that of the husband,
under whose wing and protection she performs everything."...
Such being the undoubted law of marriage, how can it be conceived that pending
the existence of this relation the unity it creates can be reconciled with separate and
independent capacities in that unity, such as belong to beings wholly disconnected, and
each sui juris?
Id. at 600-01 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
39. Reva Siegel, who has particularly stressed Barber's pivotal reliance on the logic of marital unity, notes that "much of the idiom [Barber] used to designate marriage as a 'local' matter
within discourses of federalism either echoes or can be traced to the common law doctrines of
marital privacy," which contended that governmental intervention into the family undermined
marital harmony. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogativeand Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2203 (1996).
40. See, e.g., De La Rama v. De La Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1906) (holding that federal courts have jurisdiction over all domestic relations cases arising in federal territories); Simms
v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167-68 (1899) (same); Cheely v. Clayton, 110 U.S. 701, 705 (1884)
(same).
By 1890, the Court was announcing in a case involving a child custody dispute that "Itihe
whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the
laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States." Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 59394 (1890). By 1930, this proposition had grown to embrace cases of arguably exclusive federal
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common law coverture, became the seminal decision excepting "domestic
relations" claims from diversity jurisdiction. Indeed, Barber, as reinterpreted to emphasize its dicta, became the essential foundation of the entire
jurisprudence, since neither Barber nor the decisions following offer any
explanation or authority for the proposition that some family law cases are
not for the federal courts, other than to entwine the notion with the doctrine of marital unity."
The history of the domestic relations exception constitutes perhaps
the clearest case of a tradition based solely on reasoning that is now constitutionally unacceptable--on reasoning that no longer counts as such. The
Supreme Court created the domestic relations exception as a simple
extension of coverture rules, and the dispute in Barber makes no sense outside the confines of the marital unity doctrine. Subsequent decisions, in
jurisdiction. Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379 (1930), held that even divorce and alimony claims against a foreign official living in the United States had to be brought in state court.
Although Article III
and federal statutes noted no exceptions to the requirement that federal
courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over suits against foreign diplomats, see id. at 382-83, the
Court stated that all this language "[had] to be interpreted in the light of the tacit assumptions
upon which it is reasonable to suppose that the language was used," id. at 383. To support the
supposition that non-territorial cases involving the issuance of divorce or alimony decrees were
never to be heard in a federal tribunal, the Popovici Court relied exclusively on its own line of
cases beginning with Barber. See id.
41. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 694 (1992) ("The Barber Court, however,
cited no authority and did not discuss the foundation for its announcement. Since that time, the
Court has dealt only occasionally with the domestic relations limitation on federal-court jurisdiction, and it has never addressed the basis for such a limitation."); Naomi R. Cahn, Family
Law, Federalism, and the Federal Courts, 79 IOWA L. REV. 1073, 1080 (1994) ("Historically, the
Court's statements concerning the source and scope of the Domestic Relations Exception have
provided little guidance for the lower federal courts.").
In fact, several lower court opinions in the 1960s and 1970s brought to light evidence from
the colonial period and English practice suggesting that the Barber dictum and its progeny may
represent an absolutist break from a more complicated past in which national-level courts issued
divorce and alimony decrees. Judge Jack Weinstein first made this argument, noting:
The historical reasons relied upon to explain the federal courts' complete lack of
matrimonial jurisdiction are not convincing. Colonial courts and the English Chancery
were not without power in matrimonial affairs. Even in Barber the Supreme Court had
referred to "the belief" that existed at the time the Constitution was adopted that the
power to decree alimony "belonged to the high court of chancery, in the absence of
ecclesiastical tribunals"; it cited, seemingly with approval, several early state cases
which held that a court of equity had the "inherent jurisdiction to decree alimony."
Spindel v. Spindel, 283 F. Supp. 797, 806 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (citations omitted); see also Phillips,
Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.)
("We have no disposition to question that conclusion [by the Supreme Court in finding the
exception], whether the history was right or not." (citing Spindel, 283 F. Supp. at 802-03));
Solomon v. Solomon, 516 F.2d 1018, 1031 (3d Cir. 1975) (Gibbons, J., dissenting) ("Judges
Friendly and Weinstein say it as well as it need be said. They make clear that it simply has never
been the law that because the dispute is between a present or former husband and wife and
involves the marital status it is nonjusticiable in a federal district court.").
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turn, rely wholly on Barber. But even in Ankenbrandt, the Supreme Court
relied on the sheer weight of past practice, without ever considering why
this tradition was worth such deference or whether its decision to uphold
the domestic relations exception would functionally perpetuate the legacy
of coverture.
C.

The Definition of Family Law in Localism

Family law has become the quintessential symbol of federal noninvolvement on the strength of appeals to history. Yet localists never explain
why they have chosen to rely so heavily on the past in this context. Still, a
decision like Ankenbrandt does not indicate the full scope of what
arguments from history have deemed local. The exception to federal
jurisdiction that Ankenbrandt recognizes is explicitly limited to "divest[ing]
the federal courts [in diversity cases] of power to issue divorce, alimony,
and child custody decrees."42 While the Court offered this fairly crisp
delineation of the diversity exception as recently as 1992, claims for
exclusive localism in family law are frequently made without such doctrinal
precision, leaving ambiguous the exact nature of the law covered. These
more indefinite and expansive definitions of family law render the implications of family law's status as the symbol of federal noninvolvement more
sweeping than even Ankenbrandt suggests.
Rarely stopping to explain what it means by family law, the Supreme
Court has often relied on reasoning and language that first appeared in
the context of the diversity exception for support in areas falling far
outside the limits of Ankenbrandt. Lopez-with its anxiety that Congress's
commerce power not reach "family law (including marriage, divorce, and
child custody)"--draws on the particular preoccupations of the diversity
exception.
But, significantly, the case leaves the exact definition of
family law indeterminate, while signaling that it is broader than the mere
issuance of decrees that occupied Ankenbrandt. Similarly, although
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo4 concerned whether federal retirement benefits for
railroad workers should count as community property, the Court relied on
the 1890 decision that expanded the diversity exception to include child
custody decrees, quoting it for the absolutist proposition that .'[tihe whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
42. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703.
43. United States v.Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
44. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
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States."'45 Rose v. Rose46 quoted the same passage to explain "the
constitutional standard" that the Supreme Court had applied in order to
determine that the federal laws governing veterans' disability benefits did
not preempt a state child support statute.47 Whatever Ankenbrandt's future
impact on the Court, it has done little elsewhere to moderate the reigning
definitions of family law and the scope of the claim that family law is
quintessentially and exclusively for the states.
Fought largely after
Ankenbrandt was decided, the struggle over the Violence Against Women
Act,4" in which opponents successfully defined family law to include all
gender-motivated violence,4 9 is the most notable case in point.
As I explain more fully below,50 the best definition of family law may
vary with context; claims from history for exclusive localism in family law
are most reasonably evaluated against a definition of family law as rich as
the one that such assertions typically assume. Establishing exclusive localism within the narrow confines of a decision like Ankenbrandt would leave
the far more common and expansive claims for the inherent and exclusive
localism of family law-in contexts well outside the diversity exceptionlargely unsupported. For that reason, this Article employs the following
three-part definition: Family law, first, determines what constitutes a family
and who is or may become a spouse, parent, child, or other family member.
Second, family law shapes the legal creation and dissolution of these family
relationships. Third, family law establishes the legal rights and responsibilities that family members have because of their familial status. The
Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which falls outside each
of these categories, exemplifies the indefiniteness and expansionism that
give arguments from tradition for exclusive localism in family law such
enormous scope.
VAWA creates a federal civil right to be free from gender-motivated
violence and entitles the victims of such violence to sue their attackers in
federal court for money damages.5 Its purpose is to compensate for inadequate or nonexistent state remedies.52 Its provisions draw directly from
older federal civil rights laws penalizing racial discrimination, statutes now
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 581 (quoting Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)).
481 U.S. 619 (1987).
Id. at 625.
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
See infra text accompanying notes 61-73.

50. See infra Part III.A.
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a).
52.

See infra text accompanying notes 57-60.
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thought to be at the heart of national jurisdiction." VAWA is not concerned with familial status or relationships. Indeed, the Congresses that
debated the bill never sought to limit its reach to gender-motivated violence within familial or intimate settings or to otherwise treat violence
differently depending on the familial connection between perpetrator and
victim. At the same time, the bill introduced in 1990 explicitly intended
to disrupt patterns of spousal rape and familial violence.54 Such crimes55
have often been categorized as falling within the purview of family law,

and opposition to the civil rights bill soon centered on the proposition that
VAWA would upset a long-standing tradition of leaving "family" matters
to the states.56 Although the notion that VAWA implicated family law
more than equal protection was deeply problematic, the "federalist" critique of VAWA attracted the support of the state and federal judiciary.
This opposition drew enormous power from its appeal to a supposedly clear
tradition and its incorporation of all gender-motivated violence within the
definition of family law. Without ever explaining why history should be
dispositive, localists ultimately won substantial limitations on VAWA's
civil rights remedy.
When first introduced, VAWA included three congressional findings:
first, that gender-motivated crime violated "the victim's right to equal protection of the laws;" second, that existing federal law "provide[d] a civil
rights remedy for gender crimes committed in the workplace, but not on
the street or in the home;" and third, that states had inadequately
addressed the "bias element" in gender-motivated crimes, which "separates
these crimes from acts of random violence.",5' To substantiate these findings, VAWA's sponsors held hearings exploring discrimination and neglect
in state judicial systems and invited several prominent legal scholars to
comment on the constitutionality of the bill.58 These experts agreed that
VAWA was within Congress's authority.59 As several stressed, remedying
53. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 51 (1990) (explaining that language of VAWA's original
civil rights remedy was modelled after 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985(c)).
54. See S.2754, 101st Cong. § 301(a) (1990).
55. For a penetrating historical analysis of the idea that wife beating is a private matter best
shielded in familial intimacy, see Siegel, supra note 39.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 61-73.
57. S.2754 § 301(a).
58. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 33-48 (1991) (summarizing hearings); S. REP. NO.
101-545, supra note 53, at 31-34 (same).
59. See, e.g., Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearing on S. 15 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 104-05 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Hearing] (testimony
of Professor Cass R. Sunstein, University of Chicago Law School); id. at 99-102 (testimony of
Professor Burt Neuborne, New York University Law School).
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discrimination in state law enforcement is at the core of federal equal
protection. 6°
But criticism soon mounted against the bill. VAWA's opponents
were. certain that history marked family law as exclusively local and that
gender-motivated violence was family law. They accordingly contended
that the bill's civil rights remedy would federalize matters of inherently
state concern and overwhelm the federal courts with inappropriate litigation. The state-based Conference of Chief Justices, which voted on January 31, 1991 to oppose all of VAWA's civil rights remedy, was the earliest
prominent opponent. 61 Its entire critique flowed
.,,62 from the emphatic contention that family law was "not federal in nature, a proposition that the
state judges supported only by noting that such matters have "been traditionally reserved to the states."63 So informed, the Conference denounced
VAWA's purported potential to undermine state jurisdiction over family
law as a major threat and fatal weakness. 64 While never challenging the
bill's substantive goals, the Chief Justices appealed to history to conclude
that VAWA pursued "a narrow objective, 65 not worth the havoc it would
wreak on "the very core of familial relationships." 66
It soon became clear that such sentiments reflected more than the
institutional position of the Chief Justices, who, after all, had personal
stakes in maintaining the reputation of state courts.67 In September 1991,
In particular, legal scholars testified that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact
VAWA under its power to regulate interstate commerce, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.
3, and to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at amend. XIV, § 5. For a discussion of the constitutional challenges to VAWA that have arisen in light of the subsequent Lopez decision, see infra
note 84 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., 1991 Hearing, supra note 59, at 104 (testimony of Professor Sunstein)
(describing equal protection from violence as "core meaning of 'equal protection of the laws.'
and state failure to provide it as denial of equal protection "in the classic sense").
61. See Statement by Conference of Chief Justices on S. 15-Violence Against Women Act
of 1991, reprintedin Crimes of Violence Motivated By Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 80-84 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Hearing].
62. Id.
at 82.
63. Id. at 80; see also id. at 83 ("[S]pousal and sexual violence and all legal issues involved
in domestic relations historically have been governed by state criminal and civil law.") (emphasis
added).
64. See id. at 80.
65. Id. at 82.
66. Id. at 80.
67. See Letter from Lyle Reid, Chairman of the Committee on State-Federal Relations of
the Conference of Chief Justices, to Don Edwards, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee
(Nov. 16, 1993), reprinted in 1993 Hearing, supra note 61, at 77-78 ("[Mlajor dislocations of state
court responsibility for family law should be taken only in the most extreme circumstances. It
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the Judicial Conference of the United States, the organization for federal
judges, joined its state counterpart in opposing VAWA's provision for a
civil rights cause of action. Once again, the assertedly clear history of
exclusive localism in family law, and the implicit contention that this tradition exerts compelling normative force, shaped the response. From this
baseline, the federal judges could characterize the fact that VAWA would
bring "family law" claims into federal courts as a cause of "major statefederal jurisdictional problems." ' On this view, the judges could agree that
violence against women was an important concern, and still contend that a
federal response to inadequate state remedies was a dangerous engine that
would overwhelm the federal docket with cases that would not best utilize
"scarce judicial resources." 69
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who chose to speak out against VAWA personally in his capacity as chief administrator of the federal courts, invoked
similar themes. The federal judiciary's "precious" resources should, he
argued, be "reserved for issues where important national interests predominate."70 Rehnquist's only evidence for VAWA's failure to implicate such
interests was that family law "ha[s] traditionally been reserved to state
courts; '.'7 he, too, never denied the seriousness of gender-motivated
violence. But the Chief Justice found this vision of history sufficient to
demonstrate the intrinsically local character of family law. In this light, he
argued that VAWA "would unnecessarily expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts"72 and urged Congress to consider the judiciary's concern
"that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole host of
domestic relations disputes."73
VAWA's advocates attempted to counter this criticism, but ultimately had to limit the bill's civil rights remedy significantly. Emphasizing
that VAWA would only cover violent crimes motivated by gender dishas been argued that Federal action is required because of the inadequacy of State programs
given the fact that the problem persists. We do not find this argument convincing.").
68. Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Sept. 23-24,
1991), reprinted in 1993 Hearing, supra note 61, at 75 (emphasis added).

69. Id.
70. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice's 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THE
THIRD BRANCH (Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts, Wash., D.C.), Jan. 1992, at 1, 2.
71. Id. at 3; see also Remarks of Chief justice Rehnquist, reprinted in 138 CONG. REC. 6186,
6186 (1992) (making same statement).
72. Rehnquist, supra note 70, at 3; see also Remarks of Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note
71, at 6186 (making same statement).
73. Rehnquist, supra note 70, at 3; see also Remarks of Chief Justice Rehnquist, supra note
71, at 6186 (making same statement).
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crimination rather than all violence against women, Joseph Biden, Jr., the
bill's chief sponsor in the Senate, argued that VAWA would be no more
far-reaching than existing civil rights remedies that focus on race.74 "No
one," he noted, "would say today that laws barring violent attacks
motivated by race or ethnicity fall outside the Federal courts' jurisdiction."
"[W]hy," he asked, "are they saying that violent discrimination motivated
by gender is not a traditional civil rights violation?"75 Why didn't the
prevalence of gender-motivated violence, the NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund
added, "argue in favor of, not against, passing legislation to
76
it?
remedy
But the counterargument that "family law" is inherently and exclusively for the states was enormously successful in separating VAWA from
established federal civil rights law. To win a congressional majority,
VAWA's proponents had to restrict the bill's scope substantially. The initial versions of the Act applied to all violent crimes "committed because
of gender or on the basis of gender, 77 and created a statutory presumption
The Senate Judiciary
that this definition included every rape.78
Committee, however, added several important limitations to VAWA's
civil rights remedy in May of 1993 to protect state prerogatives and the
federal docket.79 Most notably, a crime now also had to be "due, at least in
74. See Violence Against Women: Hearing Before theSubcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice
of theHouse Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 8-11 (1992) (testimony of Sen. Biden).
75. Id. at 11 (testimony of Sen. Biden).
76. Prepared Statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and
Education Fund, reprinted in 1993 Hearing, supra note 61, at 12.
77. See, e.g., S.15, 102d Cong. § 301(d)(1) (1991). The committee report noted that this
"definition of gender-motivated crime Iwas] based on title VII which prohibits discrimination in
employment 'because... of sex."' S. REP. No. 102-197, supra note 58, at 50 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2).
78. For instance, the bill that House members were debating immediately prior to the May
1993 compromises provided that a "'crime of violence motivated by the victim's gender." meant,
inter alia, "a crime of violence that is rape (excluding conduct that is characterized as rape solely
by virtue of the ages of the participants), sexual assault, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual contact."
H.R. 1133.IH, 103d Cong. § 301(e)(1) (1993).
At one press conference, Senator Biden explained the presumption in the early versions of
VAWA this way: "If the crime is a consequence of gender motivation, and that predicate can be
laid down in court, then there can be a civil rights action. In almost all rape you'd find that
situation." Press Conference to Release the Report on "The Response to Rape: Detours on the Road
to Equal Justice," May 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUTRN File (statement of
Sen. Biden).
79. See S.11, 103d Cong. (1993) (as amended by Judiciary Committee), reprinted in S. REP.
NO. 103-138, at 2-37 (1993). On May 27, 1993, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably
reported the bill as amended. See 139 CONG. REc. D597 (daily ed. May 27, 1993).
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part, to an animus based on the victim's gender"' and had to rise to the
level of a felony that included risk of injury.S The legislative history
indicated, in addition, that the presumption in favor of covering all rapes
had been eliminated.8 2 With these changes, VAWA became law on
September 13, 1994.8

The Lopez decision in 1995, which identified family law as uniquely
beyond the scope of Congress's commerce power, rendered VAWA's civil
rights remedy particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenge; the statute has been under constant attack since then." But even if the Supreme
80. S.11 § 301(d)(1), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 103-138, supra note 79, at 30. For the final
formulation, see 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(1) (1994) ("[T]he term 'crime of violence motivated by
gender' means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and
due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender ....).
81. See S.11 § 301(d)(2)(A), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 103-138, supra note 79, at 30. The
1993 amended bill and the enacted version of VAWA define crimes rising to the level of
a felony to include acts that state law would otherwise classify as felonious, but demotes
to misdemeanors when committed within the family. See S.11 § 301(d)(2)(B), reprinted in S.
REP. NO. 103-138, supra note 79, at 30 (providing that "term 'crime of violence'.., includes an
act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the
relationship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such
action is taken"); 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (same).
In addition, the May 1993 bill explicitly stated that VAWA did not give the federal government jurisdiction over state law claims "seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony,
equitable distribution of marital property, or child custody decree." S.11 § 301(e)(4), reprinted
in S. REP. No. 103-138, supra note 79, at 30. For the final version, see 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4)
(same text). It further established concurrent jurisdiction in federal and state courts over all civil
rights claims brought under the Act. See S. 11 § 301(e)(3), reprinted in S. REP. No. 103-138,
supra note 79, at 30. For the ultimate codification of this provision, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 13981(e)(3).
82. See S. REP. No. 103-138, supra note 79, at 51 (explaining that VAWA's civil rights
remedy no longer created "a general Federal law for all assaults or rapes against women").
83. See 140 CONG. REC. D1062 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994).
84. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 973-74 (4th
Cir. 1997) (rehearing en banc granted and opinion vacated, Feb. 5, 1998) (upholding constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights remedy under Commerce Clause), rev'g 935 F. Supp. 779, 785801 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding that neither Commerce Clause nor Enforcement Clause
of Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress authority to enact VAWA's civil rights remedy);
Mattison v. Click Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-CV-2736, 1998 WL 32597, at *6 (E.D. Penn. Jan. 27,
1998) (upholding constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights remedy under Commerce
Clause); Crisonino v. New York City Hous. Auth., 985 F. Supp. 385, 396-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(same); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 540 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (same); Seaton v. Seaton, 971
F. Supp. 1188, 1193-95 (E.D. Tenn. 1997) (same); Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp. 1375, 1422-23
(N.D. Iowa 1997) (same), rev'd in part and vacated in part, 134 F.3d 1339, 1341 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that plaintiff failed to state claim that came within scope of VAWA); Doe v. Doe, 929
F. Supp. 608, 610 (D. Conn. 1996) (upholding constitutionality of VAWA's civil rights remedy
under Commerce Clause).
For expressions within this litigation of the notions that family law is inherently local and
that VAWA's civil rights remedy constitutes family law, see Seaton, 971 F. Supp. at 1190-91
("[TIhere is no doubt that violence against women is a serious matter in our society ....[But]
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Court ultimately finds this aspect of VAWA constitutional, the argument
from history for exclusive localism in (what localists describe as) family law
has already achieved a far-reaching victory here. This argument has not
only placed Congress's authority to enact VAWA in question, it has profoundly altered the structure and scope of the statute that we now have.
Faced with claims that VAWA did not fit within federal jurisdiction, the
bill's sponsors both eliminated the presumption in favor of covering all
rapes" and
86 added an "animus" requirement that appears in no other federal
statute. Forming a wedge between the Act and other civil rights legislation, the definition of "animus" is both uncertain and the linchpin determining the ultimate reach of VAWA" What is clear, however, is that
VAWA now covers fewer instances of gender-motivated violence.
As the controversy over the Violence Against Women Act makes
manifest, the scope of historical claims for the inherent and exclusive
localism of family law is as broad and expandable as the reigning definitions of family law itself. Here, as in the Supreme Court's sweeping
statements on family law's place, a purported tradition and implicit assertions of its normative dominance had the power to render all other argument apparently unnecessary.
Indeed, VAWA's critics said hardly
anything in opposition to the bill that was not either an historical account
or the direct result of the premise that history should control.
Throughout the debate over federalism and family law, appeals to a
supposedly clear past exert enormous force in maintaining family law as the
[t]he framers of the Constitution did not intend for the federal courts to play host to domestic
disputes and invade the well-established authority of the sovereign states."); Doe, 929 F. Supp. at
615-16 ("Defendant... argues that enactment of the VAWA encroaches on traditional police
powers of the state and impermissibly 'federalizes' criminal [law], family law, and state tort law.");
Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 793 ("Family law issues and most criminal issues affect the national
economy substantially and in turn have some effect on interstate commerce. These too have
interstate travel implications. However, to extend Congress's power to these issues would unreasonably tip the balance away from the states.").
In addition, one district court, in an opinion the Eighth Circuit has since reversed, held that
the federal commerce power does not reach the provision of VAWA, 18 U.S.C. § 2 262(a)(1)
(1994), that makes it a federal crime to cross state lines with the intent to violate a protective

order and then to violate that order. See United States v. Wright, 965 F. Supp. 1307, 1315 (D.
Neb. 1997), rev'd, 128 F.3d 1274, 1274-76 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1376 (1998).
85.

See supra note 82.

86. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Gender Motivation and the Violence Against Women Act: A
New Chapter in Federal Civil Rights Law 24 (Mar. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with

author).
87. In its sole discussion of "animus," the 1993 Senate Judiciary Committee Report states:
"This new language elucidates the committee's intent that a victim alleging a violation under
this section must have been targeted on the basis of his or her gender. The defendant must have
had a specific intent or purpose, based on the victim's gender, to injure the victim." S. REP. No.
103-138, supra note 79, at 64.
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paragon of localism and in defeating or discouraging federal involvement.
There is a deep question, which I will address in Part IV, about the weight
and scope that history can legitimately assume when federalism is at issue.
But even if one accepts the historical model that courts and commentators
have uncritically put forward, Parts II and III reveal that past practice is
much more complicated than current discourse suggests. To the extent
that arguments for exclusive localism in family law intend to derive their
ultimate persuasive force from tradition alone, the examined past strips
such claims of firm grounding.
As I will explain more fully below, Reconstruction provides a fruitful
vantage point for examining the historical record of family law and federalism. Indeed, it was the culmination of a multigenerational and national
debate that was precisely about the federal government's power to regulate
family law, as both modem and nineteenth-century Americans would
understand that term. Many nineteenth-century Americans defined slavery itself as a domestic relation. But one need not take that view to see
Reconstruction as a mammoth struggle over federal intervention into family law. Reconstruction put into issue the legal prohibitions on family formation that helped constitute American slavery-family law as late
twentieth-century Americans would define it. Yet, as Part I1documents,
there was no shared sense during Reconstruction that family law-even
in the modern sense-was set apart and quintessentially local. To the contrary, Reconstruction's advocates were determined to extend federal protection to family rights, and a large majority of their critics agreed that the
federal government had jurisdiction to intervene in family law if it wished.
The only significant argument that Reconstruction Congressmen offered
for preserving exclusive localism in family law was a policy concern that is
now constitutionally illegitimate under the very Fourteenth Amendment
that these men opposed: The representatives who sought to leave family
law to the states claimed that federal intervention would threaten social
segregation between the races and coverture within the marital relation.
Such arguments were defeated, however, and the Reconstruction Congress
quickly altered the family law governing the freedmen. In fact, these same
Congressmen simultaneously pursued an extraordinarily popular campaign
against polygamy, creating in the process another federal family law. The
place of family law in the federal system was so unfixed at Reconstruction
that localist pronouncements appeared late and only hesitatingly even in
opinions reviewing the postwar legality of state bans on interracial
marriage, where the pressure to protect state prerogatives reached its peak.
Moreover, Part III should dash any hopes that one can find a post-
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Reconstruction history of invariable localism free from constitutionally
illicit motivations. Although the power of arguments from history has
done much to mask it, modem federal family law is far-reaching.

1I.

THE CONSENSUS ON FEDERAL JURISDICTION
AT RECONSTRUCTION

Reconstruction as Crux

A.

The dominant historical understanding of the Civil War and Reconstruction interprets slavery in terms of race and not family law.M But to
many nineteenth-century Americans, especially Southerners, slavery was a
domestic relation. For decades before the Civil War, opponents of federal
intervention into slavery made this point consistently. 9 Although never
ignoring race, they importantly framed the legitimacy of federal antislavery
efforts as turning on whether the federal government could regulate the
family law of the states. Reconstruction was the culmination of a massive,
wrenching, and multigenerational debate over the federal government's
ability to govern domestic relations, as nineteenth-century Americans
understood that term. And by disestablishing slavery, the federal government dramatically reshaped one of the nineteenth century's most
important domestic relations.
But one need not accept the nineteenth-century definition of slavery
as a domestic relation in order to recognize the Civil War and Reconstruction as tremendous federal interventions into state family law. The
forms of subordination and unfreedom that constituted chattel slavery in
the United States involved profound restrictions on family relations, as we
can understand that term today. Slavery denied its victims the legal right
to marry and to be recognized as the parents of their children, and stripped
them of the legal prerogatives associated with these family roles. For years
before the Civil War, abolitionists focused on this family law within slavery
and called for federal intervention on the ground of its horror alone. The
debate over slavery and its eradication importantly entailed a struggle over
the right of slaves to form families that the law would respect. The congressional architects of Reconstruction understood that disestablishing the
family law within slavery was a necessary part of abolishing the institution,
and therefore specifically granted the former slaves marital and parental
rights, fundamentally altering state family law in the modem sense.
88. See infra notes 141-142.
89.

See infra text accompanying notes 105-118.
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At a moment when the relationship between state and nation was
importantly reshaped for modernity, Reconstruction was the site of
sustained and reflective deliberation over the role of the federal
government in family law, both as this category is understood today and as
it was understood in nineteenth-century locution. Although it was likely
the first such major conversation in our history, this aspect of
Reconstruction has remained unexamined. Indeed, Reconstruction is now
frequently taken to be a crucial episode in the tradition of federal
noninvolvement in family law. 9° Certainly, Reconstruction is not the only
possible point of inquiry into the dual propositions that family law has
always been exclusively local in the United States and that history should
control family law's future status in the federal system; who knows what
one might discover in the New Deal or the War on Poverty, for instance.
But Reconstruction is one of the most interesting vantage points from
which to examine the claims from tradition for localism, and it demands
closer scrutiny.
In contrast, for instance, the Founding's great discourse on federalstate relations hardly speaks to family law and the arguments identifying
it as particularly local. Family law may have been firmly local at the
nation's inception, but the Framers did little to distinguish family law, as
we could define that term today. Instead, the men who participated in the
original constitutional debates left most subjects to the states and devoted
scant attention to the family. While the Framers did devote significant
thought to state control over slavery, their conversation took place several
decades before slavery came to be commonly understood as a domestic
relation and was instead shaped by the shared recognition that the South
never would have agreed to a Constitution that did not protect the peculiar
institution.9 '

Although the Founders assumed that family law was for the states,
they thought the same about almost everything else. These men rarely saw
the need to mention the family,92 and there is little reason to suspect that
90. See infra note 142.
91.

See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF

THE CONSTITUTION 70-74 (1996); infra text accompanying notes 374-375.
92. See Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual PrivacyBalancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 571 (1983) ("The silence of
the Constitution on the entire subject of the family does not tell us that marriage and family
were unimportant to the founders; it tells us, rather, that the Founders consciously accepted the
regulation of family life embodied in [state law and state courts]."); Linda K. Kerber, The Paradox

of Women's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin vs. Massachusetts, 1805, 97 AM.
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the Framers ever contemplated national regulation of family law.93 Their
highly scattered references to family law, and the interrelated laws of
devise, take local jurisdiction over family law-the usual practice of the
British Empire94-as a given and make clear that the issue had yet to
become contested. 95 Yet this hardly marked family law as special at the
Founding.
The Constitution formed a national union far more powerful than
anything the Articles of Confederation would have allowed, 96 but the
authority the nascent national government exercised was as limited as it
HIST. REV. 349, 351 (1992) ("The generation of men who radically transgressed inherited
understandings of the relationship between kings and men, fathers and sons, and who radically
reconstructed many basic elements of law, nevertheless refused to destabilize the law governing
relations between husbands and wives, mothers and children."); Sylvia A. Law, The Founders on
Families, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987) ("Virtually nothing in the original constitutional
debates directly addresses the situation of women and families ....
").
93. It is nonetheless quite interesting to note that the American Revolutionaries often used
familial analogies to describe their separation from England. As Linda Kerber has explained:
The rhetoric of the revolution positioned the colonists as sons who had outgrown patriarchal constraint and as adult men unfairly enslaved by the British. But republican
ideology did not eliminate the political father immediately and completely; rather, it
held a liberal ideology of individualism in ambivalent tension with the old ideology of
patriarchy. Thus George Washington quickly became the "father of his country"; at the
Governor's Palace in Williamsburg, Virginia, the life-size portrait of George III was
quickly replaced by a life-size portrait of Washington in the same pose.
Kerber, supra note 92, at 351. Moreover, the consignment of family law to the purview of state
regulation did not prevent state courts from developing a body of family law that was fairly uniform across the nation. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE
FAMILY INNINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 295-96 (1985).
94. See 2 GEORGE E. HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 331-49,
368-69, 371,373 (1904) (discussing colonial courts' jurisdiction over divorce and alimony).
95. Alexander Hamilton, for instance, assured one ratifying convention that the Constitution would not "penetrate the recesses of domestic life, and control, in all respects, the private
conduct of individuals." 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 268 (photo. reprint 1941) (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
1836). In the FederalistPapers, Hamilton also twice mentioned "the law of descent" as an example of state regulation that the federal government could and would not disturb. THE
FEDERALIST No. 33, at 204 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 29, at 183 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Tench Coxe, a
far less prominent Federalist writing in support of ratification, similarly noted that the states
would continue to "regulate descents and marriages" under the federal Constitution. Tench
Coxe, A Freeman II, PA. GAZETTE, Jan. 30, 1788, reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 508, 510 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J.
Saladino eds., 1984).
96. Indeed, the Federalist Papers began with the explicit premise that the loose bonds of
union in the Articles of Confederation had proven wholly unworkable. See THE FEDERALIST No.

1, at 37 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("For nothing can be more evident
to those who are able to take an enlarged view of the subject than the alternative of an adoption
of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the Union.").
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was important. 7 Although the Framers meant to create a government
strong and supple enough to respond to the changing demands of the
nation," federal power at the Founding hardly extended beyond the right
to tax, to conduct foreign relations, and to regulate interstate commerce,99
with the federal commerce power understood so narrowly that the Framers
debated whether it covered interstate roads.' ' While the Founders
97.

As H. Jefferson Powell has found:
The text of the Constitution and the ratification-era debates over its interpretation
both seemed to confirm that the new federal government was a government with
"certain enumerated objects only," not a purely national government with substantive
jurisdiction over all matters "so far as they are objects of lawful Government."
H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 664 (1993)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 256 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). Jack
Balkin has similarly noted that:
The degree of federal intrusion into the states' police powers today is much greater than
even the most ardent nationalist living in 1787 would have imagined. Even Hamilton,
Marshall, and Story, in their most unbridled assertions of national power, would not
have contended that the Constitution created the equivalent of a general federal police
power whose operation could displace virtually any contrary state economic policy at
will.
J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretationand the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 925
(1988) (book review).
98. See Powell, supra note 97, at 665 ("[Bloth the text and the Federalists' ratification
arguments made plain the intention of creating a central government with sufficient power and
sufficient flexibility to address the needs of the Union as a whole.").
99. The Federalist Papers frequently stressed that "the objects of federal legislation" would
largely be confined to "commerce, taxation, and the militia." THE FEDERALIST No. 56, at 34647 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 118
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (listing "[ciommerce, finance, negotiation,
and war"). Article I, section 10, the provision of the Constitution that explicitly prohibits certain state action, reflects these boundaries. It reads:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and
silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law,
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or
Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws
shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in
such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
100. During the Philadelphia convention and the ratification debates, both opponents and
supporters of the Constitution assumed that interstate roads would necessarily remain under the
states' exclusive jurisdiction. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the ConstitutionalConvention and in ContemporaryComment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432,478-80 (1941).
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assumed exclusive localism in family law, their constitutional debates also
never mention the pervasive administrative law and economic regulation, on subjects ranging from antitrust and securities to employment to
health and safety, now within federal jurisdiction. As James Madison
explained the Framers' understanding in the FederalistPapers, "[tihe powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite.... extend[ing] to all the objects which, in
the ordinary course, of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of
the people."'0 '
Given this premise, arguments from history cannot reasonably hope to
establish that family law is particularlylocal by using the Founding as their
base. It was'not until decades later that the nation faced a much more
viable choice between federal and state jurisdiction. Only during the
nineteenth-century struggle over slavery and its eradication, did family
law's place in the federal system emerge as a topic of sustained and
thoughtful debate. Only then, did volumes of speech replace almost
uninterrupted silence.'0 2
In 1817, President James Madison vetoed a bill setting aside funds for the construction of
roads and canals on the ground that "[tihe power to regulate commerce among the several
States' can not include a power to construct roads and canals.., without a latitude of construction departing from the ordinary import of the terms." James Madison, Message to the U.S.
House of Representatives (Mar. 3, 1817), reprinted in JEFFERSON POWELL, LANGUAGES OF
POWER: A SOURCEBOOK OF EARLY AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 313, 313 (1991).
Almost a century after the Founding, the Supreme Court recognized this original understanding of the Commerce Clause, noting:
The navigable waters of the earth are recognized public highways of trade and intercourse ....But it is different with transportation by land. This, when the Constitution
was adopted, was entirely performed on common roads, and in vehicles drawn by animal
power. No one at that day imagined that the roads and bridges of the country (except
when the latter crossed navigable streams) were not entirely subject, both as to their
construction, repair, and management, to State regulation and control.
Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 456, 470 (1875); see also Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 568, 574 (1853) (holding that Commerce Clause excludes control over turnpikes).
101. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[The federal
government's] jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several
States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.").
102. As Richard Fallon has observed, "political preconceptions and preferences" often influence which historical events people select as relevant to federalism debates, with "federalists"
emphasizing the Founding alone and "nationalists" stressing the Founding as well as the Civil
War and Reconstruction. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of FederalCourts Law, 74 VA. L.
REV. 1141, 1144, 1148 (1988). Fallon faults both of these models for "their role in producing
an internally conflicted and contradictory body of law," concluding that each is "too extreme in
[its] exclusion of the other's insights." Id. at 1150. 1 am inclined to agree; the claims about
family law's particular localism guided my decision not to focus on the Founding.
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Antebellum Context: Race and Family Law Intertwined

The general historical view of Reconstruction presents emancipation
as a story of race relations and not family law.'0 3 According to the few
scholars who have considered family law's place in Reconstruction at all,
Congress walked a fine line between race and family law, never allowing
itself to encroach upon the latter.' ° While neat, this story masks how
Reconstruction was understood and experienced at the time. For the
Americans who lived through the Civil War and Reconstruction, slavery
and abolitionism were also about family law and the federal government's
ability to intervene in state family codes.
Forces on both sides of the slavery question had been making this
connection for years before the Civil War broke out. Slavery's defenders
argued against federal involvement in the institution on the ground that
slavery was a domestic relation. They emphasized the links between slavery and "other" family relations in order to tie their fates together, hoping
to associate the two subjects so closely that Northern men uncomfortable
about slavery would curb their expressions of disapproval in order to protect the "rest" of family law from similar leveling. Always denying abolitionist charges that they had actual and close biological ties to their slaves,' 5
103. See infra note 141. For the most remarkable recent account exposing scholars' systemic
blindness to the role of black women in Reconstruction, see Barbara Y. Welke, When AU the
Women Were White, and All the Blacks Were Men: Gender, Class, Race, and the Road to Plessy,
1855-1914, 13 LAW & HIST. REV. 261 (1995) (uncovering lost history of predominantly female
challenges to racial segregation in public transportation in years before Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896)).
104. See infra note 142.
105.

See KAREN SANCHEZ-EPPLER, TOUCHING LIBERTY: ABOLITION, FEMINISM, AND THE

POLITICS OF THE BODY 101 (1993) ("Abolitionist writings consistently offer the light-skinned
child of the slave woman as proof of the miscegenating economy of slavery, so that the child
stands as evidence of the gap between plantation life and the ideology of the sacrosanct bourgeois family."); HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN; OR, LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY
107, 178, 182, 548 (Ann Douglas ed., 1981) (1852); Frances H. Green, The Slave-Wife, in
LIBERTY CHIMES 81, 87 (Providence, Ladies Anti-Slavery Society 1845) (recounting story of
slave woman who "was white. At least no one would suspect that she had any African blood
in her veins."). Abolitionist Lydia Maria Child reported that she had
been told of a young physician who went into the far Southern states to settle, and there
became in love with a very handsome and modest girl, who lived at service. He married
her; and about a year after that event, a gentleman called at the house and announced
himself as Mr. J*******y, of Mobile. He said to Dr. W*****, "Sir, I have a trifling
affair of business to settle with you. You have married a slave of mine." The young
physician resented the language; for he had not entertained the slightest suspicion that
the girl had any other than white ancestors since the flood. But Mr. J. furnished proof
of his claim .... [When the husband informed his wife of her purchase] the poor woman
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slave owners contended, nevertheless, that the master-slave relationship
was best understood as a familial connection operating along the same
tenets of hierarchy, dependency, and intimacy that governed ties amongst
white relatives. In turn, antislavery advocates denounced the gulf between
the basic rights that white families took for granted and the familial
conditions that slaves endured. Where articulate Southerners redefined
family law to include the institution of slavery as a whole, abolitionists focused on what late twentieth-century observers would consider to
be the family law within slavery. They argued for federal intervention on
the ground that the South's purportedly familial institution denied slaves
the legal right to be recognized as spouses and parents, and the legal
opportunity to enjoy the prerogatives associated with these familial
positions. The struggle over the federal government's role in regulating
family law pervaded the antebellum debate over slavery, no matter which
definition of family law one accepted and which view of slavery one took.
1.

The Antebellum Proslavery Discourse on the Family

As tension mounted between North and South, slaveholders came to
commonly describe slaves as part of their owners' families, embedded in
hierarchical relations of dependency and mutual obligation that paralleled,
precisely but at a lower level, those governing bonds between white men
and their wives and legitimate children. This vision sought to justify the
slave system normatively by describing it as grounded on the
"fundamental" principle "that all living on the plantation, whether colored
or not, are members of the same family."1'' In this view, Southern slavery
was "a patriarchal, social system. The master [was] the head of his family.
Next to wife and children, he care[d] for his slaves. He avenge[d] their
burst into tears and said, "That as Mr. J. was her own father, she had hoped that when he
heard she had found an honorable protector, he would have left her in peace."
LYDIA MARIA CHILD, ANTI-SLAVERY CATECHISM 17 (Newburyport, Charles Whipple 1836).
106. Foby, Management of Servants, S. CULTIVATOR, Aug. 1853, at 226-28, reprinted in
ADVICE AMONG MASTERS: THE IDEAL IN SLAVE MANAGEMENT IN THE OLD SOUTH 305,

306

(James 0. Breeden ed., 1980). Foby's article, published in a prominent southern agricultural
journal, soon generated a largely favorable response from another southern planter who agreed
that:
The plan of uniting all under one family or fraternity is not only an evidence of kind-

ness and humanity, but I [Floyd] view it as a duty due to the servant, that he may feel
that he is not a dumb brute but that his master looks upon him as a human being,
capable of giving and receiving kindness, and feels a wish that they work for each

other's benefit.
Floyd, Management of Servants, S. CULTIVATOR, Oct. 1853, at 301, reprinted in ADVICE AMONG
MASTERS, supra; at 312, 312.
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injuries, protect[ed] their persons, provide[d] for their wants, and guide[d]
their labors. In return, he [was] revered and held as protector and master."'0 7 On this theory of family law, Southern statutory codes classified the
bond between master and slave as a domestic relation.' °s
As early as the 1820 congressional debate over the admission of Missouri to the union, proslavery advocates had elaborated this claim for slavery as a domestic relation into a specific political argument against federal
intervention. By the start of this first major battle over the expansion of
slavery into the West, Southern Congressmen were already including slavery with the family in the private domain, and already associating such
privacy with state control on the ground that federal interference in this
realm would inevitably disrupt not only the peculiar institution itself, but
also the hierarchical foundation of present relations between white husbands and wives, and white parents and children. In supporting Missouri's
admission as a slave state, Representative Alexander Smyth of Virginia
107. 1 THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at ccxviii (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1858). A

future Confederate officer similarly explained that:
The Slave Institution at the South, increases the tendency to dignify the family.
Each planter is in fact a Patriarch-his position compels him to be a ruler in his household. From early youth, his children and servants look up to him as the head, and
obedience and subordination become important elements of education. Where so many
depend upon one will, Society necessarily assumes the Hebrew form. Domestic relations become those which are most prized-each family recognises its duty, and its
members feel a responsibility for its discharge. The Fifth Commandment becomes the
foundation of Society. The State is looked to only as the ultimate head in external
relations, while all internal duties, such as support, education, and the relative duties of
individuals, are left to domestic regulation.
C.G. MEMMINGER, LECTURE DELIVERED BEFORE THE YOUNG MEN'S LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, OF
AUGUSTA, APRIL IOTH, 1851, at 14-15 (Augusta, Ga., W.S. Jones 1851). Along the same lines,
George Fitzhugh, aprominent if extreme defender of slavery, observed that women, children, and
slaves were "everywhere the subjects of family government.... [SIlaves, wives and children have
no other government; they do not come directly in contact with the institutions and rulers of the
State." GEORGE FITZHUGH, SOCIOLOGY FOR THE SOUTH, OR THE FAILURE OF FREE SOCIETY 105
(Richmond, A. Morris 1854); see also State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 265 (1829) ("[The
master-slave relation has been compared] to the other domestic relations... [such as] the parent
over the child...."); Sarter v. Gordon, 11 S.C. Eq. (2 Hill Eq.) 121, 135 (1835) ("[In almost]
every instance where a slave has been reared in a family, there exists a mutual attachment
between the members of it and himself. The tie of master and slave is one of the most intimate
relations of society.").
108. See PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND
THE LAW INTHE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH, at xi (1995). For more on the familial analogy
in proslavery thought, see generally ELIZABETH FOX-GENOVESE, WITHIN THE PLANTATION
HOUSEHOLD: BLACK AND WHITE WOMEN OF THE OLD SOUTH 100-02,131-34 (1988); EUGENE
D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 73-75 (1974); Margaret
A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5 LAW & INEQ. J. 187, 191-95
(1987).
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dwelled on the intimacy slavery supposedly engendered.
Without
mentioning the legal and political structure that kept slaves bound to their
masters, he presented the relationship between slaveholder and slave as
beyond the reach of proper federal involvement because essentially familial
and wholly personal. "Will," Smyth asked,
you compel the citizen of Kentucky, the wants of whose children
require more lands, when he is about to remove to Missouri, to sell
the nurse who has fed his children from her breast, the faithful man
who has long attended on his person, the maids of his wife and
daughters, and the little children born in his family, before he can
remove to the country of his choice? Yes; this you propose to do; yet
talk of your humanity!
Senator Nicholas Van Dyke of Delaware warned even more explicitly
that federal limitations on slavery threatened the same privacy that
shielded the patriarchal relationships defining the white family.1 As he
explained, the scope of domestic relations was well understood: "They are
those of husband and wife-to which happily succeeds that of parent and
child, too often followed by that of guardian and ward; with all which is
connected that of master and servant, either by voluntary or involuntary
servitude.""' All of these bonds, Van Dyke continued, "exist in the bosom
of the family, in the humble walks of private life, and have no connexion with the general political interests of the Union."' n Each, Van
Dyke argued in an age before the South's defeat convinced even slavery's
109. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 1010 (1820) (statement of Rep. Smyth). Representative John
Sergeant of Pennsylvania soon rose to challenge the "[g]entlemen of the South, particularly those
from Virginia, who speak of their slaves as a part of their family." Id. at 1215. As he noted, the
admission of Missouri as a slave state would surely stimulate the domestic slave market. Then
slave families would experience the real family separations:
The ties of domestic life will be violently rent asunder, and those whom nature has
bound together, suffer all the pangs of an unnatural and cruel separation. Unfeeling
force, stimulated by unfeeling avarice, will tear the parent from the child, and the child
from the parent-the husband from the wife, and the wife from the husband.
Id. (statement of Rep. Sergeant).
110. See id. at 308-09 (statement of Sen. Van Dyke). Representative Louis McLane of
Delaware similarly contended (four decades before the Civil War radically expanded everyone's
conception of the scope of federal power) that the exact same logic preventing federal involvement in marital and parental relations barred Congress from outlawing slavery in Missouri:
Could we say that property should not descend to all the children equally, or not devisable by will? Could we define the marital rights, or establish certain relations between
parent and child, guardian and ward, or master and servant? No one can pretend that
we could, and for the plain reason that they are objects of municipal power, of which we
are entirely destitute. The relation of master and slave is but a domestic relation ....
Id. at 1152 (statement of Rep. McLane).
111. id. at 309 (statement of Sen. Van Dyke).
112. Id. (statement of Sen. Van Dyke).
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defenders that Congress could regulate the family," 3 was protected from
federal interference by the principle that the federal government's
constitutional mandate did not extend to "the internal regulations, the
private or domestic concerns of the States....4 Each would be endangered if
that principle was breached for antislavery. "If," Van Dyke reasoned,
Congress [could] regulate one, why not all of these domestic relations? They all stand on the same level, and if one be within the
grasp of [congressional] power, what shall exempt or protect the rest?
Even the contract of marriage, and the period of release from guardianship may become the subject of discussion in some future
Congress, on the admission of some future State. 15If such a power
exists, who shall stay its hand or prescribe its limits?
Indeed, Senator William Pinkney of Maryland predicted-almost three
decades before the appearance of an organized woman's movement' "-that
antislavery's proposed invasion of domestic privacy in the name of republicanism would lead "some romantic reformer, treading in the footsteps of
Mrs. Wolstonecraft, [to] propose to repeal our republican law salique, and
claim for our wives and daughters a full participation in political power."' 7
Pinkney was "no friend to female government," but "if it be true that all
the men in a republican Government must help to wield its power, and be
equal in rights," he queried, "why not all the women? ... Why is it that
their exclusion from the power of a popular Government is not destructive
of its republican character?"1' ' The proslavery argument that federal anti113. See infra text accompanying notes 190-195.
114. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 308 (1820) (statement of Sen. Van Dyke).
115. Id. at 309 (statement of Sen. Van Dyke). By 1858, this type of argument had proven so
successful (in some quarters) that the premier treatise on the law of slavery confidently concluded "that the right of each State to regulate for itself its domestic relations, so far as this
question is concerned, seems now to be acknowledged by the statesmen of the country; and that,
hence, the existence of slavery in a State is no ground for rejecting its admission into the
Union." 1 COBB, supra note 107, at ccx (citing, inter alia, Dred Scott v. Sandford).
116. See sources cited infra note 176.
117. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 413 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney). A "law salique" is a
legal code that bars women from inheriting land or succeeding to the throne. See RANDOM
HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1693-94 (Stuart Berg Flexner ed., 2d ed. 1987) (definitions
of "Salique" and "Salic law").
118. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 413 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney). Along the same lines,
Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky suggested that applying rigorous republican reasoning
to the slavery question would threaten the legal subordination of women and children:
In what way, I would ask, is the just principle of representation violated, by taking
three-fifths of the slaves into the calculation? The answer is given, because slaves have
no political rights. And what political rights have the female and the minor? ... In
the one case no complaint is made, but in the other injustice is urged. Every argument,
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slavery efforts would threaten the private hierarchies of both race and family law was well developed long before the onset of the Civil War, and
would blossom again after the South's defeat.
2.

Abolitionists on the Family Law of Slavery
. This proslavery discourse had a directly analogous counterpart
in the
abolitionist critique of the treatment of families under slavery. Notwithstanding the common nineteenth-century view that slavery was itself a
domestic relation, chattel slavery as practiced in the Southern states
entailed severe restrictions on family formation, as we can understand that
term today. American slaves had no right to marry 9 and no legal claim to
their children.2 Every slave state permitted the forced separation of slave
true or false, must be brought to bear upon this subject; which, in the end, will effect
nothing, and is,in fact, worse than nothing.
... The fact is, we shall be better employed in confining ourselves to the great
objects of the Confederacy, and leave every State to manage its own concerns.
Id. at 356-57 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
119. See, e.g., Opinion of Daniel Dulany, 1 H. & McH. 559, 563 (Md. 1767) ("1 adopt the
rule of the civil law... that slaves are incapable of marriage."); Howard v. Howard, 51 N.C. (6
Jones) 235, 239 (1858) ("The relation between slaves is essentially different from that of man
and wife joined in lawful wedlock."); Andrews v. Page, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 653, 660 (1871)
("[l]t was generally held, in the slaveholding States, that the marriage of slaves was
utterly ... void...."); WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 106 (Negro Univ. Press, photo. reprint 1968) (1853) (abolitionist legal scholar reporting that "'[a] slave cannot even contract matrimony, the association which takes place among
slaves, and is caled marriage, being properly designated by the word contubernium, a relation
which has no sanctity, and to which no civil rights are attached' (citation omitted)). Only one
Southern court ever held that slave marriages had any legal effect. See Girod v. Lewis, 6 Mart.
(O.S.) 559, 559-60 (La. 1819). Southern jurists widely denounced the 1819 Louisiana Supreme
Court decision, and the Louisiana legislature overturned it in 1825. See GROSSBERG, supra note
93, at 130-31.
Southern lawyers and judges developed a two-part justification for the ban on legal slave
marriages. First, they contended that slave marriages were impossible because slaves had no legal
ability to consent. See, e.g., 1 COBB, supra note 107, at 242-43 (proslavery authority on slavery
law reporting that "[tihe inability of the slave to contract extends to the marriage contract, and
hence there is no recognized marriage relation in law between slaves"). Second, they argued that
slaves could not marry because their marital rights and duties would conflict with their
obligations to their masters. See Frank & Lucy v. Denham's Adm'r, 15 Ky. (5 Litt.) 330,
331 (1824) (noting that slaves could not fulfill their marital responsibilities without doing
violence to slaveholders' rights); 1 COBB, supra note 107, at 246 ("[T]o fasten upon a master of a
female slave, a vicious, corrupting negro, sowing discord, and dissatisfaction among all his slaves;
or else a thief, or a cut-throat, and to provide no relief against such a nuisance, would be to make
the holding of slaves a curse to the master."); GROSSBERG, supra note 93, at 130-31.
120. See, e.g., Frazier v. Spear, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 385, 386 (1811) (finding that "the father of a
slave is unknown to our law"). In denying the parental rights of slave mothers, a South Carolina
court placed "the young of slaves ... on the same footing as other animals." M'Vaughters v.

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1329 1997-1998

1330

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1297 (1998)

families,' and the best evidence suggests that approximately one in six
slave marriages ended in involuntary separation.'2 2 Rather than submergElder, 4 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 7, 12 (1809). Angelina Grimk6, a prominent abolitionist, made the
same point to opposite effect. Slave parents, she reported, were
almost never consulted as to the disposition to be made of their children; they [had] as
little control over them, as have domestic animals over the disposal of their young.
Every natural and social feeling and affection [was] violated with indifference; slaves
[were] treated as though they did not possess them.
Testimony of Angelina Grimk6 Weld, in TIMOTHY DWIGHT WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY As IT
IS: TESTIMONY OF A THOUSAND WITNESSES 52, 56-57 (Arno Press 1969) (1839).
121. See, e.g., Cannon v. Jenkins, 16 N.C. (1 Dev. Eq.) 376, 379 (1830) ("Most commonly
the articles [slaves] sell best, singly; and therefore they ought, in general, to be so offered.");
Howard, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) at 239 ("The relation between slaves is essentially different from that
of man and wife joined in lawful wedlock .... [W]ith slaves it may be dissolved at the pleasure of
either party, or by the sale of one or both, depending on the caprice or necessity of the owners.");
Lawrence v. Speed, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 401, 404 (1811) ("[It cannot be denied to be in general true
that it is the duty of the sheriff to sell separately property [a slave mother and her child] which is
divisible in its nature...."); Lee v. Fellowes & Co., 49 Ky. (10 B. Mon.) 117, 119 (1849) ("A
[court] sale [of slaves] in gross would be often detrimental to the best interests of debtor and
creditor, and ought not to be countenanced .... ); McLane v. Spence, 6 Ala. 894, 895, 897
(1844) (observing in reference to "a man and his wife and ten children" that "it could not be tolerated that twelve slaves, most of whom were grown, should be sold in one lot").
However, Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana prohibited (at least officially) some sales separating mothers from their very young children. In 1806, Louisiana outlawed the selling of
children under the age of ten apart from their mothers. See 1 DIGESTE GENERAL DES ACTES
DE LA LtGISLATURE DE LA LOUISANE Code Noir § 9, at 221 (L. Moreau Lislet ed., New Orleans,
Benjamin Levy 1828) (approved June 7, 1806); see also Childers v. Johnson, 6 La. Ann. 634, 639
(1851) (basing holding on this 1806 statute). In 1829, Louisiana extended the ban to out-ofstate slave children. See An Act relative to the introduction of Slaves in this State, and for other
purposes, in ACTS PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE NINTH LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF

LOUISIANA no. 24, §§ 15-16 (approved Jan. 31, 1829); see also Kellar v. Fink, 3 La. Ann. 17
(1848) (voiding sale based on statutes of June 7, 1806 and Jan. 31, 1829). In 1852, Alabama
required creditors seizing a slaveholder's assets to sell slave children under ten with their mothers, unless the child was five or older and one of the parties to the action produced an affidavit
showing that "his interest [would] be materially prejudiced, by selling the slaves together." THE
CODE OF ALABAMA § 2056, at 392 (John J. Ormond et al. comp., Montgomery, Brittan & De
Wolf 1852), reprinted in A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 189
(Willie Lee Rose ed., 1976). Similarly, an 1854 Georgia law provided that probate sales should
sell children "not exceeding five years" with their mothers, but made an exception when "such
division cannot in any wise be effected without such separation." An Act to regulate the sale
and division of Slaves, in certain cases therein named, in COMPILATION OF THE GENERAL AND
PUBLIC STATUTES OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA no. 171, § 1 (Howell Cobb ed., New York,
Edward 0. Jenkins 1859) (approved Feb. 18, 1854).
122. Herbert Gutman's analysis of the information that nine thousand Mississippi and
northern Louisiana freedmen gave to Union army clergy registering their marriages found "that
about one in six (or seven) slave marriages were ended by force or sale." HERBERT G. GUTMAN,
THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925, at 318 (1976). John Blassingame's

study of marriage certificates for emancipated slaves that the Union army and the Freedmen's
Bureau collected in Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi between 1864 and 1866 found that
slaveholders had terminated 32.4% of the 2888 analyzed slave marriages. See JOHN W.
BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 175-

77, 341, 361 tbl.17 (2d ed. 1979). Working with an 1878 survey of the black households in one
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ing such violations into their campaign against slavery as a political, economic, and racial institution, abolitionists devoted tremendous time and
energy to denouncing the family law within slavery. They called for federal
intervention on the ground that slavery denied slaves the ability to form
legally recognized family relationships and to enjoy the rights associated
with familial status.1
Throughout the 1830s, a portrait of a slave family about to be
wrenched apart on the auction block dominated the masthead of the Liberator, the preeminent antislavery newspaper.'24 Abolitionist speakers
wanted their audiences to imagine how they would feel if their "wife, the
partner of [their] bosom, the mother of [their] babes" were "ruthlessly
snatched" from them and their "beloved children stolen before [their]
eyes."'25 Indeed, the Liberator'sfirst issue asked:
Art thou a parent? shall thy children be

Rent from thy breast, like branches from the tree,
And doom'd to servitude, in helplessness, 2 6
On other shores, and thou ask no redress?

Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin (1852),127 the best seller

of the nineteenth century 28 and in many ways the culmination of the
southern Virginia town, Jo Ann Manfra and Robert R. Dykstra reported that over one-third
(35.3%) of the town's terminated slave marriages had ended in forced separation. See Jo Ann
Manfra & Robert R. Dykstra, Serial Marriage and the Origins of the Black Stepfamily: The Rowanty
Evidence, 72 J.AM. HIST. 18, 32-33 (1985). In addition, one study of slave women in Georgia
found that more than half of the mothers apparently lived apart from their husbands. However,
this study did not differentiate between widows, women whose husbands lived nearby, and
women whose husbands had been sold away. See Betty Wood, Some Aspects of Female Resistance
to Chattel Slavery in Low Country Georgia, 1763-1815, 30 HIST. J.603, 609 (1987).
123. For abolitionist condemnation of the forced separation of slave families at auction, see,
e.g., [GEORGE WASHINGTON CARLETON], THE SUPPRESSED BOOK ABOUT SLAVERY! (William
Loren Katz ed., Arno Press 1968) (1864); JOHN THEOPHILUS KRAMER, THE SLAVE-AUCTION
(Boston, Robert F. Wallcut 1859); [MORTIMER THOMSON], WHAT BECAME OF THE SLAVES ON
A GEORGIA PLANTATION? GREAT AUCTION SALE OF SLAVES, AT SAVANNAH, GEORGIA,
MARCH 2D & 3D, 1859, at 16 (n.p. 1863) (describing separation at sale of Jeffrey and Dorcas,
two young slaves who "had told their loves, had exchanged their simple vows, and were
betrothed, each to the other as dear, and each by the other as fondly beloved as though their
skins had been of fairer color"); WELD, supra note 120, at 167, 174.
124. See, e.g., LIBERATOR, Apr. 23, 1831, at 1 (masthead's first appearance).
125. REVEREND PETER RANDOLPH, SKETCHES OF SLAVE LIFE: OR, ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE
'PECULIAR INSTITUTION' 70-71 (Maxwell Whiteman ed., Afro-American History Series No.
234, photo. reprint 1969) (1855).
126. The Salutation, LIBERATOR, Jan. 1, 1831, at 1, 1.
127. STOWE, supra note 105.
128. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 89 (1988)
(noting that Uncle Tom's Cabin is "the best seller of all time in proportion to population").
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abolitionist protest," 9 gave new elaboration to this attack on family law
under slavery. While Stowe denounced forced labor and racial prejudice,
she highlighted another story of slavery, a tale "told too oft,-every day
told,--of heart strings rent and broken,-the weak broken and torn for the
profit and convenience of the strong!"'' 0 In Uncle Tom's Cabin, slavery's
central violation is its devastation of the family-'"its outrages on the
feelings and affections."' 31 For Stowe as for other abolitionists, the
national debate over slavery put more than political, economic, or racial
rights at issue. Slavery's desecration of familial bonds was a distinct
injustice that demanded rectification in its own right.
Somewhat more gingerly, abolitionists also described the systemic
sexual exploitation of slave women by white men as a family crime and
3
ground
133 for federal intervention. 1 Slaves had no legal protection against
rape, and slave women were sold into concubinage or prostitution at
129. Upon meeting Stowe in 1862, President Lincoln reportedly remarked, "'[slo you're the
little woman who wrote the book that started this great war!"' JOAN D. HEDRICK, HARRIET
BEECHER STOWE: A LIFE, at vii (1994); see also MCPHERSON, supra note 128, at 89-90.
130. STOWE, supra note 105, at 202. For more on forced separation, see id. at 49, 208-11,
467, 479. For discussion of the legal prohibition on slave marriage, see id. at 63, 187.
131. Id.at200.
132. That understanding of family law does not accord with this Article's definition,
although it does resonate with the arguments against VAWA that assumed that family law
included all gender-motivated violence, including rape.
133. See, e.g., Vail v. Bird, 6 La. Ann. 223, 224 (1851) (defining sexual relations between
slaveholder and female slave as "mutual" liaison); George (a Slave) v. State, 37 Miss. 316, 31820 (1859) (holding that no statute or common law doctrine made slave-on-slave rape a crime,
although master of raped slave had right to bring suit "for the injury done him in the loss
of service, or the diminution in value of his slave"); Alfred (a Slave) v. State, 37 Miss. 296, 316
(1859) (barring slave woman from testifying against overseer who allegedly raped her).
On the vulnerability of slave women to sexual exploitation by white men, see also LYDIA
MARIA CHILD, AN APPEAL IN FAVOR OF THAT CLASS OF AMERICANS CALLED AFRICANS
23 (Arno Press 1968) (1836); JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 93-104 (1988); GENOVESE, supra note 108, at 413-21;
CHARLES OLCOTT,

Two LECTURES

ON THE SUBJECT OF SLAVERY AND ABOLITION

112 (Massillon, Ohio 1838) (denouncing "customary ravishment and prostitution of colored
women").
Georgia actually modified its law on the eve of the Civil War, rewriting its statutory definition in 1861 to provide that rape was "the carnal knowledge of a female, whether free or slave,
forcibly and against her will." THE CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA § 4248, at 824 (R.H. Clark
et al. comps., Atlanta, John H. Seals 1861). Penalties under the new code, however, explicitly
differentiated according to the race of the assailant and the victim. A white man found guilty of
raping a white woman could be imprisoned for between two and twenty years, while a black man
convicted of the same crime was subject to death. The penalty for raping "a slave, or free person
of color" was a "fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court." Id. § 4249, at 824,
§ 4704, at 918. Notwithstanding this statutory change, no rape case involving a white defendant
and a slave victim subsequently appeared in Georgia's appellate court records. See BARDAGLIO,
supra note 108, at 69 n.140.
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"fancy girl" markets devoted specifically to that purpose.'34 Abolitionists,
particularly the women among them, mourned the plight of slave
women, denouncing legalized rape as an outrage to the slaves' female delicacy, modesty, and chastity.'
But other antislavery advocates also
described legalized rape under slavery as violating the prerogatives of slave
husbands and fathers. In an era in which marital rape remained wholly
"' many abolitionists
legal, 36
assumed without question, and argued without
134. These markets were concentrated in New Orleans. See FREDERIC BANCROFT, SLAVE
TRADING IN THE OLD SOUTH 328, 334 (Frederick Ungar Publ'g Co. 1959) (1931); GEORGE
BOURNE, SLAVERY ILLUSTRATED IN ITS EFFECTS UPON WOMAN AND DOMESTIC SOCIETY 62-63
(Books for Libraries Press 1972) (1837) (recounting visit "to the girl-market"); CHILD, supra note
133, at 196-97 (denouncing "temporary connexions" between "White gentlemen of the firstrank" and New Orleans quadroons); Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE L.J.
791, 798-99 (1993).
135. Indeed, Harriet Jacobs, an escaped slave, defined the central trauma of female enslavement as sexual vulnerability. As she observed, "there [was] no shadow of law to protect [the
slave girl] from insult, from violence, or even from death; all. these are inflicted by fiends who
bear the shape of men." HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS INTHE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL 27 (Jean
Fagan Yellin ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1987) (1861). A female slave similarly explained to
Frances Kemble why she did not attempt to defend her virtue by resisting white men's unwanted
sexual overtures: "'[W]e do anything to get our poor flesh some rest from de whip; when he made
me follow him into de bush, what use me tell him no? he have strength to make me."' FRANCES
ANNE KEMBLE, JOURNAL OF A RESIDENCE ON A GEORGIAN PLANTATION IN 1838-1839, at 270
(John A. Scott ed., Univ. of Georgia Press 1984) (1863); see also SARAH GRIMKt, LETTERS
ON THE EQUALITY OF THE SEXES AND OTHER ESSAYS 59 (Elizabeth Ann Bartlett ed., Yale Univ.
Press 1988) (1838) ("In our slave States, if amid all her degradation and ignorance, a woman
desires to preserve her virtue unsullied, she is either bribed or whipped into compliance, or if she
dares resist her seducer, her life by the laws of some of the slave States may be, and has actually
been sacrificed to the fury of disappointed passion."); STOWE, supra note 105, at 45, 160, 182,
186, 288, 472-73, 608; Caroline W. Healy Dall, Amy, 10 LIBERTY BELL 4, 11 (Boston, National
Anti-Slavery Bazaar 1849) (recounting fictional tale of Amy, "[t]he [mulatto] offspring of a lawless and unrequited affection, [who] had, nevertheless, unconsciously dedicated her whole being
to vestal chastity. But nothing availed."); Green, supra note 105, at 94 (describing fictional
plight of Clusy Davis, who "was beautiful. She was in her master's power. She was in the power
of every white man that chose to possess her.").
136. See, e.g., JAMES SCHOULER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS;
EMBRACING HUSBAND AND WIFE, PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, INFANCY, AND
MASTER AND SERVANT § 36, at 63 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 3d ed. 1882) ("Living in the
same house, but wilfully declining matrimonial intimacy and companionship, isper se a breach of
duty, tending to subvert the true ends of marriage.").
Many legal writers on the marital rape exemption find its common law origins in a
seventeenth-century statement by Lord Matthew Hale. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE
72 (1987); Rebecca M. Ryan, The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption, 20 L.
& SOC. INQUIRY 941, 947 (1995); Note, The Marital Rape Exemption, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 306,
307 (1977); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255-56 (1986); 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., Professional Books Ltd. 1971) (1736) ("[T]he
husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband,
which she cannot retract."). As late as 1977, every state in America either applied the common
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hesitation, that male slaves, like free men, should control sexual access to
their female relatives. Francis Green's The Slave-Wife, a nicely representative abolitionist short story, insisted that laws allowing masters to rape
their female slaves transgressed the rights that slave husbands should enjoy
as part of their familial status. Green's account of a slave woman tortured
for refusing her master's sexual advances ended with the following
instruction: "Think of that, husbands-ye who have beds you can call your
own! ye who had honor to lose-I must submit to see her scourged, because
' Green's vision
she would not yield herself willingly!"137
was typical. Again
and again, abolitionists asked the male members of their audiences to
imagine their wives and daughters "every moment liable to be pollutedand, if [they] refuse submission, to be lacerated, then foiced by [their]
tyrant to comply.' '.. Legalized rape, abolitionists stressed, did more than
violate slave women; it left their husbands and fathers with no right to
defend them.
All of this sustained advocacy made clear that slavery was not just
economic, political, or racial subjugation, and that emancipation would
not be complete until it extended to family formation. Indeed, Harriet
Beecher Stowe offered an essentially familial definition of both slavery and
freedom in Uncle Tom's Cabin:
To your fathers, freedom was the right of a nation to be a nation. To
[a slave], it is the right of a man to be a man, and not a brute; the
right to call the wife of his bosom [h]is wife, and to protect her from
lawless violence; the right to protect and educate his child; the right
to have a home of his own, a religion of his own, a character of his
39
own, unsubject to the will of another.1

When she concluded her epic with a call for abolitionist volunteers, Stowe
was not asking them to battle racial prejudice alone. To the contrary,
Uncle Tom's Cabin became the most popular and influential book of the
nineteenth century by revealing slavery's most intimate violations and
demanding specifically familial reform.' 4°
law rule or provided a statutory exemption for marital rape. See The Marital Rape Exemption,
supra, at 308.
137. Green, supra note 105, at 99.
138. BOURNE, supra note 134, at 126.
139. STOWE, supra note 105, at 544-45.
140. Stowe articulated her call this way:
And you, mothers of America,-you who have learned, by the cradles of your own children, to love and feel for all mankind,-by the sacred love you bear your child; by your
joy in his beautiful, spotless infancy; by the motherly pity and tenderness with which
you guide his growing years; by the anxieties of his education; by the prayers you
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The Reconstruction Debates

Although historically intertwined, race and family law are dichotomized in the leading modem accounts of Reconstruction. The standard
histories of the period devote little or no attention to family law at all.' 4'
While several women's historians have considered the role of family law
in Reconstruction, their work stresses how mindful Congressmen were to
breathe for his soul's eternal good;-I beseech you, pity the mother who has all your
affections, and not one legal right to protect, guide, or educate, the child of her bosom!
Id. at 623.
Many slaveholding characters in Stowe's novel express abolitionist sentiments when confronted with the forced separation of slave families. For instance:
Mrs. Shelby stood like one stricken. Finally, turning to her toilet, she rested her
face in her hands, and gave a sort of groan.
"This is God's curse on slavery!-a bitter, bitter, most accursed thing!-a curse to
the master and a curse to the slave! I was a fool to think I could make anything good
out of such a deadly evil. It is a sin to hold a slave under laws like ours,-I always felt it
was ....
"Why, wife, you are getting to be an abolitionist, quite."
"Abolitionist! if they knew all I know about slavery, they might talk!"
Id. at 84-85.
141. Perhaps the leading work on Reconstruction includes no discussion of family law as
such. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877
(1988). Although Foner mentions that the emancipated slaves believed that family rights were
an essential part of freedom, he never explores the point. See id. at 55-56, 78, 82, 84. Similarly,
Foner briefly describes the involuntary apprenticeship laws that Southern states enacted immediately after abolition, but does not consider their implications for the parental rights of the
freedmen. See id. at 40-41, 201; see also infra Part II.C.4. For other prominent accounts of
Reconstruction that do not address family law (or mention it only in passing), see HERMAN BELZ,
EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL WAR

ERA 109, 111 (1978); DAN T. CARTER, WHEN THE WAR WAS OVER: THE FAILURE OF SELFRECONSTRUCTION IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1867 (1985); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE CIVIL WAR (2d ed. 1994).
In contrast, while Herbert Gutman's classic study of the black family covers Reconstruction,
its main purpose is to disprove the common claim that slavery left African-Americans socially
and culturally disorganized, unable to form lasting familial bonds, and prone to sexual promiscuity. Gutman's book therefore offers detailed, localized accounts of the depth of family ties
amongst the emancipated slaves, without systematically attempting to link this history to
national Reconstruction politics. See GUTMAN, supra note 122, at 366-85, 402-31. For more
on the familial relations of the emancipated slaves during Reconstruction, see LEON F. LITWACK,
BEEN IN THE STORM SO LONG: THE AFTERMATH OF SLAVERY 229-47 (1979). For more work
analyzing the internal dynamics of slave families, see JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS,
JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 137-40 (7th ed. 1994);
ANN PAT7ON MALONE, SWEET CHARIOT: SLAVE FAMILY AND HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY LOUISIANA 205-72 (1992); BRENDA E. STEVENSON, LIFE IN BLACK
AND WHITE: FAMILY AND COMMUNITY IN THE SLAVE SOUTH 161, 206-57 (1996); Brenda E.
Stevenson, Black Family Structure in Colonial and Antebellum Virginia: Amending the Revisionist
Perspective, in THE DECLINE IN MARRIAGE AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 27 (M. Belinda Tucker & Claudia MitchellKernan eds., 1995).
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distinguish race and family law. In this view, the Reconstruction Congress
stayed as far away from all aspects of family law as possible in order
to ensure that coverture rules would survive the emancipation of the
slaves.' Both of these rubrics, however, focus on only one strand of the
143
conversation at Reconstruction.

142. Patricia Lucie, for instance, has concluded that:
It would be too much to say that [Reconstruction Congressmen] deliberately avoided
the necessary changes in the Constitution to achieve equality under law between the
races for fear of giving women rights. Rather they judged that when a measure went far
enough to limit a state's freedom to legislate on married women's property, family law,
marriage, or divorce it went too far in altering the balance between the federal government and the states.
Patricia Lucie, On Being a Free Person and a Citizen by Constitutional Amendment, 12 J. AM. STUD.
343, 350 (1978). Similarly, Amy Dru Stanley has observed that "[wihen confronted with the
legal counterpoint between marriage and slavery [during the debates on the 1866 Civil Rights
Act], congressional Republicans recast the achievement of emancipation as a question simply of
race." Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75J. AM. HIST. 471, 480 (1988).
This view has filtered into the legal literature. See, e.g., Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond
Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 207, 207-08, 215 (1992) ("When Congress debated the Thirteenth Amendment ... members inquired whether it would alter the traditional relationship of husband and
wife .... [T]he Congressmen's anxiety was treated as absurd by sponsors of the Amendment ....

Congress constructed the Thirteenth Amendment... to address what it believed to

be the root of slavery.., coerced labor.").
Peggy Cooper Davis's work constitutes a rare exception to the strict separation between
family law and race in accounts of Reconstruction. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED
STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES (1997). Davis's object, however, is to
anchor family privacy doctrines constitutionally by connecting substantive due process to a series
of thickly described stories about the history of slavery, antislavery, and Reconstruction that
highlight the importance of family law to freedom. See id. at 4-13, 216-17, 248-49; see also
Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested Images of Family Values: The Role of the State, 107 HARV. L. REV.
1348, 1361-67, 1371-73 (1994); Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe
v. Wade, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 302-11, 314-22, 334-57, 376-94 (1993); Peggy C.
Davis, Law, Science, and History: Reflections Upon In the Best Interests of the Child, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1096, 1110-19 (1988) (book review).
143. The historical work on the intersection between race and family law in slavery is much
stronger. W.E.B. Du Bois, an African-American leader and historian in the first half of this century, perhaps first stressed the restrictions on family formation that slaves endured. His list of
"[tihe essential features of Negro slavery in America" read, in full:
1. No legal marriage.
2. No legal family.
3. No legal control over children.
ATLANTA UNIV., PUB. No. 13, THE NEGRO AMERICAN FAMILY 21 (W.E. Burghardt Du Bois ed.,
1908). Modern histories of the experience of black women under slavery elaborate this theme.
See PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON RACE
AND SEX IN AMERICA 39, 41-46 (1984) (exploring systematic sexual exploitation of slave
women by white men and laws enslaving every child born from these unions); JACQUELINE
JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM

SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 12 (1985) ("[For slaveholders,] racial and patriarchal ideologies [were]
wedded to the pursuit of profit. As blacks, slave women were exploited for their skills and physi-
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The men responsible for Reconstruction clearly did not contemplate
preempting all of state family law. But the limits they placed on themselves did not reflect any sense that family matters were beyond federal
reach. Reconstruction Congressmen normatively approved of much of the
state family law already in place, and were particularly anxious to avoid disturbing state laws that prohibited interracial marriage and enforced hierarchical status relations between husbands and wives, and parents and
children.' At the same time, these men were ready to intervene in state
family law-as both we and they would define the term-when they felt
that it was important to do so. They had just survived and supported a
Civil War in which the federal government eradicated what many
nineteenth-century Americans took to be a domestic relation inherently
under state control, and as Congressmen they were ready to deal slavery its
final blows. Moreover, the architects of Reconstruction also eagerly
involved themselves in family law as we, too, would understand the subject.
Aware of the restrictions that American slavery placed on family
formation, they were anxious to protect emancipated slaves' families and,
more generally, to establish federal standards for certain basic family rights
that no state would ever be allowed to fall below. Indeed, they placed
cal strength in the production of staple crops; as women, they performed a reproductive function
vital to individual slaveholders' financial interests .. "); id. at 43 ("Because slaveholders valued
the reproduction of the plantation work force just as highly as increases in their annual crop....
it would be difficult to argue that racial prejudice superseded sexual prejudice as an ordering
principle for this peculiar society.... [Tihe two systems shared a dense, common tangle of
roots . . .

In the legal literature, a number of scholars have drawn on this historical work to offer
accounts of slavery that focus on the connections between race and gender. See Cheryl I. Harris,
Finding Sojourner's Truth: Race, Gender, and the Institution of Property, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 309,
329 (1996) ("Under slavery, defining who is property and who owns property-who was Black
and who was white-then became a matter of regulating reproduction and subordinating women
on the basis of a racially stratified construction of gender."); Dorothy E. Roberts; PunishingDrug
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419, 1438 (1991) ("From slavery on, Black women have fallen outside the scope of the American ideal of womanhood.... Black women's historical deviation from traditional female roles has
engendered a mythology that denies their womanhood.").
Along somewhat different lines, Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky have discussed
white masters who enslaved the children they themselves had fathered with slaves in order to
ground their argument that the Thirteenth Amendment "provides the best constitutional vehicle
to conceptualize and characterize cases [of extreme child abuse]." Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 1359, 1360, 1366 (1992); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 465, 466-67 (1995) ("Slave women were breeders against their will
as women. They were forced to be wet nurses as women, and sexual playthings as women.... So,
the slavery experience should, I suggest, teach us that intimate association between men and
women does not in and of itself guarantee respect and protection.").
144. See infra Part ll.C.2.
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extending significant federal protection to the family at the forefront of
their mission. Even a substantial majority of Reconstruction's opponents
conceded that the federal government could exercise jurisdiction over
family law, arguing against the project on (now constitutionally illicit)
policy grounds alone. And Reconstruction's advocates overcame these
objections to pass laws and a Fourteenth Amendment that concretely
improved the family law governing the freedmen.
1.

The Centrality of Family Law for Reconstruction's Architects

When the men behind Reconstruction were convinced that an aspect
of state family law merited federal involvement, they displayed no hesitation about intervening. Painfully cognizant of the history of American
slavery, these men realized that political freedom was ultimately worthless
without the right to marry, to raise a family, and to maintain a home.
Refusing to allow the freedom they had given the slaves in the Thirteenth
Amendment to turn into "a mere paper guarantee,"'45 they therefore set out
to establish that the federal government would protect certain core family
rights and to ensure that the freedmen would be able to form recognized
family relations. While Reconstruction's congressional supporters saw no
need to wrest the basic machinery of family law out of the states' hands,
they made clear that there were national standards for family law that
no state or section of the nation would be permitted to deviate below."'
145. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lst Sess. 1151 (1866) (statement of Rep. Thayer).
146. Freedmen also frequently expressed their understanding that emancipation necessarily
entailed the right to marry freely, parent their children, and keep their families together. In
1864, Spotswood Rice, an African-American soldier in the Union army, wrote his enslaved
daughters to reassure them that the federal government would soon promote a familial reunion:
"Dont be uneasy my children[.] I expect to have you. If Diggs dont give you up this Government
will and I feel confident that I will get you[.]" Letter from Spotswood Rice to My Children (Sept.
3, 1864), in THE BLACK MILITARY EXPERIENCE 689, 689 (Ira Berlin et al. eds., 1982). Rice
similarly invoked federal authority in his simultaneous letter to Kittey Diggs, his daughters'
owner:
my Children is my own and I expect to get them and when I get ready to come after
mary I will have bout a powrer and autherity to bring hear away and to exacute vengencens on them that holds my Child[.] you will then know how to talke to me[.] ... I
have no fears about geting mary out of your hands.] this whole Government gives
chear to me and you cannot help your selfi.]
Letter from Spotswood Rice to Kittey Diggs (Sept. 3, 1864), in THE BLACK MILITARY EXPERIENCE, supra, at 690, 690. Immediately after the Civil War, many freedmen enthusiastically
pursued just the sort of familial reunification that Spotswood Rice had so eagerly anticipated. As
one Freedmen's Bureau agent in South Carolina observed,
[the emancipated slaves] had a passion, not so much for wandering, as for getting
together; and every mother's son among them seemed to be in search of his mother;
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Reconstruction Congressmen eagerly reported on the state of family
the former Confederacy. What they found horrified them and
in
law
spurred them to action. Even as the states were ratifying the Thirteenth
Amendment, the South was enacting a flurry of "Black Codes." These
47
laws, which Reconstruction would render specifically illegal,' prevented
the emancipated slaves from marrying freely, hampered them as they parented their children, and left them (or their wives and daughters) unprotected from rape. Mississippi, for example, had 'compel[led] all freedmen
to marry whomsoever they [were then] living with, and to support the issue
of what was in many cases compulsory cohabitation.""4 South Carolina,
Senator Sumner informed his colleagues, left no black child "safe for one
moment from a compulsory serfdom." The state permitted the involuntary
"apprenticeship" of black children whose parents were "'paupers, or unable
to afford them a comfortable maintenance, or whose parents [were] not
teaching them habits of industry and honesty, or [were] persons of notoriously
bad character, or [were] vagrants, or ha[d] been convicted of infamous
offenses."..4 9 The Black Code of Tennessee similarly provided that the
children of "vagrant" blacks could "be bound out" involuntarily "to a master by the county court."'5 0 Kentucky did not criminalize the rape of black
s and Sumner reported that black women had 'no
women by white men,'
every mother in search of her children. In their eyes the work of emancipation was
incomplete until the families which had been dispersed by slavery were reunited.
JOHN WILLIAM DE FOREST, A UNION OFFICER IN THE RECONSTRUCTION 36 (James H.
Croushore & David Morris Potter eds., 2d ed. 1968). An oration commemorating the first anniversary of emancipation similarly called the occasion
a day of gratitude for the freedom of matrimony. Formerly there was no security for
domestic happiness. Our ladies were insulted and degraded with or without their consent. Our wives were sold, and husbands bought, children were begotten and enslaved
by their fathers, we therefore were polygamists by virtue of our condition. But now we
can marry and live together till we die, raise our children and teach them to fear God,
0! black age of dissipation, thy days are nearly numbered.
John T. Shuften, An Outline of the Oration Delivered by Chaplain Henry M. Turner, in Springfield
Baptist Church, on January 1st, 1866, Being the Celebration of the First Anniversary of Freedom,
COLORED AM. (Augusta, Ga.), Jan. 13, 1866, at 1, 4.
147. See infra Part II.C.4.
148. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1160 (1866) (statement of Rep. Windom)
(quoting letter from Lieutenant Stewart Eldridge to Major General Howard (Nov. 28, 1865)).
149. Id. at 93 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (quoting South Carolina statute). On the
involuntary apprenticeship of black children after the Civil War, see infra Part IL.C.4.
150. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 509 (1866) (statement of Sen. Donnelly).
151. See id. at 651 (statement of Rep. Grinnell). "[Tihe rape of a white woman by a negro
man [was] punishable by death, and the Governor of the State [could not] commute." Id.
Acting independently, Ulysses S. Grant, commanding general of the United States army,
attempted to void state rape statutes that imposed different penalties on black and white perpetrators by ordering the military to protect freedmen "from prosecutions in any of said [former
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rights that [were] respected' in areas of the Gulf states where no Union
soldiers were stationed. 2
Determined to rectify horrors that they saw as an intrinsic part of
slavery, the men responsible for Reconstruction wholeheartedly intervened
into the restrictions on family rights that importantly constituted American servitude. Senator John Sherman of Ohio set the tone. The 1866
Civil Rights Act'53 was the immediate prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment and the statute that Amendment constitutionalized.'54 The Act's
first version prohibited legal discrimination in the former Confederate
States "by reason or in consequence of a previous condition or status of
'
slavery or involuntary servitude." 55
Sherman, however, immediately
adequately protect the freedmen.'56
not
objected that such an act would
He proposed instead that the bill be amended to "secure to the freedmen of
the southern States certain rights, naming them, defining precisely what
Confederate] States charged with offenses for which white persons are not prosecuted or punished in the same manner and degree." General Orders No. 3, Jan. 12, 1866, Adjutant General's
Office, reprinted in THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DURING THE
PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 123 (Edward McPherson ed., 2d ed. 1875).
152. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1865) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (quoting"a
trustworthy traveler who has recently traversed the Gulf States").
153. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The first section of the Act reads, in part:
[AIU persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property,
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Id. § 1, at 27. The current version of the 1866 Civil Rights Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994).
154. Congress enacted the 1866 Act under its authority to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, but the Act's constitutionality under that Amendment was disputed. Virtually all scholars
agree that the principal purpose of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was to establish the
constitutionality of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and to ensure that it could not be repealed. See,
e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 22-23 (1977); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48 (1988); Alexander M.
Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955).
155. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
156. See id. at 41 (statement of Sen. Sherman).
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they should be." Specifically, Sherman argued that emancipation would be
hollow unless Congress "secure[d] to these freedmen the right to acquire
and hold property, to enjoy the fruits of their own labor, to be protected
in their homes and family, the right to be educated, and to go and come at
pleasure." "These," Sherman declared, were "among the natural rights
of free men."' 57 The Senate accepted Sherman's proposal with little discussion, and immediately amended the 1866 Civil Rights bill to include, inter
alia, the rights "to make and enforce contracts,... to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as it is enjoyed by white citizens."'"" Although the amended bill
was less explicit in its intervention into family law than Sherman had
been, to the nineteenth-century mind extending equal contractual and
property rights to freedmen encompassed marital and parental rights.'59
Michigan Senator Jacob Howard articulated the underlying conception of federalism perhaps most eloquently.' 6° There was, he declared,
''no invasion of the legitimate rights of the States." The Thirteenth
Amendment had guaranteed the former slaves liberty, and "simply
157. Id. at 42 (statement of Sen. Sherman) (emphasis added). Later, Senator Sumner also
stressed the importance of providing specific protection for family rights under the Civil Rights
Act. See id. at 91 (statement of Sen. Sumner) (quoting regulations that accompanied 1861
proclamation emancipating Russian serfs).
158. Id. at 42.
159. Mainstream nineteenth-century legal theory understood a man's right to control and
protect his wife and children as a property right. See GROSSBERG, supra note 93, at 25. As Ohio
Representative Chilton White, a defender of slavery, put it, a man had "property in the service of
[his] child" and a husband had "a right of property in the service of his wife." CONG. GLOBE,
38th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (1865); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864)
(statement of Rep. Wood) ("The social and domestic relations are equally matters of individual
ownership with flocks and herds, houses and lands. The affections of a man's wife and children
are among the dearest of his possessions, and as such are under the protection of the law."). All
sides of the abolitionist debate saw the right to marry as a contractual right. Thomas R.R. Cobb,
the author of an apologist treatise on slavery law, reported that "[t]he inability of the slave to
contract extends to the marriage contract, and hence there is no recognized marriage relation
in law between slaves." 1 COBB, supra note 107, at 242-43. Abolitionist legal scholar William
Goodell lamented that "[a] slave [could not] even contract matrimony." GOODELL, supra note
119, at 106 (emphasis added). Frederick Douglass, the leading black abolitionist and black intellectual of the nineteenth century, informed his audiences that he was "ready to prove, by the
laws of slave states, that three million of the people of those States are utterly incapacitated
Frederick Douglass Discusses Slavery (Dec. 8, 1850), in 1
to form marriage contracts."
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 313 (Herbert
Aptheker ed., 1951) (emphasis added).
160. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 504 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
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reliev[ing] the slave from the obligation to render service to his master"
would leave him far from free. Howard refused to allow the former
Confederacy and its sympathizers to trap the emancipated slaves in such a
state. The purpose of Reconstruction was to make the bondman "the
opposite of a slave, to make him a freeman." And as was "the universal
understanding of the American people," a freeman had "the right of having
a family, a wife, children, home." "What definition," Howard asked, would
"you attach to the word 'freeman' that does not include these ideas?"' 6'
Faced with a history of servitude that systematically violated private
boundaries and armed with a conviction that family rights were essential to
freedom, the Reconstruction Congress felt no dissonance in extending its
work into the realm of family law.
The same vision of federalism guided the enactment of the Freedmen's
Bureau Bill, 16 the second prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment. Proponents started with the premise "that the poorest man, be he black or
white ....is as much entitled to the protection of the law as the richest
and proudest man."' 63 Convinced that extending freedom meant protecting family rights, they made their conviction that the federal government
should do so clear. Advocates like Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts
stressed that the Freedmen's Bureau Bill would guarantee that every man's
family and home would be legally protected. The Bill meant that
the poor man, whose wife may be dressed in a cheap calico, is as
much entitled to have her protected by equal law as is the rich man
to have his jeweled bride protected by the laws of the land ....[TIhe

poor man's cabin, though it may be the cabin of a poor freedman in
161. Id. (statement of Sen. Howard).
162. Freedmen's Bureau Act, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173 (1866). Section 14 of the Act reads, in
part:
[Iln every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been

interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same shall be fully restored, and in every
State or district whose constitutional relations to the government have been practically
discontinued by the rebellion, and until such State shall have been restored in such
relations, and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States, the right
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease' sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to have full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security,
and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including
the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens
of such State or district without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery.
Id. § 14, at 176-77.
163. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866) (statement of Sen. Wilson).
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the depths of the Carolinas, is entitled to the protection of the same
64
law that protects the palace of a Stewart or an Astor.

Massachusetts Representative Thomas Eliot agreed that family rights were
central to freedom. "Slavery," he reminded his colleagues,
cannot know a home. Where the wife is the property of the husband's master, and may be used at will; where children are bred, like
stock, for sale; where man and woman, after twenty years of faithful
service from the time when the priest with the owner's sanction
by mock ceremonies pretended to unite them, are parted and sold at
that owner's will, there can be no such thing as home. Sir, no act of
ours can fitly enforce their165freedom that does not contemplate for
them the security of home.

Safeguarding family rights was at the core of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill
and the entire Reconstruction project.
2.

The Consensus on Federal Jurisdiction over Family Law

Reconstruction's advocates were so committed to the proposition that
family rights were "civil rights" within the meaning of their legislation,
that they refused to retreat from this position even when their opponents
focused on their two deepest vulnerabilities, the accusation that they
favored interracial sex and procreation (always referred to as amalgamation
or miscegenation) 166 and the charge that Reconstruction would disturb
164. Id. (statement of Sen. Wilson).
165. Id. at 2779 (statement of Rep. Eliot).
166. The term "miscegenation" originated in an anonymous pamphlet first published in
December 1863 that purported to advocate widespread interracial marriage and to congratulate
the Republican Party for its leadership on the issue. The tract, MISCEGENATION: THE THEORY
OF THE BLENDING OF THE RACES, APPLIED TO THE AMERICAN WHITE MAN AND NEGRO

(Literature House 1970) (1864), claimed abolitionist authorship. On that pretense, its authors
sent the work to several prominent antislavery leaders for review and garnered some tentative
praise in return. It soon became clear, however, that ardent opponents of Lincoln had actually
written and distributed the pamphlet as a hoax meant to ensnare the president and his party
before the 1864 election. Democrats like Representative Samuel Sullivan Cox of Ohio cited the
abolitionists' comments as evidence that the Republican Party was "moving steadily forward to
perfect social equality of black and white, and can only end in this detestable doctrine of-miscegenation!" CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 712 (1864). Despite such efforts, however,
the ploy seems to have had little effect on the 1864 election results. (Representative Cox, for
instance, lost his congressional seat.) Its most lasting impact was linguistic. "Miscegenation," a
clear pejorative, quickly became white America's term of choice for interracial sex and marriage.
See MARTHA HODES, WHITE WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY

SOUTH 144-45 (1997); MCPHERSON, supra note 128, at 789-91; FORREST G. WOOD, BLACK
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state laws subordinating wives to husbands. Southern apologists understood full well that their opponents in Congress intended to abolish the
"domestic relation" of slavery, including its restrictions on family formation-family law as both we and they would understand the term. What's
more, they conceded that the federal government could regulate family
law-in both senses-if it wished. Their opposition, instead, explicitly and
continually expressed the anxiety that extending federal equal protection
to family law would unseat state anti-miscegenation and coverture laws. In
response, many of the men responsible for Reconstruction reaffirmed their
normative and political commitment to preserving these particular state
family laws. Strikingly, however, they never defended themselves by
explaining that the entire category of family law, as such, was beyond the
reach of federal power.
White America's fear of interracial sex and marriage, the most
dreaded examples and the purportedly inevitable consequences of social
167
mixing between whites and blacks, reached a peak after the Civil War.
Although the sexual exploitation of black women by white men had been a
systemic part of slavery,' 68 abolition tore down the absolute distinction
between slave and master, leaving whites eager to impose new boundaries
between the races. 1' 9 "Racial purity" became a symbolic linchpin of white
supremacy in an era in which the appearance of evolutionary paradigms
encouraged a far more demographic conception of the polity, one that
located the nation's fate in reproductive activity itself. 70 In 1866, Horatio
R. Storer, the leader of the nineteenth-century campaign against abortion,
SCARE: THE RACIST RESPONSE TO EMANCIPATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

53-62 (1968);

Sidney Kaplan, The Miscegenation Issue in the Election of 1864, 34 J. NEGRO HIST. 274, 277-98

(1949).

167. See DAVID H. FOWLER, NORTHERN ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE:
LEGISLATION AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC AND THE STATES OF THE OLD
NORTHWEST, 1780-1930, at 238 (1987); HODES, supra note 166, at 1-2, 10. This anxiety
should be distinguished from the actual incidence of interracial marriage, which almost vanished
after the Civil War. See Steven A. Bank, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Dilemma of Symmetry:
The Understanding of Equality in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 303,
315-17 (1995).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 132-138.
169. See, e.g., HODES, supra note 166, at 147-48, 157-58, 199-202; Emily Field Van Tassel,
"Only the Law Would Rule Between Us": Anti-Miscegenation, the Moral Economy of Dependency,
and the Debate over Rights After the Civil War, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 873, 896-98 (1995).
170. As one white Southerner explained at the time:
If we have social equality, we shall have intermarriage, and if we have intermarriage we

shall degenerate; we shall become a race of mulattoes; we shall be another Mexico; we
shall be ruled out from the family of white nations. Sir, it is a matter of life and death
with the Southern people to keep their blood pure.

DAVID MACRAE, THE AMERICANS AT HOME 297 (E. P. Dutton & Co. 1952) (1870).
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published a highly influential essay that compared the fertile female body
to America's Great Plains and warned native-born white women that "the
7'
future destiny of the nation" depended upon their relative birth rates.
During Reconstruction, anti-miscegenation laws, which had assumed a
relatively minor position in Southern slave codes, spread to a number of
Southern states for the first time."

In the midst of this anti-miscegenation scare, an emerging woman's
rights movement was beginning to contest many other aspects of state

family law. In the 1860s, coverture rules still governed familial status, dissolving the legal identity of wives into their husbands.'
Married women
had little, or no, right to contract, own property, file suit, or obtain custody
of their children.' 74 Children were similarly restricted, with state family
codes granting parents in general and fathers in particular almost unquestioned custody and control.' 5 By the mid-nineteenth century, however,
171. HORATIO ROBINSON STORER, WHY NOT? 85 (Boston, Lee and Shepard 1866). For a
brilliant account of Storer's campaign, see CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY
CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 217-44 (1985); see also Reva Siegel,
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 299 (1992) ("Translating the creed of manifest destiny into
reproductive terms, Storer fused America's populations, territories, and women in a powerful
image of reproductive potentiality .... In this vision, the state was its populations, and its
identity was determined by the reproductive conduct of its female citizens."). For more on the
eugenics movement, see MAROUF A. HASIAN, JR., THE RHETORIC OF EUGENICS IN ANGLOAMERICAN THOUGHT (1996); Mary L. Dudziak, Oliver Wendell Holmes as a Eugenic Reformer:
Rhetoric in the Writing of Constitutional Law, 71 IOWA L.REV. 833, 843-59 (1986).
172. Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina had no anti-miscegenation statutes
before the Civil War. See FOWLER, supra note 167, at 217, app. During Reconstruction, each of
these states prohibited interracial union. See Van Tassel, supra note 169, at 903-05; Peter
Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s-1960s, 70
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 373-75 (1994) (discussing Alabama).
In all, thirty-eight states and commonwealths banned interracial marriage during the nineteenth century. Anti-miscegenation laws were concentrated in the South and West, with the
Northeast and Midwest relying on private prejudice to accomplish the same end. See
GROSSBERG, supra note 93, at 127.
173. See, e.g., ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, IN CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL CASES 91 (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke 1810) ("[Tlhe law considers the husband and
wife to be one person, and their interest to be the same .... ).
174. See GROSSBERG, supra note 93, at 25; Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property
Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1368 (1983) (noting that "wives were treated as civilly
dead" in many situations). See generally NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN,
MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK (1982).
175. See, e.g., State v. Paine, 23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 523, 533 (1843) (noting common law
status of children "as the property of the husband and the father, having no will of their own, no
rights in contradiction to his power and authority, and only considered through him as a portion
of the community in which they lived"); GROSSBERG, supra note 93, at 235; Jill Elaine Hasday,
Before Privacy: The Origins of Public Intervention Against Child Abuse 45-49 (Mar. 25, 1997)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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organized feminist challenges to this regime were causing widespread
alarm.'76
The simplest and most effective retort to charges that Reconstruction
would undermine state anti-miscegenation and coverture laws would have
been to explain that, while Reconstruction would guarantee civil equality,
it would not disturb state jurisdiction over family law. After all, legal
thought in this period carefully distinguished between "civil rights," the
basic prerequisites of freedom that all agreed the 1866 Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment would protect, and "social rights," which
almost everyone thought that Reconstruction would not touch.'
The
definition of each category was in flux,"" and Reconstruction's supporters
could have easily argued that family law fell entirely within the purview of
social rights, to which federal action would not extend. But the advocates
of Reconstruction, determined to protect freedmen in their marriages and
families, refused to repudiate federal jurisdiction.
Indeed, as late as the end of the nineteenth century, fathers still successfully utilized stubborn child laws, which permitted the criminal prosecution of disobedient or unruly children. See
LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF FAMILY
VIOLENCE, BOSTON 1880-1960, at 190-91 (1988); S.M. WILCOX, U.S. BUREAU OF EDUCATION, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 27 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of Education Circu-

lars of Information 1880).
176. See infra text accompanying notes 186-189. For an overview of the nineteenth-century
woman's rights movement, see ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE
EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1848-1869 (1978);
ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES (rev. ed. 1975); AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE
MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1981) (1965).
177. Lawmakers also classified rights into a third, "political" category, but that was largely
irrelevant to the debate over the status of anti-miscegenation. For supporters' explanations of
the reach of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866)
(statement of Sen. Trumbull) (explaining that "[tihe bill is applicable exclusively to civil
rights"); id. at 1117 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (noting that bill did not mean "that in all things
civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race or color, shall be equal").
The Supreme Court similarly resorted to the distinction between civil, political, and social
rights in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), concluding that "[tihe object of the
[fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two races before
the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality," id. at 544.
For more on the distinction between civil, political, and social rights, see Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1014-23 (1995);
Reva Siegel, Why Equal ProtectionNo Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State
Action, 49 STAN. L.REV. 1111, 1119-29 (1997); Mark Tushnet, The Politics of Equality in Constitutional Law: The Equal ProtectionClause, Dr. Du Bois, and Charles Hamilton Houston, 74 J. AM.
HIST. 884, 886-90 (1987).

178. See McConnell, supra note 177, at 1017; Siegel, supra note 177, at 1119-29; Tushnet,
supra note 177, at 886-90.
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Although the slur of miscegenation was explosive, Reconstructionists
chose a less sweeping response. They ridiculed the suggestion that whites
would want to marry blacks and claimed that, regardless, Reconstruction
would not affect "separate but equal" anti-miscegenation laws on the
ground that such statutes restricted and punished whites and blacks
equally. Rather than disclaiming federal jurisdiction over family law, Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee
and principal author of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, was sorry to hear that in
Senator Garret Davis's Kentucky "there [was] such a disposition to amal-79
'
gamation that nothing but penalties and punishments [could] prevent it."'
Laws against interracial marriage were, he stressed, unnecessary "where
there [was] no disposition for this amalgamation."' 8° Representative John
Farnsworth of Illinois agreed and declared that neither he "nor [his] friends
require[d] any restraining laws to prevent [them] from committing any error
in that direction."'8'
Trumbull, a respected constitutional lawyer and former state supreme
court justice,'8, was also quick to assert that Reconstruction would not
touch state laws that prohibited black men from marrying white women as
long as these statutes placed the same penalties on white men who
attempted to marry black women.' 8 ' Senator William Pitt Fessenden of
Maine, who led the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, seconded the
argument that there was "no discrimination" in statutes that gave a black
man "the same right [or lack thereof] to make a contract of marriage with
a white woman that a white man has with a black woman.""'u And
Farnsworth went further. If one of his colleagues feared the temptation of
amalgamation, he had no hesitation about enacting a prophylactic federal
statute. Farnsworth would "very cheerfully join with [the tempted member]
in voting the restraining influence of a penal statute." He would "vote to
punish [amalgamation] by confinement in the State prison, or, if [his
colleague] please[dl, by hanging-anything rather than [that Congressmen]
should be betrayed into or induced to form any such unnatural relations. ''
179. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 420 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
180. Id. at 600 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
181. Id. at 204 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth).
182. For Trumbull's biography, see 19 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 19-20
(Dumas Malone ed., 1936); HORACE WHITE, THE LIFE OF LYMAN TRUMBULL (1913).
183. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322, 420 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
184. Id. at 505 (statement of Sen. Fessenden).
185. Id. at 204-05 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). According to Michael McConnell and
Steven Bank, Reconstruction's advocates eventually abandoned their claim that state antimiscegenation laws survived the Fourteenth Amendment as long as those statutes conformed to
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Reconstruction's advocates also did not resort to localism in order to
counter accusations that their work would undermine state coverture
doctrines. Rather than contending that the federal government had no
jurisdiction over family law, they expressed their substantive agreement
with state laws subordinating wives to husbands (and children to parents)
and insisted that their intervention into state family codes was carefully
tailored to preserve such interfamilial hierarchy, granting black women and
children only the rights that their white counterparts enjoyed. As Representative Henry Bromwell of Illinois explained, there was no need to give
white women the legal entitlements that black men needed so desperately:
Ladies are a part of the family with most of us.... [Ilnasmuch as the
negro is not even of the white family is of a different race and so
treated .... you have no right to strip him of every attribute of manhood .... You do not associate with him; you do not affiliate with
him; you do not go with him in counsel; you do not sympathize with
him .... None of these causes operate in regard to the family .... 86
For this reason, Representative Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio continued,
the whole effect of the 1866 Civil Rights Act was
to require that whatever rights.., the States may confer upon one
race or color of the citizens shall be held by all races in equality.
Your State may deprive women of the right to sue or contract or
testify, and children from doing the same. But if you do so, or do not
do so as to one race, you shall treat the other likewise. It does not
prohibit you from discriminating between citizens of the same race,
or of different races, as to what their rights to testify, to inherit, &c.,
shall be. But if you do discriminate, it must
not be "on account
87
of race, color, or former condition of slavery."'1
the requirements of separate but equal. McConnell reports that "not a single supporter of the
1875 [Civil Rights] Act attempted to deny that under their interpretation, anti-miscegenation

laws were unconstitutional." McConnell, supra note 177, at 1018. Similarly, Bank contends
that
supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 ... were unwavering in their rejection of
symmetrical equality.

Moreover, when directly confronted with the miscegenation

question, several Republicans called for the repeal of anti-miscegenation statutes on the

basis of their understanding of equality, and no supporter of the bill sought to avoid
the issue by defending the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws or by invoking
the principle of symmetrical equality.

Bank, supra note 167, at 305.
186.
187.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 410 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bromwell).
Id. at 1293 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger). Less articulately, Senator Trumbull

silenced contentions that the 1866 Civil Rights Act would give wives an equal right to contract
with a curt "Oh, no." Id.at 1782 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
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Indeed, Representative James Wilson of Iowa, Chair of the House Judiciary
Committee and floor manager of the Civil Rights Act, noted that he had
successfully amended the Act early on to read that all citizens would enjoy
the same legal protection "as is enjoyed by white citizens" because he believed
this phrase clearly indicated that the bill preserved the legal distinctions
states made between men and women, and parents and children.' Building on this precedent, Pennsylvania Representative Thaddeus Stevens
countered accusations that the Fourteenth Amendment would permit
Congress to extend equal property rights to married women by stating only
that "[wihen a distinction is made between two married people or two
femmes sole, then it is unequal legislation; but where all of the same class
are dealt with in the same way then there is no pretense of inequality."'8 9
Reconstruction's advocates normatively accepted certain aspects of state
family law, but they refused to deny federal jurisdiction.
Moreover, as the very existence of this debate suggests, a strong
majority of Reconstruction's opponents agreed that marriage was a civil
right within the purview of the federal government. They, too, could have
relied on claims about the inherent and exclusive localism of family law to
counter much of the Reconstructionist project in one fell swoop. Yet
although they found the substantive policies of Reconstruction horrifying
and much preferred state control, Reconstruction's critics conceded that
the federal government could regulate family law.
Indiana Senator Thomas Hendricks's charge that Reconstruction
would overturn state laws prohibiting interracial marriage was rooted in his
understanding that "to marry according to one's choice [was] a civil right"
the federal government could protect.1' 9 As Senator Davis explained,
federal legislation like the Freedmen's Bureau Bill "provide[d] that the
freedman shall be entitled to all the civil rights and privileges that a white
man is entitled to" and white men, of course, had an uncontroverted right
to marry white women.' 9' Even if this sort of reasoning was flawed,
Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson, a moderate and former United States
Attorney General,1 92 anticipated that some courts would adopt it and that
188.
189.

Id. at app. 157 (1865) (statement of Rep. Wilson) (emphasis added).
Id. at 1064 (statement of Rep. Stevens).

190.

Id. at 318 (statement of Sen. Hendricks); see also id. at 632 (statement of Rep.

Thornton).

191. Id. at 417-18 (statement of Sen. Davis); see also id. at app. 181 (1865) (same); id. at
598 (1866) (same); id. at 604 (statement of Sen. Cowan); id. at 629 (statement of Rep.
Marshall).
192. See 10 DICTIONARY OFAMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra note 182, at 113.
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interracial marriages would destroy "the harmony and peace of society."' 93
Indeed, even President Andrew Johnson's veto of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, which Congress ultimately overrode, acknowledged that the bill
lawfully reached state interracial marriage statutes. The sole reassurance
that Johnson's veto message could offer to those who rightly feared that the
1866 bill would soon become law was to explain that some state antimiscegenation laws could survive the bill's passage under the formal
equality (separate but equal) arguments that Reconstructionist
Congressmen had developed. 94 Only Illinois Representative Samuel
Moulton ever clearly asserted that marriage was not a civil right within the
meaning of the Reconstruction statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment,
insisting instead that marriage was simply "a matter of mutual taste,
contract, and understanding between the parties." But he knew that
he was in the minority. 19 The Reconstruction consensus that the federal
government had jurisdiction over family law was profound and widespread.
Reconstruction's advocates were intent on creating statutory and
constitutional protection for familial rights, and most of their opponents
agreed that they could. Indeed, as this section suggests, the case for
exclusive localism in family law at Reconstruction was almost entirely
rooted in normative concerns that would now be considered
constitutionally illegitimate.
3.

Status Relations and the Case for Localism at Reconstruction

In the thousands of pages of congressional debate leading to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congressmen volunteered only two justifications for
keeping the federal government far away from the family. First, some
193.

CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 505-06 (1866) (statement of Sen. Johnson).

194. As President Johnson explained:

I do not say this bill repeals State laws on the subject of marriage between the two

races, for as the whites are forbidden to intermarry with the blacks, the blacks can only
make such contracts as the whites themselves are allowed to make, and therefore can-

not, under this bill, enter into the marriage contract with the whites. I cite this dis-

crimination, however, as an instance of the State policy as to discrimination, and
to inquire whether, if Congress can abrogate all State laws of discrimination between
the two races in the matter of real estate, of suits, and of contracts generally, Congress
may not also repeal the State laws as to the contract of marriage between the two races?
Id. at 1680 (veto message of President Johnson).
195. Id.at 632 (statement of Rep. Moulton); see also id. (statement of Rep. Moulton) ("[It is
not] a civil right for a white man to marry a black woman or for a black man to marry a white
woman. It is a simple matter of taste, of contract, of arrangement between the parties."); id. at
633 (statement of Rep. Moulton) ("[M]arriage is not a civil right, as contemplated by the provisions of this [1866 Civil Rights] bill.").
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members claimed to see no logical reason why Reconstruction's massive intervention into race relations should unsettle family law. This
discourse was most notable for its thinness, respecting the status quo
without explication. Ohio Representative John Bingham, for instance,
dismissed the notion that the President's suspension of Confederate
"municipal authorities"'196 reached Southern marriages as "Paganism,"
without further inquiry.197 More prominently, however, Congressmen
voiced the concern that extending Reconstruction's guarantee of equal
protection to family law would threaten the social segregation of the races
and disrupt the legal hierarchies placing husband over wife, and parent
over child. This latter, more substantial rationale had deep antebellum
roots in proslavery thought.' 98 Without question, it is now contrary to the
opposed.'9
very Fourteenth Amendment that localist Congressmen
Rather than argue that the federal government lacked jurisdiction
over family law, Reconstruction's critics elaborated the disastrous implications for public policy-and private relationships-of introducing federal
equal protection into family law. Senator Garrett Davis, certain that marriage would be a civil right within the meaning of the Reconstruction
enactments, warned that Reconstruction would likely override state antimiscegenation laws and state penal codes that subjected black men who
raped white women to death while only imprisoning whites who commit201
Particularly incensed over the threat to asymmetrited the same crime.
cal rape statutes, Davis declared that such a transformation was
"preposterous, ... absurd and unsound. 20 2 His Kentucky, Davis assured his
fellows, would never submit to such a corruption of its law, notwithstand196. Id. at 159 (statement of Rep. Smith).
197. Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also id. at 479 (statement of Sen. Saulsbury).
198. See supra Part ll.B.1.
199. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (striking down gender-based alimony
law under Equal Protection Clause on ground that statute preserved common law status relations,
"reinforcing stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women and their need for special
protection"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("To deny this fundamental freedom
[marriage] on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in [state antimiscegenation] statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the
heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without
due process of law."); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (beginning long line of
cases striking down de jure racial segregation and noting in context of education that "[tlo
separate [children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone").
200. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
201. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 598 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis).
202. Id. (statement of Sen. Davis).
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ing "[aill the legislation that may be devised by Congress, and all the
oppressive and unjust discriminations sought to be introduced against the
white man. ' ' 03
Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania, a conservative Republican,
agreed. He wondered whether his colleagues really wanted to see "the
President ... intervene with bayonet and ball" if a state punished a black
man for marrying a white woman. Was that, Cowan asked, "prudent, politic, lawful, or cons utona
Representative John L. Dawson of Pennsylvania was even more direct. "[T]his Government," he declared, "was
made by and for the white race." Under abolitionist guidance, federalizing
family law would "involve[] and demand[] social equality." "[Black] children [would] attend the same schools with white children" and interracial
marriages would soon follow, with the black man enjoying "the privilege of
205
free miscegenation accord[ed] him.,
Along much the same lines, Reconstruction's congressional opponents
also argued that involving the federal government in family law would
threaten the legal subordination of wives to husbands and children to parents. In Congress, Senator Cowan raised his voice again to predict that
allowing Reconstruction to disturb state family law with notions of equal
protection would endanger "the involuntary servitude of [his] child to
[him] .... or the quasi servitude which the wife to some extent owes to her
husband."2°6 While the Senator never denied federal jurisdiction over
family law, Cowan urged narrower statutes on the ground that Congress did
not want to "actually liberate the minor from the control of his parent or
guardian" or to "actually entitle the wife to be paid for her services, [rather
than having her wages] go to the husband. 20 7 Similarly, New York Repre203. Id. at 397 (statement of Sen. Davis).

Following Davis's line of argument, Repre-

sentative Andrew J. Rogers of New Jersey asked:
Has Congress the power to enter the domain of a State, and destroy its police regulations with regard to the punishment inflicted upon negroes? For instance, the State of
Kentucky, provides by law that if a negro man commits a rape upon a white woman, he
shall be punished by death; but a white man committing a rape upon a white woman
is to be punished by imprisonment.
Id. at 1121 (statement of Rep. Rogers).
204. Id. at 604 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
205. Id. at 541 (statement of Rep. Dawson).
206. Id. at 499 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
207. Id. at 1784 (statement of Sen. Cowan); see also id. at 499 (same). Cowan similarly
observed:
[A] married woman in no State that I know of has a right to make contracts generally.... Now, I ask Senators... whether they are willing.., to interfere with regard
to the contracts of married women.... I say that this bill ... confers upon married
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sentative Robert Hale warned that the Fourteenth Amendment's
"extremely vague, loose, and indefinite" language would enable Congress to
guarantee married women equal property rights, at a time when one could
not find "a State in the Union where disability of married women in relation to the rights of property [did] not to a greater or less extent still exist."
"[Slubjects of this character," he insisted, would consequently better
remain objects of exclusively state concern.'o'
Such localist appeals, however, were unavailing. Reconstruction's
opponents never effectively countered their adversaries' contention that
certain basic family rights were essential to freedom and that Congress
could guarantee these rights without endangering state anti-miscegenation
and coverture laws. The results-the Civil Rights and Freedmen's Bureau
Acts of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment-concretely improved the
family law governing the emancipated slaves.
4.

Outcome

The Reconstruction enactments quickly altered the landscape of family law for the freedmen. Although the impact of this federal law varied
and could occasionally (as with the postwar challenges to antimiscegenation discussed below) go beyond what Congress had intended, z°'
the consequences of Reconstruction in the postwar period importantly
reflected the familial concerns of its congressional authors. The fate of
state laws permitting the involuntary apprenticeship of freedchildren is one
of the more notable cases in point."l
women, upon minors, upon idiots, upon lunatics... the right to make and enforce
contracts ....
Id. at 1781-82 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
208. Id. at 1064 (statement of Rep. Hale).
209. See infra Part II.D.2.
210. Laura Edwards has recently written a fascinating account of the ways in which North
Carolina freedmen used their new legal ability to marry as the foundation from which to attack
See LAURA F. EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE AND
racial discrimination of many sorts.
CONFUSION: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RECONSTRUCTION 40-54 (1997) [hereinafter
EDWARDS, GENDERED STRIFE AND CONFUSION]; Laura F. Edwards, "The Marriage Covenant Is at

the Foundation of All Our Rights": The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina After
Emancipation, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 81 (1996) [hereinafter Edwards, The Marriage Covenant].
There is, however, less of a litigated record on the right of freedmen to marry. While the white

South fiercely contested the former slaves' efforts to control their children and their children's
labor, they frequently encouraged the freedmen to marry. Marriages among the emancipated
slaves, it was thought, would make the freedmen economically responsible for themselves
and their families, protecting the public fisc from the claims of unattached women and children
and encouraging all former slaves to return to productive labor. See EDWARDS, GENDERED
STRIFE AND CONFUSION, supra, at 34-40; Edwards, The Marriage Covenant, supra, at 91-94;
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Enacted throughout the South in the immediate aftermath of the
Civil War, these statutes attempted to recreate the conditions of bondage-including slavery's restrictions on family formation-as closely
as possible."' Legalizing family separation and ignoring all parental rights,
they authorized local judges to apprentice black children without their parents' consent
and under
conditions
resembling slavery in their harshness
and '.
r
.
212
and lack of compensation. More than twenty-five hundred children were
so "apprenticed" within the first month after emancipation, often to their

former masters."' By 1867, approximately ten thousand freedchildren had
been bound in Maryland alone."1 4 The Reconstruction Congress specifically targeted these laws as violations of parental prerogatives," l' and its
work soon rendered them void.
PETER KOLCHIN, FIRST FREEDOM: THE RESPONSES OF ALABAMA'S BLACKS TO EMANCIPATION

AND RECONSTRUCTION 59-60 (1972); LITWACK, supra note 141, at 240-41.
211. Many freedmen understood involuntary apprenticeship in explicitly familial terms and
argued that countervailing federal intervention was justified and required to protect the family
rights of the emancipated slaves. For instance, leaders of the African-American community in
Baltimore called on President Johnson to sign the 1866 Civil Rights bill
[blecause everywhere throughout the State our homes are invaded and our little
ones seized at the family fireside, and forcibly bound to masters who are by law expressly
released from any obligation to educate them either in secular or religious knowledge;
and because the Legislature of Maryland would not, by the repeal of this law, give us the
right to a home or guarantee to us the safety of our children around the hearth while we
were at labor, or their support in our old age.
The Civil Rights Bill: Petition of Loyal Colored Men, BALTIMORE AM. AND COM. ADVERTISER,
Mar. 19, 1866, at 1.
212. See S. EXEC. DOc. NO. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 172-74, 180-81, 187-88, 190-91, 19798, 200-02, 208, 224-26 (1867) (reprinting Southern Black Codes on apprenticeship);
ROBERTA SUE ALEXANDER, NORTH CAROLINA FACES THE FREEDMEN: RACE RELATIONS
DURING PRESIDENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-67, at 45, 89, 113 (1985); GEORGE R.

BENTLEY, A HISTORY OF THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU 80, 179 (1955); EDWARDS, GENDERED
STRIFE AND CONFUSION, supra note 210, at 39, 41-45; BARBARA JEANNE FIELDS, SLAVERY AND
FREEDOM ON THE MIDDLE GROUND: MARYLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 139-42
(1985); FONER, supra note 141, at 201; GUTMAN, supra note 122, at 402; WILMA KING, STOLEN
CHILDHOOD: SLAVE YOUTH IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 151-52 (1995); KOLCHIN,
supra note 210, at 63-64; LITWACK, supra note 141, at 191, 237-38, 365-66; Edwards, The Marriage Covenant, supra note 210, at 97-98, 101-06, 116-19; W.A. Low, The Freedmen's Bureau and
Civil Rights in Maryland, 37 J. NEGRO HIST. 221, 229, 231-32 (1952); John B. Myers, The Freedman and the Law in Post-Bellum Alabama, 1865-1867, 23 ALA. REV. 56, 62-63, 66-67 (1970);
Rebecca Scott, The Battle over the Child: Child Apprenticeship and the Freedmen's Bureau in North
Carolina, 10 PROLOGUE 100, 104 (1978); Richard Paul Fuke, Black Marylanders, 1864-1868, at
ch.l0 (1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago) (on file with author);
Joseph Patrick Reidy, Masters and Slaves, Planters and Freedmen: The Transition from Slavery
to Freedom in Central Georgia, 1820-1880, at 213-18 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Northern Illinois University) (on file with author).
213. See KING, supra note 212, at 151; see also FONER, supra note 141, at 40-41.
214. See Low, supra note 212, at 233.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 149-150.
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Immediately after the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau, emancipated slaves turned to the federal agency for assistance in liberating their
children from unwanted apprenticeships."' "'Not a day passes," reported
one Annapolis officer, "'but my office isvisited by some poor woman who has
walked perhaps ten or twenty miles to see the agent of the bureau, and try
to procure the release of her children taken forcibly away from her and held
to all intents and purposes in slavery.""'2 7 In 1867, this man estimated that
the parents of apprenticed children had registered no less than two
thousand complaints with his office in the past year.118 The Freedmen's
Bureau was not able to help every parent who came to its door, and some
agents and offices were less devoted to that task than others.1 9 But many
Bureau officials recognized that Reconstruction had given the former slaves
a right to raise their children, to control their children's labor, and to keep
their families together, and they eagerly combated involuntary apprenticeship on that basis. In setting out the rules under which his office would
operate, Eliphalet Whittlesey, the assistant commissioner for the Freedmen's Bureau in North Carolina, made clear that 'children may be bound
to service with the consent of their parents only."' As he explained, "'[in
law parents [including freedmen] have a right to their children. The
principle is an important one, though in exceptional cases, its application
may work badly.' 220 Superintendent Allen G. Brady similarly understood
involuntary apprenticeship in terms of the rights of freedparents, rather
than their children, and assailed the practice on that ground: 'Great
care,"' he insisted to his subordinates, "'must be exercised that none except
orphans, or ''children
whose parents give their consent, be bound out as
2
apprentices.

1

216. See FIELDS, supra note 212, at 149; FONER, supra note 141, at 201; KING, supra note
212, at 144, 152-54; KOLCHIN, supra note 210, at 64-67; LITWACK, supra note 141, at 237-38;
Low, supra note 212, at 233-34; Reidy, supra note 212, at 215-16.
During the months before Congress established the Freedmen's Bureau, the United States
Army, acting at the direction of particular local commanders in the occupied South, took a
leading role in combatting the involuntary apprenticeship of emancipated slaves. See FIELDS,
supra note 212, at 148-49; Fuke, supra note 212, at 185-91.
217.

0.0. HOWARD, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF REFUGEES,

FREEDMEN AND ABANDONED LANDS 41 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1867).
218. See id.
219. See KING, supra note 212, at 152; Scott, supra note 212, at 101-02, 104, 107-08.
220. Scott, supra note 212, at 102-03.
221. Id. at 109. Along the same lines, Oliver Otis Howard, the commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau in Maryland, decreed "that children cannot be bound out without consent of the
parents, or in case of an orphan, not without consent of an officer of this Bureau, or a guardian
approved by such authority.... [Clonsent should be obtained, otherwise the parent will have the
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As early as 1867, a family of former slaves had won, with the Bureau's
support, the seminal case establishing that the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and
the Thirteenth Amendment that it was meant to enforce, had rendered all
involuntary apprenticeships illegal. 2 ' Two days after her emancipation,
Elizabeth Turner, then eight years old, was bound as an apprentice to her
former master, Philemon T. Hambleton.2 The terms of the agreement
differed dramatically from those governing white apprentices, giving
Turner no right to an education,2 4 setting her total salary for ten years of
work at $37.50,'25 and according her master a transferable 'property'
interest in her service.216 Although Hambleton claimed to have received

the consent of Turner's mother, she was also one of his former slaves and
the voluntariness of any agreement on her part was highly questionable. 2 7
Riding circuit in Maryland, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase of the United
States Supreme Court held that Turner's "alleged apprenticeship" was
"involuntary servitude, within the meaning of these words in the
[thirteenth] amendment." He also found that any apprenticeship of a black
child that did not adopt the same terms and conditions that governed
white apprentices violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866."8 The decision
spelled the end for involuntary apprenticeships, 22 9 and soon thereafter 235
apprenticed black children were freed in one subdistrict of the Maryland
Freedmen's Bureau alone."o As Reconstruction's supporters had intended,
right to the child." Freed Slaves in Maryland-Indentureof Colored Children, SUN (Baltimore),
July 24, 1865, at 4; see also KING, supra note 212, at 152.
222. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). Henry Stockbridge,
the freedmen's lawyer, was a Bureau affiliate appointed specifically to combat the involuntary
apprenticeship of former slaves. See Low, supra note 212, at 228.
223. See Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 337-39.
224. See id. at 339.
225. See id. at 338.
226. Id. at 339 (quoting Maryland apprenticeship statute).
227. See id. at 338.
228. Id. at 339.
229. See Low, supra note 212, at 245 ("[In re Turner] made the system of apprenticeship
legally untenable. Slowly and often reluctantly, whites of Maryland began to release bound
Negro apprentices in larger numbers than ever before. Toward the close of the year following the
decision, a letter from the Bureau was often sufficient in procuring the release of Negro youths.");
FONER, supra note 141, at 602 ("The post-Reconstruction labor system embodied neither a
return to the closely supervised gang labor of antebellum days, nor the complete dispossession
and immobilization of the black labor force and coercive apprenticeship systems envisioned by
white Southerners in 1865 and 1866."); Edwards, The MarriageCovenant, supra note 210, at 119
(on North Carolina); Fuke, supra note 212, at 215 ("From October 1867, to July 1868, Negro
apprenticeship in Maryland gradually crumbled. Planters in most tidewater areas accepted the
consequences of the inevitable and quietly released their children. Some resisted to the end, but
eventually, they too had to submit.").
230. See GUTMAN, supra note 122, at 412.
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their federal intervention had helped destroy the restrictions on family
formation that were constitutive of American slavery and helped provide
the freedmen with the family rights inherent in freedom.
D.

Congress's Anti-Polygamy Campaign and
the Postwar Anti-Miscegenation Litigation

The assertion of federal authority over family law in the midnineteenth century was not limited to Reconstruction itself. During the
same years that Congress enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment, it pursued an aggressive and overwhelmingly
popular campaign against polygamy, in the process enacting a federal
family law undeniably directed at whites. Indeed, the notion that family
law was particularly and exclusively local was so undeveloped at the
time that even courts reviewing the postwar legality of state antimiscegenation laws made the contention late and with little emphasis,
writing the majority of their opinions on the assumption that the federal
government could regulate family law and demonstrating real concern that
Reconstruction had actually reached far enough into the family that it
legalized interracial sex and marriage.
1.

Anti-Polygamy and Federal Family Law

Uncle Tom's Cabin had a counterpart in the mid-nineteenth century
in another wildly popular genre of reformist fiction. 3 Anti-polygamy
novels, and the platform of the Republican Party from 1856 onwards,
called polygamy and slavery "twin relics of barbarism," warning that the
first would lead its victims into the latter."' When the Republicans took
over Congress in 1860, they displayed no compunction about using federal
231. In fact, the Mormons first publicly confirmed their commitment to polygamy in 1852,
the same year that Harriet Beecher Stowe published Uncle Tom's Cabin. See GUSTIVE 0.
LARSON, THE "AMERICANIZATION" OF UTAH FOR STATEHOOD 37 (1971) (noting 1852
announcement). On anti-polygamy fiction, see generally Sarah Barringer Gordon, "Our National
Hearthstone": Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the Sentimental Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295 (1996). Anti-polygamy ultimately became far more
popular and widespread than abolitionism. See EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN
MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900, at 129 (1988) ("In 1856 the Republican Party platform set as
its goals the eradication of the twin relics of barbarism: slavery and polygamy .... The first goal
was controversial and was achieved only through a bloody civil war. On the other hand, everyone-except the Mormons-favored the eradication of polygamy.").
232. Republican Platform of 1856, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1956,
at 27, 27 (Kirk H. Porter & Donald Bruce Johnson comps., 1956).
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power to destroy the intertwined evils. Both horrors called for a powerful
assertion of federal control over family law.
By the time of the Civil War, polygamy had been the official policy of
a section of the United States for almost a decade. ' The Mormon church,
which dominated the territory of Utah from its establishment, publicly
acknowledged plural marriage as a fundamental element of the Mormon
faith in 1852.23 A sweeping territorial statute functionally codified the
practice by granting the Church absolute control over family law for all
Church members."' After 1852 in the territory of Utah, polygamy was
unquestionably legal, openly practiced, and a guiding premise of much
territorial legislation. Mormon leaders defended the family form as a local
prerogative in a federal system, a domestic relation that-like slavery-the
Constitution protected from national regulation or control. 6
Using this analogy to opposite effect, anti-polygamy advocacy linked
polygamy and slavery in order to demand federal regulation of family life. 37
233. During many of the same years that Congress pursued its anti-polygamy campaign
against the Mormons, the federal government also intervened to restructure the marital relation
amongst American Indians. By 1883, the Secretary of the Interior was intent on"impress[ing]
[the Indians] with our idea of this important relation." 1 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR, H.R. EXEC. DOc. NO. 1, pt. 5, at xi (1883). To this end, he recommended to Congress that the federal government prohibit polygamy amongst the Indians. The Secretary also
sought to require Native American men to support their wives and children financially, a strategy meant to both "civilize the Indians" and protect the federal budget. Id. at x-xi. The Secretary explained:
Some system of marriage should be adopted, and the Indian compelled to conform to it.
The Indian should also be instructed that he is under obligations to care for and
support, not only his wife, but his children, and on his failure, without proper cause, to
continue as the head of such family, he ought in some manner to be punished, which
should be either by confinement in the guard-house or agency prison, or by a reduction
of his rations.
The Government having attempted to support the Indians until such time as they
shall become self-supporting, the interest of the Government as well as that of the
Indians demands that every possible effort should be made to induce them to become
self-supporting at as early a day as possible.
Id. at xi-xii. As part of the resulting campaign to reorder Native American marriage practices,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs established in 1883 a system of "Indian courts" with jurisdiction to punish polygamy and concubinage criminally. See Report of the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, in 2 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, H.R. EXEC. Doc. NO. 1, pt. 5, at 9,

10-11 (1883); Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in 2 REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF
THE INTERIOR, H.R. EXEC. DOc. NO. 1, pt. 5, at 5, 28-30 (1892).
234. See LARSON, supra note 231, at 37.
235. See 1851 Deseret Laws 67, § 3.
236. See DAVIS BITION, Polygamy Defended: One Side of a Nineteenth-Century Polemic, in
THE RITUALIZATION OF MORMON HISTORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 34, 41-42, 44 (1994).
237. Analogies to slavery remained prominent in anti-polygamy for years after Appomattox,
with advocates drawing strength from the success of abolition. The women who founded the
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Beginning in the early 1850s, novels, lectures, and newspaper editorials
argued that both peculiar institutions systematized male debauchery, denying women access to valid marriages and subjecting them instead to
institutionalized sexual exploitation. According to this account, polygamy
meant the enslavement of women in a "sink of iniquity,"2 8 a "monstrous
combination of superstition, ignorance, and debauchery. ' 3 9 Indeed, the
anti-polygamy argument continued, plural wives, like bondsmen, spent
their lives performing backbreaking work without reward from indolent
and physically abusive masters. Polygamy, along with slavery, allowed its
patriarchs to become "to the last degree demoralized, effeminate, and lazy"
and transformed women into "inhuman wretches"-"white slaves."2' 4
Worse yet, Mormon control over Utah left polygamy's victims without
legal recourse. As one anti-polygamist explained, with localities controlling family law, the Mormons
"were at liberty to form such laws as suited them, to establish precedents and decisions, conformable to their own views; and, above all,
Anti-Polygamy Standard in Utah in 1880, for instance, made their newspaper the namesake of the
NationalAnti-Slavery Standard, a leading abolitionist journal. Their inaugural issue proclaimed:
It took long years of agitation before the Anti-Slavery party of the United States
succeeded in abolishing that system which was a shame and disgrace to our country, but
they did succeed at last! And the women who inaugurated the Anti-Polygamy Society
are determined to persevere and keep this subject agitated until it, like the other twin
relic of barbarism shall no longer be a foul blot on our escutcheon as a nation, but shall
also be a thing of the past.
The Ladies' Anti-Polygamy Society of Utah, ANTI-POLYGAMY STANDARD (Salt Lake City), Apr.
1880, at 1, 1. Harriet Beecher Stowe herself voiced a similar ambition in 1874:
Our day has seen a glorious breaking of fetters. The slave-pens of the South have
become a nightmare of the past; the auction-block and whipping-post have given place
to the church and school-house; and the songs of emancipated millions are heard
through our land.
Shall we not then hope that the hour is come to loose the bonds of a cruel slavery
whose chains have cut into the very hearts of thousands of our sisters-a slavery which
debases and degrades womanhood, motherhood, and the family?
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Preface to T.B.H. STENHOUSE, "TELL IT ALL": THE STORY OF A LIFE'S
EXPERIENCE IN MORMONISM, at vi (Hartford, A.D. Worthington & Co. 1874).
238. The Modern Sodom, NAT'L INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 20, 1857, at 3.
239. Current Affairs, DAILY SAN JOAQUIN REPUBLICAN, May 22, 1857, at 2. For a postwar
reiteration of this theme, see THE WOMEN OF MORMONISM; OR, THE STORY OF POLYGAMY AS
TOLD BY THE VICTIMS THEMSELVES 113 (Jennie Anderson Froiseth ed., Detroit, C.G.G. Paine

1882) ("[Polygamy] renders man coarse, tyrannical, brutal, and heartless. It deals death to all
sentiments of true manhood. It enslaves and ruins woman. It crucifies every God-given feeling
of her nature.").
240. ALFREDA EVA BELL, BOADICEA, THE MORMON WIFE: LIFE SCENES IN UTAH 34, 32,
54 (Baltimore, Arthur R. Orton 1855); see also David Brion Davis, Some Themes of CounterSubversion: An Analysis of Anti-Masonic, Anti-Catholic, and Anti-Mormon Literature, 47 MISS.
VALLEY HIST. REV. 205, 221 (1960) ("[According to the anti-polygamy literature,] Mormons
raped and lashed recalcitrant women, or seared their mouths with red-hot irons.").
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the utter impossibility of escape or appeal, exercised a wonderful
influence over the dissatisfied, and aided, more than anything else, in
causing them to abide by their fate,1 and conform to the circum24
stances in which they were placed."

For anti-polygamy thinkers and their broad base of supporters, the solution
was clear. As Kate Field declared in her popular lecture tours across the
nation, '[t]he cure for the disease' of polygamy would be found '"in a universal marriage law. 'It [was] a disgrace that there [was] no United States
242
marriage law."..
Anti-polygamists demanded coercive federal regulation of family law.
After succession and the withdrawal of Southerners who had recognized
anti-polygamy's abolitionist ties and thwarted its progress,24 3 Congress
quickly responded. Informed by a decade of consistent advocacy coupling
polygamy with slavery to identify both as degraded family forms, federal
legislators were convinced that polygamy constituted, as its opponents
warned, a crisis in marriage. Repudiating the Mormon claim that family
241.

MARIA WARD, FEMALE LIFE AMONG THE MORMONS: A NARRATIVE OF MANY YEARS'

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 294-95 (New York, J.C. Derby 1855), quoted in Gordon, supra note 231,

at 329.
242. LILIAN WHITING, KATE FIELD: A RECORD 446 (Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 1899)
(quoting Mr. Charles A. Dana, Miss Kate Field as a Model of Self-Possession and Enduring Interest,
N.Y. SUN). Whiting reported Field's popularity and influence in no uncertain terms:
There is no exaggeration in saying that Miss Field aroused the entire country with
these lectures. Her statements offered a revelation of conditions little known. Rarely
has such fire and eloquence and splendor of oratory, combined with the mental discipline of trained thought, scholarly acquirements, and finished elegance, been known in
the annals of the lyceum.
Id. at 429-30.
Field, who lectured on a wide variety of subjects, also advocated "'a national marriage law"'
to combat escalating divorce rates. Id. at 451 (quoting Field). For discussion of the connection
between anti-polygamy, anti-divorce, and other movements to regulate deviant family forms, see
Davis, supra note 240, at 219 ("[Anti-Mormon] literature was written in a period of increasing
anxiety and uncertainty over sexual values and the proper role of women.... [Mlinisters and
journalists pointed with alarm at the spread of prostitution, the incidence of divorce, and the lax
and hypocritical morality of the growing cities .... "); KIMBALL YOUNG, ISN'T ONE WIFE

ENOUGH? 26-27 (1954).
243. On the South's concerns, see, e.g., CONG GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1410 (1860)
(statement of Rep. Branch) ("I will suggest to my friends upon this side of the House, that if
we... render polygamy criminal, it may be claimed that we can also render criminal that other
'twin relic of barbarism,' slavery, as it is called in the Republican platform of 1856."); id. at app.
197 (statement of Rep. Keitt) ("If there is power in Congress to inspect the morals of a nascent
political community, and of its own autocratic will to decree this and prohibit that, where will
you find a check upon its power?"); id. (statement of Rep. Keitt) ("And shall we, under the
impulse of an honest reprobation of an offensive and hated practice in Utah, sanction this
hideous usurpation of power? I never will. If you allow Congress to declare polygamy in the
Territories to be a crime, and to punish it, where will you stop?").
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law was Utah's exclusively local prerogative, Congress enacted a legislative
scheme that completely displaced the established local code governing
family law in Utah.
Representative Daniel Gooch of Massachusetts proposed as early
as 1860 an anti-polygamy statute that would have also transformed
adultery, fornication, and lewd cohabitation into federal crimes. 24" As he
explained, "a judicious parent ....permits the child to regulate and govern
his own conduct so long as he applies wholesome and salutary rules to
himself; but when he fails to do that, the parent again resumes the exercise
of control over his own offspring." 4 ' Representative William Elliot Simms
of Kentucky agreed that rather than "interfere" with local family law,
federal anti-polygamy legislation would
safeguard the institution of
46
virtue.
national
preserve
marriage and
The Morrill Act of 1862 criminalized bigamy, annulled the incorporation of the Mormon Church, and prohibited any religious organization
from owning real estate worth more than $50,000.247 Like all subsequent
anti-polygamy legislation, it was limited to the territories,248 which the
Constitution places under Congress's plenary authority. 49 But while the
anti-polygamy campaign was not the legal equivalent of other instances
of federal intervention into family law, 5 it is a close historical analogy
to Reconstruction, highly illustrative of contemporary thought.
To
244.

See id. at 1540 (statement of Rep. Gooch).

245. POLYGAMY IN UTAH: SPEECH OF THE HON. DANIEL W. GOOCH OF MASSACHUSETTS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, APRIL 4, 1860 (Washington 1860).
246. CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 199 (1860) (statement of Rep. Simms).

247. See An Act to punish and prevent the Practice of Polygamy in the Territories of the
United States and other Places, and disapproving and annulling certain Acts of the Legislative
Assembly of the Territory of Utah (Morrill Act), ch. 126, §§ 1-3, 12 Stat. 501, 501-02 (1862);
see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878) (upholding Morrill Act and
declining to find religious exemption).
248. See, e.g., Morrill Act § 1, at 501 (outlawing bigamy in territories "or other place over
which the United States have exclusive jurisdiction").
249. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (granting Congress plenary authority over United
States territory and property).
250. For instance, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of territorial courts
whose judges are appointed under Article 1,rather than Article Ill, on the ground that Congress
exercises all powers of government in the territories, including those that the states normally discharge. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
The recent legislative hearings on the Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110
Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 11 1996) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West
Supp. 1998)), nevertheless provide an interesting footnote to the legal principles differentiating
Congress's activities in the territories. Supporters of the 1996 statute-which promulgates a federal definition of marriage, denies federal benefits to same-sex couples, and permits states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states-cited the federal anti-polygamy
legislation as precedent for their proposed federal regulation of marriage law. See Defense of Mar-
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nineteenth-century minds, slavery and polygamy were of a kind. Both were
"relics of barbarism" that demanded federal intervention in order to ensure
proper family relations. The Morrill Act, which defined marriage, was a
statement of federal family law, setting out national standards and
preempting an entire local family code. Indeed, a federal court citing the
Barber dictum that disclaimed federal jurisdiction over marriage and
divorce now felt compelled to add a caveat: Congress, the court carefully
noted, has "prohibited polygamy in any 'territory or other place over which
the United States has exclusive jurisdiction.'.''
After the Civil War, Congress's attention soon returned to antipolygamy, still determined to assert national control over deviant family
relations and to close the now-apparent gaps in the 1862 Act."' As Congressmen debated the Civil Rights Act of 1866, New York Representative
Elijah Ward stepped forward to denounce the "great and remaining barbarism of [their] age and country," one that still had to "be swept (like the twin
system of slavery) from the Territories of the Republic." The Mormons, he
declared, were defiantly "sustaining the abominable system of polygamy."
In fact, "the crime and abomination consequent thereon [were] largely
on the increase." Ward did not understand why the Morrill Act had not
been effective, but he was determined to see Congress adopt "means
adequate" to abolishing polygamy. To that end, Ward proposed that the
House Committee on Territories "inquire and ascertain what means, civil
or military, may lawfully be resorted to to effectually eradicate this evil
from the land, and what legislation is needed, if any, to effect that object,
and what reasons exist why the laws against polygamy have not been
executed." The resolution passed without need for debate."'
riage Act: Hearing on H.R. 3396 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm.on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 32 (1996) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) ("There is precedent for the
Congress acting in this area and some of it's 100 years old. The admission of Utah to theUnion
was delayed for several years until such time as Utah agreed to abolish polygamy and not to
legalize polygamy once admitted to the Union.").
251. In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas. 262, 264 (N.D. Ga. 1871) (No. 6,550) (quoting Morrill Act).
The court also noted that "Congress ... ha[d] enacted laws regulating marriage and divorce in
the District of Columbia." Id.
252. The Morrill Act was ultimately unenforceable, largely because Utah grand juries, which
Mormons dominated, refused to indict. See LARSON, supra note 231, at 62. The poorly drafted
statute also required proof of multiple marriages without directing Utah to keep marriage records,
and set a three-year statute of limitations, which the Mormons allegedly evaded by sending
polygamists abroad on three-year missions immediately after their plural marriages. See FIRMAGE
& MANGRUM, supra note 231, at 149-51.
253. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1866) (statement of Rep. Ward) (emphasis
added).
Later that year, the Territories Committee reported that "the laws of the United States
[were] openly and defiantly violated throughout the [Utah] Territory." It called for a "practical

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1362 1997-1998

Federalism and the Family Reconstructed

1363

Over the next twenty years, Congress would enlarge the jurisdiction
of federal territorial courts in Utah," 4 disenfranchise polygamists," exclude
all faithful Mormons from juries,3 6 and lower the standard of proof necessary to establish polygamy.3 7 In upholding these federal assaults on polygamy, the Supreme Court explained that abolishing this familial
arrangement was necessary for national security. As the Court reasoned in
1885, America's freedom and national virtue rested on
the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from
the union for life of one man and one woman in the holy estate
of matrimony; the sure foundation of all that is stable and noble
in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent morality which
is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political
improvement.

Indeed, the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 188759 added a whole new chapter to
the federal law of the family. Having extended federal jurisdiction in the
territories to divorce cases in 1874," 0 Congress now defined and criminalsolution to the evils and abuses complained of," but had some difficulty proposing one. H.R.
REP. No. 39-96, at 1 (1866). Another report, from the House Judiciary Committee in 1867,
similarly conceded "[tlhe humiliating fact.., that the law is at present practically a dead letter
in the Territory of Utah," concluding "that the gravest necessity exists for its enforcement."
H.R. REP. 39-27, at 3 (1867).
254. The Poland Act, ch. 469, 18 Stat. 253 (1874), granted federal district courts in Utah
exclusive jurisdiction over federal crimes, see id. § 3, at 254, and the ability to empanel juries
whose membership was at least half non-Mormon, see id. § 4, at 254-55. It also provided that
the United States Supreme Court could review on appeal any decision about polygamy or bigamy
from the Utah Supreme Court, rather than only those that invalidated a federal law or upheld a
local one against constitutional challenge. See id. § 3, at 254.
255. See An act to amend section fifty-three hundred and fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of
the United States, in reference to bigamy, and for other purposes (Edmunds Act), ch. 47, § 8, 22
Stat. 30, 31-32 (1882).
256. Seeid.§5, at31.
257. See id. § 3, at 31. The Edmunds Act criminalized cohabitation with more than one
woman at a time. Thus, prosecutors did not need to prove multiple marriages. See id.
258. Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885) (upholding Edmunds Act of 1882); see also
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890) ("[Bigamy and polygamy] tend to destroy the purity of
the marriage relation, to disturb the peace of families, to degrade woman and to debase man.
Few crimes are more pernicious to the best interests of society and receive more general or more
deserved punishment."); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("[P]olygamy leads
to the patriarchal principle.... which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in
stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.").
259. An act .to amend an act entitled "An act to amend section fifty-three hundred and
fifty-two of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in reference to bigamy, and for other
purposes," approved March twenty-second, eighteen hundred and eighty-two (Edmunds-Tucker
Act), ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635 (1887).
260. See Poland Act, ch. 469, § 3, 18 Stat. 253, 253-54 (1874).
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6

met 262
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263

ized adultery,"' incest,
and fornication;
abolished spousal immunity
and permitted
plural wives to testify against their husbands in polygamy
264
cases; granted the first wives of polygamous men a dower right;2 6 and
provided that children who were born to subsequent wives more than
twelve months after the enactment of this statute would be considered

illegitimates who could not inherit.268
Four months after the Supreme Court upheld the Edmunds-Tucker
Act in 1890,267 the Mormon Church capitulated, renouncing polygamy as
an element of the faith. 268 Congress, however, was still not satisfied-even
when the Utah territory had otherwise met the criteria for statehood.
In 1894, Congress enacted legislation that conditioned Utah's admission
into the union on its agreement to provide in its state constitution, in
language "irrevocable without the consent of the United States," that
"4polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited., 269 To this day, the
Utah Constitution states that polygamy is "forever prohibited."7 0 Congress
understood polygamy to be on a par with slavery, and its anti-polygamy
261. See Edmunds-Tucker Act § 3, at 635-36.
262. See id. § 4, at 636.
263. See id. § 5, at 636.
264. See id. § 1, at 635.
265. See id. § 18, at 638-39.
266. See id. § 11, at 637. This provision represented a change in policy from the Edmunds
Act of 1882 § 7, at 31, which stated that children of polygamous marriages who were born before
1883 would be considered legitimate.
The Edmunds-Tucker Act also directed the U.S. Attorney General to see that the Mormon
Church corporation was abolished and all but $50,000 of its property escheated, finally enforcing
the Morrill Act's mandate. See Edmunds-Tucker Act § 13, at 637, § 17, at 638. Lastly, the 1887
Act disenfranchised women in the Utah territory, reversing territorial law. See id. § 20, at 639;
Sarah Barringer Gordon, "The Liberty of Self-Degradation": Polygamy, Woman Suffrage, and Consent in Nineteenth-Century America, 83 J. AM. HIST. 815 (1996).
267. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136
U.S. 1 (1890).
268. See LARSON, supra note 231, at 263-64 (reprinting Mormon manifesto making this
declaration).
269. The Utah Enabling Act states that:
[The Utah constitutional] convention shall provide, by ordinance irrevocable without
the consent of the United States and the people of said StateFirst. That perfect toleration of religious sentiment shall be secured, and that no
inhabitant of said State shall ever be molested in person or property on account of his
or her mode of religious worship: Provided, That polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.
An Act To enable the people of Utah to form a constitution and State government, and to be
admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107,
108 (1894).
270. UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1.
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campaign importantly paralleled Reconstruction. Convinced that polygamy, like slavery, was a perversion of domestic relations, Congress
intervened here, as in Reconstruction, to enforce national standards of
proper familial conduct.
2.

Federalism in the Anti-Miscegenation Litigation

The postwar place of family law in the federal system was so complicated and in flux, and the familial concerns of Reconstruction so clear, that
even courts reviewing the contention that the 1866 Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment had rendered state anti-miscegenation statutes
unlawful thought it possible that federal power reached so far into familial
relations as to be able to legalize the domestic arrangement that whites
most feared. With the scope of federal authority unclear, judges assumed
that federal law could regulate marriage. Displaying real signs of worry,
they tried to explain, in this light, why the particular federal actions
undertaken during Reconstruction had left interracial relationships
unprotected. The assertion that family law was exclusively within the
states' purview, which-if established-would have disposed of these
unsettling challenges quickly and easily, appeared only after a number of
years of litigation, and only as one of many arguments. Clearly, the
proposition was not self-evident, even when protecting white America
from social horror was at stake.
As their congressional opponents had predicted, the 1866 Civil Rights
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment soon gave rise to claims that the
states could no longer prohibit interracial marriage."' In fact, a few early
challenges actually succeeded.2 2 In Burns v. State,2" the Alabama Supreme
Court rejected the argument, which congressional supporters of the 1866
Civil Rights Act had developed, that the 1866 Act did not disturb formally
271. The Supreme Court essentially settled this controversy in 1883, by holding that prohibitions on interracial adultery and fornication satisfied the requirements of equal protection

if they punished blacks as harshly as whites. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883),
overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 184 (1964); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,

12 (1967).
272. See aLso State v. Webb, 4 Cent. L.J. 588, 588-89 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1877) (rejecting claim
under Civil Rights Act of 1866, but holding that abolition had repealed Texas anti-miscegenation

law by implication), rev'd, Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 277 (1877) (holding that Texas
anti-miscegenation statute was not repealed by implication).

273. 48 Ala. 195 (1872) (reversing conviction of justice of the peace for marrying interracial
couple), limited by Ford v. State, 53 Ala. 150, 151 (1875), overruled by Green v. State, 58 Ala.

190,197 (1877).
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equal restraints on the marital choices of whites and blacks." 4 More
strikingly, every member of the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed in Hart v.
Hoss & Elder.. that marriage was "a civil contract" within the meaning,
and under the jurisdiction, of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.16 These two
decisions were quickly reversed, and no other state would overturn its antimiscegenation laws in light of Reconstruction. But the notion that the
states had exclusive jurisdiction over marriage was hardly responsible for
the successful defense of anti-miscegenation. That argument did not surface in the judicial opinions until 1871, when the Indiana Supreme Court
articulated it in State v. Gibson 77 as a sidelight to a somewhat bizarre
holding. Subsequent cases cited Gibson for the proposition, but never felt
comfortable relying on its weight. The claim that family law was exclusively for the states was too strong, and too doubtful, to carry the day. 7 "
Gibson held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not add to the powers of the federal government at all, a dubious and distinctly minority posi274. As the court explained:
The [1866 Act] intended to destroy the distinctions of race and color in respect to the
rights secured by it. It did not aim to create merely an equality of the races in reference to each other ....It can not be supposed that this discrimination [the antimiscegenation statute] was otherwise than against the negro, on account of his
servile condition, because no State would be so unwise as to impose disabilities in so
important a matter as marriage on its most favored citizens, without consideration of
their advantage.
Bums, 48 Ala. at 197.
275. 26 La. Ann. 90 (1874) (recognizing validity of interracial marriage for purpose of children's inheritance).
276. Id. at 98 ("The [1866] law declares [that people of color] 'shall have the same right,
in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts' ..... Marriage
is a civil contract."); id. at 101 (Morgan, J., dissenting) ("Marriage is, with us, a civil contract;
inheritance is regulated by law. White persons and persons of color may by this [1866] act
contract marriage; colored children may inherit. This proposition I do not dispute.").
Although civil law, rather than common law, governed this Louisiana decision, the state's
family law policies during the nineteenth century generally conformed with those adopted in
common law states. See ELIZABETH BOWLES WARBASSE, THE CHANGING LEGAL RIGHTS OF
MARRIED WOMEN, 1800-1861, at 56 (1987); Mary Ann Glendon, Matrimonial Property: A Comparative Study of Law and Social Change, 49 TUL. L. REV. 21, 25-26, 28 (1974).
277. 36 Ind. 389 (1871). A much more limited claim about state jurisdiction over family
law appeared in a federal opinion that same year. In upholding Georgia's anti-miscegenation
law, Judge John Erskine remarked that "[t]he marriage relation, which is a civil institution, has
hitherto been regulated and controlled by each state within its own territorial limits, and I cannot think it was intended to be restrained by the [fourteenth] amendment." But he quickly
retreated from that general statement, adding the important caveat: "so long as the state marriage
regulations do not deny to the citizen the equal protection of the laws." In re Hobbs, 12 F. Cas.
262, 264 (N.D. Ga. 1871) (No. 6,550).
278. lam very grateful to Reva Siegel for first drawing my attention to this theme in Gibson
and later cases. See Siegel, supranote 177, at 1121-23 & n.46.
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tion.27 9 Along the way, however, the case declared that regulation of the
marital relation was wholly outside the scope of federal authority: "The
right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, and preserve"
marriage was, the court explained, "of inestimable importance, and [could
not] be surrendered, nor [could] the states suffer or permit any interference
therewith."'
Several state courts adopted this latter point, invoking
Gibson as support for the claim that "no power on earth" could prevent the
states from enforcing their anti-miscegenation statutes"' because marriage
was "left solely by the Federal Constitution and the laws to the discretion
of the states. '8 2 If sound, this proposition alone was enough to defeat all
legal assaults on state anti-miscegenation laws. But judges determined to
prevent interracial marriage actually devoted relatively little space to
Gibson's argument from jurisdiction. Instead, they wrote the majority of
their opinions on the assumption, which they apparently believed was
more likely, that the federal government could regulate marriage, and then
offered a host of reasons explaining that Congress had not exercised all of
its potential authority.
At least one of these defensive arguments showed clear signs of worry
that Reconstruction had actually reached into the core of state family
law to legalize interracial marriage.
Courts considering state antimiscegenation laws easily explicated the social horror of interracial union
as a ground for its illegality, 83 and turned to the same formal equality
arguments that Reconstruction's congressional defenders had employed and
that the Supreme Court ultimately accepted as adequate justification for
279. See Gibson, 36 Ind. at 393 ("The fourteenth amendment .... did not enlarge the powers of the federal government, nor diminish those of the states. The inhibitions against the states
doing certain things have no force or effect. They do not prohibit the states from doing any act
that they could have done without them.").
280. Id. at 403.
281. State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 176 (1883); see also id. at 178 (citing Gibson).
282. Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 275-76 (1877) (citing Gibson); see also Green v.
State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877) (citing Gibson to suggest that marital regulation is beyond limits
of federal power). Years later, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896), also cited Gibson,
but not on federalism grounds.
283. See Jackson, 80 Mo. at 179 ("[l]f the issue of a black man and a white woman, and a
white man and a black woman, intermarry, they cannot possibly have any progeny, and such a
fact sufficiently justifies those laws which forbid the intermarriage of blacks and whites, laying
out of view other sufficient grounds .... ); Frasher, 3 Tex. Ct. App. at 277 ("Civilized society
has the power of self-preservation, and, marriage being the foundation of such society, most of
the states in which the negro forms an element of any note have enacted laws inhibiting intermarriage between the white and black races."); Green, 58 Ala. at 194 ("Who can estimate the
evil of introducing into the[] most intimate relations, elements so heterogeneous that they must
naturally cause discord, shame, disruption of family circles and estrangement of kindred?").
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anti-miscegenation laws. 28 In addition, they made the case, which
Reconstruction's congressional supporters had rejected, that miscegenation
was a social right that Reconstruction left unprotected by definition."' But
still feeling unsure, judges reviewing state anti-miscegenation statutes also
insisted that marriage was a status relation not reducible to mere contract,
and therefore not a contract within the meaning of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act. 2 6 This last argument, at odds with the broad consensus in Congress,
was a dramatic indication of concern. The nineteenth century is generally
known as "the golden age of contract law" in American history17 because
of the significance of libertarian thought in this period and the weight consequently given to the notion that people have the right to order their own
lives through voluntary agreement.M To a significant extent, legal thought
measured progress and freedom by the expansion of the realm of life under
284. See Jackson, 80 Mo. at 177 ("The act in question is not open to the objection that
it discriminates against the colored race, because it equally forbids white persons from
intermarrying with negroes, and prescribes the same punishment for violations of its provisions
by white as by colored persons ... ."); Green, 58 Ala. at 192 ("There is no discrimination made
in favor of the white person, either in the capacity to enter into such a relation, or in the penalty."); Frasher, 3 Tex. Ct. App. at 276 ("It is conceded by [defense counsel] that, if the statute
upon which this prosecution is based punished both the white person and the negro alike,
it ... would be constitutional, and clearly within the legislative powers of the state."); supra
note 271 (discussing Supreme Court decision that accepted formal equality defense of state antimiscegenation laws).
285. See Green, 58 Ala. at 196 ("The amendments to the Constitution were evidently
designed to secure to citizens, without distinction of race, rights of a civil or political kind onlynot such as are merely social, much less those of a purely domestic nature. The regulation of
these belongs to the States."). This argument was frequently articulated in a discourse of taste
and sensibility. See Jackson, 80 Mo. at 176 ("It may interfere with the taste of negroes who want
to marry whites, or whites who wish to intermarry with negroes, but the State has the same right
to regulate marriage in this respect that it has to forbid the intermarriage of cousins and other
blood relations."). For a fuller account of the way that courts wielded the social rights designation to limit the scope of equality in the post-emancipation period, see Siegel, supra note 177,
at 1119-29.
286. See Green, 58 Ala. at 193-94 ("'Marriage is not treated as a mere contract between the
parties, subject as to its continuance, dissolution and effects, to their mere pleasure and intentions. But it is treated as a civil institution'. . . . [M]arriage is not a contract, but a status .... "
(quoting Judge Story's treatise on conflict of laws)); Frasher,3 Tex. Ct. App. at 276 ("Marriage is
not a contract protected by the Constitution of the United States, or within the meaning of the
Civil Rights Bill. Marriage is more than a contract within the meaning of the act. It is a civil
status .... ).
287. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 275 (2d ed. 1985).
288. On the legal and intellectual history of contract, see PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE
AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979); DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY
IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1770-1823, at 489-501 (1975); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 160-85 (1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST,
LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 18,

75, 103 (1956).
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contractual control. As Henry Sumner Maine's influential treatise articulated the notion in a chapter on family law, women, and slavery, the
"movement of the progressive societies ha[d] hitherto been a movement
from Status to Contract."' 9 Modernity, the editor of the Nation agreed,
meant "releas[ing] all human beings from obligations imposed by imperative law, and... submit[ting] our social relations more and more to the
dominion of contract simply."2'90 In this light, deeming marriage a status
beyond contract was an undeniable step backward, one taken only to
ensure that anti-miscegenation laws survived a Reconstruction that courts
understood had left even prohibitions on interracial union, now the sacred
heart of state family law, vulnerable.
All told, when the postbellum nation was redrawing the lines of federal and state jurisdiction for the modern age, there was no consensus that
family law was particularly and exclusively local. Far from it. Reconstruction's supporters in Congress believed that guaranteeing family rights
in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment was one of
their most pressing tasks, and the strong majority of their opponents agreed
that the federal government could exercise jurisdiction over family law.
Indeed, as Congress worked to make familial protections part of the legacy
of Reconstruction, it simultaneously conducted an overwhelmingly popular
campaign against polygamy, one that turned on creating a national law of
the family to set standards that no family, white or black, would be allowed
to deviate below. Assertions of exclusively local jurisdiction over family
law looked so dubious that even courts intent on preserving state antimiscegenation laws in the wake of Reconstruction wrote most of their
opinions on the assumption that the federal government could regulate
interracial marriage, and offered an explanation for why Congress had not
done so that showed real concern that state anti-miscegenation statutes
were in danger.
289. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY
OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (New York, Charles Scribner & Co.
1871). Maine specifically identified the decision to marry as a contractual one, noting that

"from her coming of age to her marriage all the relations [the female] may form are relations of
contract." Id. at 164.

290. E.L. Godkin, The Labor Crisis, 105 N. AM. REV. 177, 183 (1867). Godkin also applied

the same principles to marriage:

So also in the relations of husband and wife, the tendency of legislation in all modem states.., is to reduce marriage to an instrument for the legitimization of children
simply, leaving all the relations of husband and wife which are not necessary to this end
to be regulated by individual will.
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The consensus during Reconstruction that the federal government
could exercise jurisdiction over family law-:-evident in the debates over
the 1866 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment, the antipolygamy campaign, and even the anti-miscegenation cases-was so broad
that it included most opponents of Reconstruction as well as Reconstruction's supporters. Conceding the jurisdictional question, Reconstruction's
detractors offered only the policy consideration, rooted in antebellum
proslavery thought and now constitutionally illicit, that extending the
federal government's guarantee of equal protection to family law might
destabilize the social segregation of the races and disrupt the legal subordination of wives and children.
Part II has problematized both the existence of and the reasoning
behind the history of exclusive localism in family law. Part IV will critically consider, as contemporary debate largely does not, the weight and
scope that federalism can legitimately give to a tradition of federal
noninvolvement in family law in light of these origins. But before we get
there, Part III takes the record of family law and federalism to the present.
Without attempting to narrate the entire intervening history between
Reconstruction and the late twentieth century, it offers a new perspective
on modern federal family law. Although largely concealed behind the
force of arguments from history for exclusive localism, federal regulation of
the family has remained substantial throughout the modern age.
III.

A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON MODERN FEDERAL FAMILY LAW

The argument for exclusive localism in family law has devised no clear
definition of family law itself, as the juxtaposition of the domestic relations
exception to diversity jurisdiction and the debate over the Violence
Against Women Act perhaps best illustrates. Historical accounts of
Reconstruction demonstrate another form of the failure to identify family
law. During Reconstruction, Congress and the entire nation engaged in a
massive debate over federal involvement in family law and importantly
intervened into state family codes, as both we and nineteenth-century
Americans would understand those terms. Yet several historians have
actually highlighted Reconstruction as a crucial episode in the tradition of
exclusive localism in family law. This Article is no place to rehearse all
the ways in which the federal government has been involved in family law
since Reconstruction. But it does draw to a prominent place of view how
the question of family law's proper position in the federal system is entangled in issues of characterization. From that perspective, this part examines
some notable examples of modern federal regulation of the family.
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My point here is not that the federal provisions discussed below have
been wrongly characterized as laws about taxation, citizenship, social welfare, social security, or the like. Rather, it is that important aspects of these
federal regulatory regimes also and at the same time fall within a quite reasonable definition of family law-and that this aspect of these federal statutes has been systematically overlooked. I make these observations for
positive and descriptive purposes, rather than for normative or prescriptive
ones. The mere fact that federal statutes can be classified as family law
should, at this point, suggest nothing about the legitimacy of federal jurisdiction. As I have indicated throughout this Article and will discuss more
fully in Part IV, a coherent normative argument for categorically assigning
family law to either the states or the federal government has yet to be
articulated. Instead, this part briefly discusses some important instances of
federal regulation in order to begin mapping what arguments from history
for exclusive localism in family law have obscured. Part I recounted how
localists employ an understanding of family law so unrigorous and expansive that it includes a statute like the Violence Against Women Act,
which has no connection to familial status or relationships at all. Without
offering a comprehensive account of modern federal-state relations, this
part elaborates an explicit and reasoned definition of family law in order to
suggest what localists have failed to register as family law.
It finds that federal law importantly regulates the family, even if one
excludes what constitutional adjudication, rather than democratic policymaking, has wrought. To be sure, family law has never been under predominantly federal control; the weight and persistence of certain forms
of state regulation are undeniable. But exclusive localism is simply suspect
as a description of current practice. The scope, and very existence, of this
modern federal family law remains all but invisible to us largely because of
the long-standing authority of arguments from history for exclusive localism and their failure to produce a coherent definition of family law itself.
A.

The Relevant Definition of Family Law

The reigning localist discourse on family law is both extremely
ambiguous and frequently expansive in scope. Ankenbrandt placed family
law within narrow and technical confines. There, the Court defined
"domestic relations" for purposes of the exception to diversity jurisdiction
to include only the "power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees,"29' allowing a tort claim for child abuse to remain in federal court
291.

Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992).
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because it was outside the exception's historical contours.2 9 But claims
from tradition for exclusive localism much more commonly adopt a far
broader, if substantially less defined, understanding of family law. Before
Ankenbrandt and in Lopez, the Supreme Court rarely indicated what it
meant by family law, but often relied on reasoning and language developed
in support of the domestic relations exception to decide questions far outside the scope of a decision like Ankenbrandt. A case adjudicating a
divorced spouse's claim to federal railroad retirement benefits would quote
a statement from the 1890 decision that first included child custody decrees
within the diversity exception, the absolutist proposition that '[tihe whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States."'' 93 Indeed, the debate over VAWA, conducted largely after
Ankenbrandt was decided, employed such a far-reaching and unexplained
definition of family law that it included without question legislation that
was never dependent on familial status or relationships.!"
The appropriate delineation of family law may vary with context.
Arguments from history for exclusive localism, however, cannot survive
critical review in their current form based on a definition as limited as that
operative in Ankenbrandt. Even if the issuance of divorce, alimony, and
child custody decrees has been under exclusively state control, that would
not support localists' much more typical and sweeping statements-in contexts extending far beyond the concerns of Ankenbrandt-about the inherent character of all of family law. Although the indefiniteness governing
the scope of family law in almost all of the localism discourse does not
deserve to be replicated, assessing the possibility that claims from tradition
can rely on a modem practice of exclusively state jurisdiction does require
a richer understanding of family law.
To this end, my account of federal family law applies, as indicated
above, the following definition: Family law, first, determines what constitutes a family and who counts as or may become a spouse, a parent, a child,
or another family member. This category includes some of the rights that
particularly concerned the congressional authors of Reconstruction, such as
the basic principles that consenting adults should be able to legally marry
292. See id. at 704.
293. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting Exparte Burrus, 136 U.S.
586, 593-94 (1890)); see also Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (same); McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981) ("This Court repeatedly has recognized that "Ithe whole
subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife ...belongs to the laws of the States and
not to the laws of the United States."" (quoting Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. at 581) (citation omitted)).
294. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
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and that no people should be categorically denied the right to parent their
children. Second, family law structures the legal creation and dissolution
of these family relationships, thus exercising legal control over marriage,
adoption, divorce, annulment, alimony, child support, child custody,
property division, the determination of paternity, and the termination
of parental rights. Third, family law establishes the legal rights, and
associated legal obligations, that family members have because of their
familial status. This category includes both rights and responsibilities that
family members have with respect to each other and laws that otherwise
regulate family members based on their familial status. Laws requiring each
spouse to support the other financially, marital rape exemptions, and
federal statutes protecting children against parental abuse and neglect fall
within the first half of this category. 95 The latter half of this category
includes, as we shall see, federal tax, citizenship, social welfare, and social
security laws that turn on one's status as a spouse, parent, child, or other
family member. 96
Modern Federal Family Law

B.

Armed with an appropriate and clear definition of family law, its
presence in modern federal statutes, regulations, and case law becomes easy
to recognize. As a preliminary matter, it is worth noting that many of the
Supreme Court's constitutional holdings, and the federal law they have
encouraged, fall within the above definition of family law. Overall, it
seems fairer and more telling to focus on what democratic action rather
than constitutional mandate has produced when considering the record
The Supreme Court is less
of localism in modern family law.
representative of the polity, and some-but not all-of its decisions on
family life reflect the general application of constitutional principles. The
Equal Protection Clause, for instance, applies equally to all state
legislation, rather than singling out family law. At the same time, it is still
striking how often the Court's constitutional decisions have established
uniform family law policies for the nation, the Justices' professed
commitment to exclusive localism notwithstanding. For instance, the
decisions in the 1970s that first subjected gender classifications to
intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause 29'-especially Orr
295.

See infra text accompanying notes 321-329.

296.

See infra text accompanying notes 306-320, 330-346.

297.

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976), first clearly articulated this intermedi-

ate standard, although Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971), was the first Supreme Court
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v.Orr (1979),'98 which found gender-based alimony laws unconstitutional-spurred a massive rewriting of state marital status law.2s9
o and
Supreme Court case law, starting with Meyer v. Nebraska (1923')3
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925),01 has constitutionalized a particular vision
case that ruled in favor of a woman who asserted that her state had denied her equal protection
of the laws.
298. 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
299. In 1969, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia authorized alimony awards to
wives but not husbands. See Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault
Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 12 n.33 (1987). By the time the Court decided
Orr a decade later, "about forty states had already 'de-sexed' alimony and had authorized its
award, under appropriate circumstances, to either spouse." Doris Jonas Freed & Timothy B.
Walker, 21 FAM. L.Q. 417, 474 (1988). Orr compelled the remaining states to fall into line and
rewrite their family law to be gender-neutral. See, e.g., Lee Hargrave, Louisiana Constitutional
Law, 46 LA. L. REV. 535, 542-43 (1986) ("After [Orr], the Louisiana courts followed suit. About
the same time, the Louisiana legislature amended the alimony statutes to be gender-neutral.");
Isabel Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform in New
York, 42 U. MIAMI L. REv. 55, 71 (1987) ("For almost a decade (1972-1980), the debate over
the distributional rules governing marital property upon divorce was caught up in the intricacies
of New York politics.... [Orr] broke the legislative impasse .... The New York choice was
[now] either to eliminate alimony or make it available to either spouse."); Ronald J. Resmini, The
Law of Domestic Relations in Rhode Island, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 411 (1995) ("Subsequently
[to Orr], the Rhode Island General Assembly redefined the concept of alimony to mandate that
'alimony shall be construed as payments for the support and maintenance of either the husband
or wife."' (quoting 1979 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 279, § 2)); W. Henry Parkman, Note, The Significance
of Stokes v. Stokes: An Examination of Property Rights Upon Divorce in Georgia, 16 GA. L. REV.
695, 705 n.55 (1982) (discussing 1979 Georgia law enacted "'to revise and modernize certain
laws of this State which relate to intrafamilial duties, rights and obligations .... so as to comply
with those standards of equal protection under the law announced in the United States Supreme
Court decision in the case of Orr v. Orr"' (quoting 1979 Ga. Laws 466, § 1)).
300. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that state prohibition on teaching foreign languages to
children violates Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause). In recognizing a Fourteenth
Amendment right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children," id. at 399, the Meyer
Court specifically rejected alternative conceptions of parental rights, noting:
In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled
the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training
to official guardians. Although such measures have been deliberately approved by men
of great genius, their ideas touching the relation between individual and State were
wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest; and it hardly will
be affirmed that any legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a
State without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.
Id. at 402.
301. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In striking down a state statute requiring all children to attend
public school, the Pierce Court reasoned that the act:
unreasonably interfereld] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.... The fundamental theory of liberty
upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and
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of parental relations that grants parents, and denies the state, primary
control over their children's education and upbringing.Z The Court's
recognition and highly detailed regulation of the constitutional right to
abortion and birth control have both severely limited the possibility of
state variation 303 and prompted significant 305federal law that preempts the
states entirely. 304 Similar examples abound.
More notably, Congress has enacted a substantial body of legislation
that falls within the definition of family law articulated above. Modem
federal family law is, first and most obviously, a significant component of
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.
Id. at 534-35.
302. For the most notable modem case adhering to this principle, see Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (allowing Amish parents to remove their children from school after
eighth grade for religious reasons). For more discussion of the normative choice that Meyer and
Pierce represent, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) ("Along with protecting religious
liberty and intellectual freedom, Meyer and Pierce constitutionalized a narrow, tradition-bound
vision of the child as essentially private property.").
303. Note, for instance, how precisely the Court has defined the contours of permissible
parental notification provisions for minors seeking abortions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that state could not lawfully authorize absolute
parental veto over decision of minor to terminate her pregnancy); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 646-51 (1979) (plurality opinion) (striking down state statute that did not permit any
minor to obtain judicial consent to nonemergency abortion without informing available parents,
and that allowed a court to overrule minor's decision to have abortion even if court found minor
mature and fully competent to make decision independently); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,
407-13 (1981) (upholding state law requiring doctor to notify, if possible, parents of minor
seeking abortion, as statute applied to immature and dependent minors); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding state statute requiring every
unemancipated minor seeking nonemergency abortion to either obtain consent from one parent
or prove to court that she "is mature and capable of giving informed consent and has in fact
given her informed consent, or that an abortion would be in her best interests").
Interestingly enough, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the decision recognizing a constitutional right to abortion, actually identifies the interests at issue by examining the particular
history of state statutes criminalizing abortion in the nineteenth century, see id. at 148-52;
Siegel, supra note 171, at 278 n.64 ("Roe ... draws its authority from the nation's history and
traditions. The privacy right Roe recognized protects a liberty available to women at common
law, and the state regulatory interests Roe recognized are those embodied in nineteenth century
criminal abortion statutes, as the Court understood them.").
304. See, e.g., Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994) (creating
federal criminal penalties and civil remedies to protect right of access to abortion clinics); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 177-81 (1991) (upholding federal regulations prohibiting federallyfunded clinics from: providing counseling or referrals concerning abortion; engaging in activities
that encourage, promote, or advocate abortion; and remaining physically or financially connected to organizations performing prohibited abortion activities); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 326 (1980) (upholding federal "Hyde Amendment" that severely limited federal funding for
abortions performed under Medicaid program).
305. See cases cited supra note 7.
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uniquely federal responsibilities. Federal tax laws, for instance, establish
what constitutes a family for their purposes, distribute privileges and burdens on the basis of marital status, and only recognize relationships of
dependency if they exist within certain specified family groups.3°6 While
the federal tax code frequently uses state determinations of family status as
a baseline for establishing federal rights, it often expands or contracts state
definitions to suit federal purposes, a course with far-reaching substantive
ramifications given the impact of the federal income tax system and what
turns within it based on family status.0 7 All of these tasks are important
tax functions; but in defining what counts as a family and in establishing
the legal rights and responsibilities that family members have because of
their status, they also satisfy the first and third parts of my definition of
family law.
The family law within federal citizenship policy has been the subject
of national debate for almost a century. In 1907, Congress provided that
306. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (allowing federal income tax deductions for certain
spouses and dependents); id. § 152 (a)-(b) (defining "dependents" for federal income tax purposes to include, inter alia, stepchildren, siblings, half-siblings, parents, stepparents, nieces,
nephews, aunts, and uncles); id. § 7703 (determining marital status for federal income tax
purposes); Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46, 49-51 (2d Cir. 1982) (upholding higher federal
income tax rates for some married taxpayers, while noting that this "marriage penalty" may influence people's decision about whether to marry and remain married); Mapes v. United States, 576
F.2d 896, 898-904 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (upholding marriage penalty and observing that it may affect
decisions about whom to marry); DANIEL R. FEENBERG & HARVEY S. ROSEN, RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MARRIAGE TAX 2, 9-15 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working
Paper No. 4705, 1994) (predicting that 52% of married couples filing jointly would pay more
federal income tax in 1994 than they would have paid if divorced (an average of $1244 more)
and 38% would pay less than if divorced (an average of $1399 less)); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 9 (1997)
("The federal income tax code assumes that married couples combine their incomes and other
resources to support themselves and their dependents, and therefore imposes taxes on the joint
incomes of spouses. ... [Unmarried couples or family members] must pay taxes on their separate
incomes, even if they consume together."); see also EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN
268 (1997) (arguing that federal "tax system in context is deeply biased against working wives
and mothers"); Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1392 (1975) (noting Internal Revenue Code's substantial concern with "the status of marriage
and the family"); Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage:A Different Perspective, 28
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1157-59 (1981) (discussing taxation of unmarried cohabitants); Edward
J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40
UCLA L. REV. 983, 987-98 (1993) ("Major, structural aspects of the tax laws were put in place
at a time when traditional families ... were dominant. These aspects persist to this day, serving
as an anchor against the emergence of more modem and flexible family models.").
307. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1) (defining brother and sister, categories that count as
dependents, to "include a brother or sister by the halfblood"); id. § 2(b)(2)(C) ("[A] taxpayer
shall be considered as not married at the close of his taxable year if at any time during the taxable year his spouse is a nonresident alien.. . ."); id. § 2(b)(2)(D) ("[A] taxpayer shall be considered as married at the close of his taxable year if his spouse.., died during the taxable year.").
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an American woman's marriage to an alien terminated her United States

citizenship. 3°8 The law conditioned women's nationality on their (statedefined) marital status, but it did more than that. Much like the domestic
relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, this federal statute was
enacted, understood, and challenged as a direct expression of the coverture
principles that dominated all of family law at the time. In upholding the
1907 law, the Supreme Court explained that "[tihe identity of husband and
wife is an ancient principle of our jurisprudence .... And this was the
dictate of the act in controversy.'3°9 As an approving legal treatise of the

time elaborated, "[tihe woman merges her nationality in that of her
husband upon marriage to a foreigner" because "[sihe does not enjoy in
coverture, any other or different rights and privileges from those enjoyed by
her husband. 31 °
In the 1910s, 19 2 0s, and 1930s, an organized woman's movement
challenged this federal policy as part of its struggle to eradicate marital
status law, provoking a national debate over the role of the federal government in perpetuating and contributing to a family law founded on coverture rules. Where their opponents contended that marriage-based
citizenship laws for women were a necessary component of "family
308. See An Act In reference to the expatriation of citizens and their protection abroad,
ch. 2534, § 3, 34 Star. 1228, 1228-29 (1907). For more on the 1907 Act, see Virginia
Sapiro, Women, Citizenship, and Nationality: Immigration and Naturalization Policies in the United
States, 13 POL. & Soc'Y 1, 9-11 (1984); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in
the United States, 1830-1934, at 23-24 (July 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) ("By punishing American women who would introduce foreign elements into the body
politic, the act was akin to state laws which criminalized or nullified marriages between whites
and persons of color ....[Tjhe 1907 act [also] showed that Congress took the primacy of male
citizenship and headship of the family for granted.").
This statute joined an 1855 federal law that granted foreign women automatic citizenship
upon their marriage to a United States citizen or upon the naturalization of their alien husbands.
See An Act to secure the Right of Citizenship to Children of Citizens of the United States born
out of the Limits thereof, ch. 71, § 2, 10 Stat. 604, 604 (1855).
309. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
310. PRENTISS WEBSTER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CITIZENSHIP INTHE UNITED STATES
TREATED HISTORICALLY 299, 297 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1980) (1891). Candice Lewis
Bredbenner has a somewhat different view of the 1907 Act. As she explains it,
the appearance of marital expatriation in 1907 seemed untimely; its declaration of
women's political dependence was better suited to that earlier era when the common
law doctrine of coverture ruled and a woman suffered civil death upon marriage. However, Congress did not pass the Expatriation Act of 1907 to revive the dying legal concept of coverture, although lingering presumptions about female dependence certainly
informed the statute's provisions.... Congress was responding to a general demand
from inside and outside the government to enact restrictive nationality and immigration
laws.
CANDICE LEWIS BREDBENNER, A NATIONALITY OF HER OWN: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND THE

LAW OF CITIZENSHIP 56-57 (1998).
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unity," '' women like Sophonisba Breckinridge, dean of what is now the
University of Chicago's School of Social Work,"' condemned these federal
statutes for reinforcing husbands' "general dominion" over their wives and
children"' and demanded "that the married woman.., be treated as an
adult person capable of self-determination.,3 4 This national debate produced a flurry of new federal laws that seriously diminished, although they
did not eliminate,
the role of marital status in determining American
315
citizenship.
311. As Representative Martin Dies of Texas explained in opposing one reform bill that
feminists advocated: "The basis of this bill is equal rights. Of course, it has always been our theory, especially in my State, that the man is the head of the home and his domicile is the domicile
of his wife." Relating to Naturalization and Citizenship Status of Children Whose Mothers Are
Citizens of the United States, and Relating to the Removal of Certain Inequalities in Matters of
Nationality: Hearings on H.R. 3673 and H.R. 77 Before the House Comm. on Immigration and
Naturalization, 73d Cong. 29 (1933) (statement of Rep. Dies).
312. See FLEXNER, supra note 176, at 215.
313. SOPHONISBA P. BRECKINRIDGE, MARRIAGE AND THE Civic RIGHTS OF WOMEN 6
(1931).
314. Id.
at 17.
315. In 1920, both the Democratic and the Republican Party platforms promised to enact
federal legislation providing that American women would not lose their United States citizenship by marrying foreigners. See Democratic Platform of 1920, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY
PLATFORMS, 1840-1956, supra note 232, at 213, 219; Republican Platform of 1920, reprinted in
id. at 229, 236. Enacted in 1922 and 1931, the first and second Cable Acts fulfilled this promise
and generally made Congress's citizenship policy less dependent on sex and marital status. See
An Act Relative to the naturalization and citizenship of married women, ch. 411, 42 Stat. 1021
(1922); An Act To amend the naturalization laws in respect of posting notices of petitions for
citizenship, and for other purposes, ch. 442, 46 Stat. 1511 (1931). In 1934, Congress eliminated
the sex distinction in laws that allowed legitimate children born abroad to U.S. citizen fathers to
become citizens, but denied the same privilege to the foreign-born legitimate children of U.S.
citizen mothers. See An Act To amend the law relative to citizenship and naturalization, and for
other purposes, ch. 344, 48 Stat. 797 (1934). American immigration policy continued to distinguish, however, between the illegitimate children of citizen mothers and the illegitimate children
of citizen fathers. See Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, §§ 201, 205, 54 Stat. 1137, 1138-40
(imposing harsher requirements on illegitimate children of citizen fathers); infra note 318.
In explaining their support for the first Cable Act, some Congressmen stated that the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 represented a national rejection of coverture rules
that accordingly made reforming the law of women's citizenship necessary. Representative John
Jacob Rogers of Massachusetts, for instance, noted that
there was no particular force in the demand for this bill until the nineteenth amendment became a part of the organic law of the land. But when women were given civil
equality with men, the right to vote, it seems to me that that moment it became ludicrous for us to say that thereafter the rights of women to citizenship shall be dependent
on the rights of men. At that moment the doctrine of dependent or derived citizenship
became as archaic as the doctrine of ordeal by fire.
62 CONG. REC. 9047 (1922) (statement of Rep. Rogers); see also id. at 9041 (statement of Rep.
Vaile) ("The second event which has demonstrated the need for a change in our present laws was
the nation-wide adoption of woman suffrage ....
[Woman] is now in name, as well as in fact, an
equal partner in the business of conducting the American Government:'); id. at 9043 (statement
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Today, family law, and disputes over its content, continue to occupy
an important place in federal policy regulating United States citizenship,
although attention now focuses on the alien relatives of American citizens.
The modem immigration code accords substantial advantages to people
who fall within its articulation of the family. In order to identify which
family bonds it will recognize and privilege, this body of federal law creates
and administers detailed definitions of familial relations enacted
specifically for federal purposes.' 6 It establishes, for instance, what counts
as a sham marriage ' " or "a bona fide parent-child relationship." ' Indeed,
much of the law determining who can immigrate to this country turns on a
uniquely federal family status: The "immediate relatives" of United States
citizens are permitted to immigrate without numerical restriction, although
their admission counts toward the numerical cap on annual immigration
that applies to all other immigrants.1 9 In fiscal year 1996, for example,
"immediate relatives" accounted for thirty-three percent of all immigration
of Rep. Raker) ("We have extended suffrage to women, and all the dire troubles and complications which were predicted, the question of the division of the family and the want of their
attendance upon the polls and their interest in Government affairs, have all been wiped away
and everything of the kind proven to be a myth."); id. at 9048 (statement of Rep. Siegel) ("As to
the right of the woman to be an independent American citizen in her own right there can be no
controversy, because the nineteenth amendment to the Constitution has settled that for all
time.").
316. For more on who the immigration code excludes from its definition of the family, see,
e.g., Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414-15 (9th Cit. 1994) (holding that state law does not
conclusively determine whether family ties (here, a common law marriage) exist for purposes of
deportation waiver); Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039-41 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
same-sex marriage is not recognized for immigration purposes, even if valid under state law).
317. See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(2) (1994) (providing that petition for permanent residency
cannot be approved if "the Attorney General has determined that the alien has attempted or
conspired to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading the immigration laws").
318. Under the immigration code, an illegitimate child falls within the legal definition of a
child if he is sponsored by his natural mother or is sponsored by his natural father and "has or had
a bona fide parent-child relationship" with that father. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(D) (1994).
The Supreme Court recently reviewed the constitutionality of this distinction based on the sex
of an illegitimate child's citizen parent. See Miller v. Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428 (1998). Five
Justices agreed that the distinction violates the equal protection rights of citizen fathers. See
id. at 1445 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 1455 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However,
two of these Justices concluded that the Miller plaintiff, the illegitimate child of a citizen father,
lacked standing to pursue her father's claim and therefore declined to join a holding on the
merits. See id. at 1442-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The law, accordingly, stands
for the moment. See id. at 1432 (Stevens, J., announcing judgment of the Court and delivering
an opinion).
319. The term "immediate relatives" includes spouses, unmarried minor children, parents
when the citizen is at least twenty-one years old, and certain widows and widowers. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994). In turn, federal immigration law defines children, for instance, to
include, inter alia, stepchildren, legitimated children, and adopted children who have achieved
that status by a certain age. See id. § 1101(b)(1)(A)-(C), (E).
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to the United States, and all family-based admissions accounted for sixtyfive percent of the year's immigration.320
Federal family law also extends far beyond singularly federal domains
to create interactive federal-state control over family life. Although state
law occupies much of the field, federal legislation importantly regulates the
parental relation in families with no particular connection to the federal
government-leaving some elements of the law to the states and taking
others for itself. The Child Support Enforcement Act (CSEA) ,321 for
example, oversees much more than the enforcement of existing state court
orders. It also structures the creation of legally recognized parental relationships; in exchange for financial and other incentives, CSEA largely
determines state procedures for establishing paternity.3 2 In addition, the
Act helps define the rights and responsibilities of parents upon the dissolution of their marriage or other relationship, requiring states to conform to
highly specific guidelines on the content of child support orders. 3 The
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 324 uses similar incentives to
shape other routes to the legal formation of parental relationships. This
Act specifies the standards of review that state courts must apply to foster
care placements.3 5 It also regulates state adoption policies by, for instance,
320. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, 1996, at 13-15, 19 (1997). The modem
federal family law governing American Indian families is also far-reaching. For instance, Congress has exerted enormous control over the creation and dissolution of parental relationships
with Indian children. The Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1994), both
structures proceedings for the termination of parental rights, see id. § 1913, and sets forth the
principles governing adoptive placements, see id. § 1915.
321. Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 651-669 (1994)).
322. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (requiring participating states to create "a hospitalbased program for the voluntary acknowledgment of paternity during the period immediately
before or after the birth of a child"); id. § 666(a)(5)(B) (requiring participating states "to require
the child and all other parties, in a contested paternity case, to submit to genetic tests upon the
request of any such party"); id. § 666(a)(5)(F) (specifying how objections to genetic testing
results must be made).
323. CSEA, for example, creates national uniformity by requiring states to "petition for the
inclusion of medical support as part of any child support order whenever health care coverage is
available to the absent parent at a reasonable cost." See id. § 652(f).
324. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 620-628, 670-679a (1994)).
325. The Victims of Child Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4792 (1990) (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13001-13041 (1994)), offers additional assistance and training to
state judicial personnel and attorneys based on Congress's finding that the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act makes "substantial demands on the courts handling abuse and neglect
cases," 42 U.S.C. § 13021(a)(2), including requiring state courts to "(A) determine whether the
agency made reasonable efforts to prevent foster care placement; (B) approve voluntary nonju-
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requiring states to pay the adoption expenses of parents adopting "a child
with special needs," 6 a protected category that the federal statute itself
defines at length." 7 Along the same lines, the Adoption and Safe Families
Act32 employs detailed conditions on federal spending in order to accelerate the adoption of neglected and abused children and the termination of
their biological parents' rights. Among many other requirements, a state
seeking funding under this federal statute must agree to begin proceedings
to terminate parental rights once a child has spent fifteen out of the last
twenty-two months in foster care and must initiate such proceedings
almost immediately if the child was abandoned or abused.2 9
Similarly, the federal government's many social welfare and benefits
programs do not merely impact on family life; they constitute federal family
law. From its origins in 1935 as the dominant provider of means-tested
relief to its recent termination, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) explicitly regulated based on family status, importantly establishing the legal rights and obligations associated with particular family roles.
AFDC's guiding premise was that needy children and their caretaker
relatives, but not other able-bodied adults, have a federal entitlement to a
minimum level of support. While the Social Security Act of 1935, which
created AFDC,330 defined the range of possible caretaker relatives
broadly, 331 federal administrators subsequently defined need to turn narrowly on marital status-treating widows much more favorably solely
because they had once been wives. For decades, welfare's designers were
concerned that a generous welfare policy for single women would make
marriage less attractive to them, foster undue female independence, and
"usher in a new relationship between man and wife. 3 32 The federal social
security board therefore sanctioned "suitable home" policies that subjected
mothers who had never married to much harsher requirements than those
dicial placement; and (C) provide procedural safeguards for parents when their parent-child
relationship is affected," id. § 13021(a)(3).
326. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 673(a).
327. See id. § 673(c).
328. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
329. See id. § 103(a)(3) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)).
330. See Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (repealed
1996).
331. The Act defined "caretaker relative" to cover a father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, or aunt. See id.
§ 406(a).
332. ABRAHAM EPSTEIN, INSECURITY: A CHALLENGE TO AMERICA 639 (1933). Epstein
was a prominent social insurance advocate whose proposals significantly shaped the Social Security Act. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY

OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 148 (1994).

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1381 1997-1998

1382

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1297 (1998)

widows faced."' Even when never-married women (and two-parent families) eventually managed to participate in the AFDC program in large
numbers, work requirements that were enacted as late as the 1970s continued to differentiate legal rights based on marital status. Federal welfare law
completely exempted all married women from the work obligations that
were a condition of aid for single women with no children under the age of
six;334 in other words, AFDC defined the bundle of rights associated with

being a married woman to include the ability to participate in the nation's
most important means-tested welfare program without satisfying any of its
work requirements.
A more recent example of family law within federal benefits programs
is even more sweeping in scope. The Defense of Marriage Act of 1996
(DOMA) does more than regulate interstate relations by permitting states
to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other states; it also
affirmatively preempts much of the effect that state recognition of such
marriages would have. DOMA defines marriage as the union of one man
and one woman for the purpose of all federal laws, rulings, regulations, and
interpretations, and denies federal benefits to same-sex couples.13 For all
federal purposes, it makes any contrary state determination of family status
irrelevant.
Federal family law can also be found within the federal social security
system. While this Article is no place for a complete account of social
333.

See

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, BUREAU OF PUBLIC

ASSISTANCE, BUREAU CIRCULAR NO. 9, at § 209, at 1(May 1, 1940).
334. See Act of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223, 85 Stat. 802, 805-06 (repealed 1996);
Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. PA. L. REV.
1249, 1264-67 (1983). Tellingly, Johnnie Tillmon, a welfare mother and leader of the National
Welfare Rights Organization in the 1960s and early 1970s, described AFDC in explicitly familial
terms:
The truth is that A.F.D.C. is like a super-sexist marriage. You trade in a man for
the man. But you can't divorce him if he treats you bad. He can divorce you, of course,

cut you off anytime he wants. But in that case, he keeps the kids, not you.
The man runs everything. In ordinary marriage, sex is supposed to be for your hus-

band. On A.F.D.C., you're not supposed to have any sex at all. You give up control of
your own body. It's a condition of aid. You may even have to agree to get your tubes
tied so you can never have more children just to avoid being cut off welfare.
The man, the welfare system, controls your money. He tells you what to buy, what

not to buy, where to buy it, and how much things cost. If things-rent, for instancereally cost more than he says they do, it's just too bad for you. He's always right.
Johnnie Tillmon, Welfare is a Woman's Issue, MS., Spring 1972, at 111, 111.
335. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L.No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1
U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 11 1996) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998)); see also HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 10 (1996)
("The word 'marriage' appears in more than 800 sections of federal statutes and regulations, and
the word 'spouse' appears more than 3,100 times.").
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security, it is worth noting one very significant way in which the program
distributes benefits based on marital status and structures the dissolution of
the marital relationship. In addition to entitling workers in qualified
industries to old age benefits based on their history of paid employment,336
the social security program also grants "spousal benefits" to the spouses,
surviving spouses, and divorced spouses of these workers. This entitlement
is a right that recipients enjoy solely because of their family status, which is
defined in the social security statutes and regulations to build on, but
importantly diverge from, state law. The spousal benefit provisions cover
all present spouses once their marriage has lasted one year, 3 ' but exclude
surviving spouses who remarry before the age of sixty,"' divorced spouses
who were married for less than ten years,339 and any divorced spouse (with
Although the social security
infrequent exception) who ever remarries.
program otherwise rewards paid labor, the spousal benefit does not depend
on its recipients' work history; spouses eligible to receive benefits based on
their past employment must forgo such payments in order to collect based
on their marital relationship, 34 ' and spousal benefits are set as a fraction (up
to fifty percent for spouses and divorced spouses, up to one hundred percent
341
for surviving spouses) of the payment the "primary" spouse receives.
While the spousal benefit provisions hardly represent the sum total of the
336. As Alice Kessler-Harris has explained, the social security program initially
excluded nearly half the working population, including farmworkers, casual laborers,
domestic servants, and laundry workers, as well as seamen, the self-employed, government employees, and those who worked for nonprofit groups. Because the program did
not provide benefits to those who worked in covered occupations intermittently or for
only a few years, more than three-fifths of fully employed African Americans were

denied coverage. Sixty percent of the excluded workers were female-in a labor force
where less than 30 percent of women were employed. Probably as many as 80 percent of
wage-earning black women were deprived of participation and benefits.

Alice Kessler-Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools: The Construction of the Social Security
Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY 87, 92 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds.,
1995).

337. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(b)(2) (on wives), 416(f)(2) (on husbands) (1994).
338. See id. § 402(e)(1)(A), 402(e)(3) (on widows), 402(f)(1)(A), 402(f)(4) (on widowers).
339. See id. §§ 402(b)(1)(G)(ii), 416(d)(1) (on divorced wives), 402(c)(l)(G)(ii),
416(d)(4) (on divorced husbands).
340. See id. § 402(b)(1)(C), 402(b)(3) (on divorced wives), 402(c)(1)(C), 402(c)(4) (on
divorced husbands). If the "primary" spouse dies, however, the social security program treats the

divorced spouse as a surviving spouse for purposes of the remarriage rules. See id.
§§ 402(e)(1)(A), 402(e)(3), 416(d)(2) (on surviving divorced wives), 402(f)(1)(A), 402(f)(4),
416(d)(5) (on surviving divorced husbands).
341. See id. § 402(b)(1)(D) (on wives and divorced wives), 402(c)(1)(D) (on husbands and
divorced husbands), 402(e)(1)(D) (on widows), 402(f)(l)(D) (on widowers).
342. See id. § 402(b)(2) (on wives and divorced wives), 402(c)(3) (on husbands and
divorced husbands), 402(e)(2)(A) (on widows), 402(f)(3)(A) (on widowers).
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social security system, they are no minor footnote either. The spousal
benefit is the means by which most women receive social security. It
grants them the legal right to a higher payment by virtue of their marital
status than they would have obtained if lacking the required family relationship and dependent only on their paid work histories.343
Indeed, the family law within this important feature of the social
security program has an even farther-reaching impact than that. Spousal
benefit law not only creates a valuable new legal right attached to status as
a spouse, it also notably structures the termination of this familial status, at
least at divorce. 3" As applied to divorced spouses, the federal government's
spousal benefit provisions are at odds with most state divorce law. Where
the social security program limits a divorced spouse's spousal benefits to
fifty percent of the "primary" spouse's entitlement and entirely excludes
from spousal benefits divorced spouses who were married for less than ten
years, the trend in state divorce law is to include contractual pension rights
in marital or community property and to divide them equitably. 345 The
Supreme Court, however, has indicated in a closely analogous case on federal railroad retirement benefits that it interprets the Social Security Act
343. In 1996, only 36.2% of all female recipients of social security collected benefits based
on their own work history. Over a third (37.4%) of the women receiving social security collected as spouses, surviving spouses, or divorced spouses because their employment history did
not qualify them for worker benefits at all. The remaining 26.3% of the female recipients were
entitled to collect social security benefits based on their work histories, but instead collected
spousal benefits because these latter benefits entitled them to larger payments. See Donald T.
Ferron, Social Security Benefits for Women Aged 62 or Older, December 1996, SOC. SECURITY
BULL., No. 4 1997, at 32, 32, 34 tbl.2; see also SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
STATISTICAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 1997, at 201 tbl.5.A14
(providing same information).
People collecting social security as independent workers receive payments based on their
years of paid employment and average wages. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(d) (1994); Ferron, supra, at
33. This rubric systematically disadvantages women, who tend to devote more of their lives
to unpaid labor and to be paid less when they do enter the marketplace. See Mary E. Becker,
Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein &
Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264, 279-81 (1989); Katharine
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 38-41 (1996).
344. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), federal law that regulates
retirement plans worth trillions of dollars in the aggregate, similarly preempts state law governing
property distribution at divorce (and death). Since 1984, Congress has granted surviving and
divorced spouses specific, limited property rights in private employee pension benefits. See
Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S.Ct. 1754, 1758, 1760 (1997)
(holding that ERISA preempts state community property law permitting deceased first wife to
make testamentary transfer of her interest in husband's undistributed pension benefits and noting
that residents of community property states alone have perhaps $1 trillion in retirement plans).
345. See Bonnie C. Kittinger, Note, Should Married Couples Share Social Security Earnings
Credit?, 26 J. FAM. L. 601, 606 (1987/1988).
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to bar claims by one spouse against the social security entitlement of the
other." As federal family law, the Social Security Act, with its provision
of limited spousal benefits, therefore preempts state property distribution
principles, restructuring the termination of the marital relationship according to the federal government's requirements.
This part briefly reviews only a few areas of modem federal regulation,
but it should be sufficient to indicate what the claims from history for
exclusive localism in family law have failed to register. While the federal
laws that I outlined above are not wrongly classified as tax, citizenship,
social welfare, or social security statutes and regulations, they also and
simultaneously are important examples of federal family law. Just as a
factual matter, exclusive localism simply misdescribes family law in modem
America. A clear and appropriate definition of family law quickly uncovers notable federal regulation of the family. Only the continuing power
of arguments from history, and their failure to produce a coherent and
consistent definition of family law, has blinded us to that reality.
Even if one accepts the claim, which localists have uncritically put
forward, that history should control the place of family law in the federal
system, Parts II and III reveal that localism lacks a firm grounding in tradition. During Reconstruction, the culmination of a multigenerational
debate over federal involvement in family law, there was a broad consensus
that the federal government had jurisdiction over family law, as both we
and nineteenth-century Americans would understand the category. This
agreement extended from the debates on the 1866 Civil Rights Act and
the Fourteenth Amendment, to the anti-polygamy campaign and the litigation over state anti-miscegenation laws. It encompassed most of Reconstruction's critics as well as Reconstruction's supporters and produced
federal law that concretely improved the family law governing the freedmen. Moreover, the only significant policy concern that Congressmen
raised against federal intervention into family law, maintaining social segregation between the races and coverture within the marital relationship, is
rooted in antebellum proslavery discourse and now constitutionally
illegitimate. While the argument from tradition for exclusive localism fails
to characterize and identify family law appropriately, a clear definition of
the subject reveals an important body of modern federal family law.
346. In Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), the Court held that benefits payable
pursuant to the federal Railroad Retirement Act are not community property subject to division
at divorce, see id. at 581-91. In dicta throughout the opinion, the Court indicated that it would
apply the same analysis to social security benefits. See id. at 574-77, 579, 582-83, 585-87.
Subsequent state court decisions have consistently followed this dicta. See Becker, supra note

343, at 288 n.125; Kittinger, supra note 345, at 607.
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In this light, Part IV considers, as current thinking largely does not,
the role that history should assume in federalism debates and the specific
force-and lessons---of the past that this Article has uncovered.
IV.

THE PLACE OF HISTORY IN FEDERALISM

The Supreme Court and the judiciary in general have been extremely
unreflective about the place of history in federalism. 7 Lopez, paradigmatic
of the Court's entire localist discourse, never once indicates why it relies on
history to identify family law as uniquely beyond the reach of the federal
commerce power. 48 Scholars, too, have been remarkably silent, given the
Court's clear, if unexplained, assumption that history dictates the resolution of this debate. But the weight and scope that history can appropriately
exert in disputes over what should be under national jurisdiction and what
under local control remains a profound question, particularly because federalism in the context of the debate over family law has less to do with textual interpretation, a fairly familiar proposition, and more with structural
concerns: The claim in Lopez about the inherent localism of family law was
not a quasi-contractual argument about the original intent of particular
constitutional provisions, but an implicit assertion that history, in the
sense of exclusive practice over many years, should control family law's
place in the federal system. 49 This contention about the power of tradition
as an argument demands critical inquiry, whatever one thinks about
347. See supra Part I.
348. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) ("[Ulnder the Government's
'national productivity' reasoning, Congress could regulate any activity that it found was related
to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and
child custody), for example."); id. at 564-65 ("Justice Breyer posits that there might be some
limitations on Congress' commerce power, such as family law or certain aspects of education.
These suggested limitations, when viewed in light of the dissent's expansive analysis, are devoid
of substance." (citing id. at 624 (Breyer, J., dissenting))); id. at 565 ("This analysis [by the dissent
in support of the Gun-Free School Zones Act] would be equally applicable, if not more so, to
subjects such as family law and direct regulation of education."); id. ("Under the dissent's
rationale, Congress could just as easily look at child rearing as 'fallling] on the commercial side of
the line' because it provides a 'valuable service-namely, to equip [children] with the skills they
need to survive in life and, more specifically, in the workplace."' (quoting id. at 629 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting))).
349. Lawrence Lessig is one of the few scholars who has considered history's role in the
interpretation of federalism. Lessig's work, however, focuses on the constitutional text, the
Founding understanding, and how broadly or narrowly to read the total scope of federal power.
See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 125,
127-30 (1995). In contrast, the localist argument about family law more immediately raises the
questions of how history, in the sense of repeated practices over time, should affect what falls on
which side of the national/local divide and why family law should be immune from the dramatic
increases in federal power acknowledged almost everywhere else.
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whether or when family law should be under federal authority.350 In this
part, I offer three standards for judging the force that history should bring
to bear on the federalism debate. Concluding that the actual record of federalism and family law adds almost no weight to the case for exclusive
localism, I go on to suggest what the history that I have uncovered can
teach.
The first, and perhaps clearest, reason to rely on history when deciding where to draw lines between national and local jurisdiction is the simple fact of longevity itself. Where it exists, longevity can produce settled
expectations, established institutions, and specialized competence. It
allows both public and private entities to engage in long-range planning
and resource allocation, and also permits individuals to order their lives
based on clearly understood expectations and limitations. Indeed, in some
measure, one must rely on something like longevity-what is and has been
the case-to avoid having to reconsider everything constantly and all at
once. More than that, repeated practices can, over time, become part of
our articulation of national and personal identity. It is this socially expressive aspect of longevity, rather than the arguments for predictability, that
concerned Justice Scalia, for instance, in his dissent from the Supreme
Court's recent decision to open the Virginia Military Institute to women
after over one hundred and fifty years of exclusively male admissions.35'
An argument from longevity could be quite powerful then, although
one might suspect that its usefulness for localism's advocates will be limited
since family law became a symbol of exclusive and inherent localism precisely because federal involvement was so patent and pervasive everywhere
else. Certainly, the notion that the federal government has stayed far away
from family law is untenable. Reconstruction was the culmination of a
. 350. For an example of a policy argument about family law and federalism that delves into
the virtues of federal versus state control, see Anne C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA.
L. REV. 1787, 1820 (1995) ("[S]tate sovereignty over family law... promot[es] the development
of civic virtue-and in particular the virtue of situated autonomy-in maturing children. Federalism in this context destroys the federal government's power to mold the moral character of
future citizens in its own uniform image.").
351. Justice Scalia articulated his position this way:
[The Court] counts for nothing the long tradition, enduring down to the present, of
men's military colleges supported by both States and the Federal Government.
[1n my view the function of this Court is to preserve our society's values regard[1

For that reason it is
ing (among other things) equal protection, not to revise them ....
my view that, whatever abstract tests we may choose to devise, they cannot supersedeand indeed ought to be crafted so as to reflect-those constant and unbroken national

traditions that embody the people's understanding of ambiguous constitutional texts.
dissenting).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 566-68 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
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multigenerational debate over the federal government's role in family
law-as both present-day and nineteenth-century Americans would define
that category-and the work of Reconstruction's congressional architects
concretely improved the family law governing the emancipated slaves.
Equipped with a coherent and appropriate definition of family law, the farreaching scope of modern federal family law also becomes clear. To the
extent that expectations of exclusive localism in family law now exist, they
originate in misguided historical arguments that have masked the reality of
federal involvement and failed to devise a coherent definition of family law
itself. Courts and commentators cannot easily rely on a vision of history
that is simply not correct-on a claimed longevity that does not actually
exist.
Reason-the continuing persuasive power of historical rationales and
the linked recognition that past practice can reflect the best judgment of
intelligent and thoughtful historical actors-constitutes a second ground
for giving weight to history in federalism questions. In fact, a commitment
to reason underlies the very notion of a rule of law, which demands, for
example, that judges explain themselves and record their opinions for posterity so that future decisionmakers can evaluate the merits of the original
thinking as well as the bare precedent of the earlier outcome. Such a
required articulation helps protect the polity from tyranny in the form of
blind commitment to the unregulated passions and predilections of individual people, present or past. It means that we should consider why something was done as well as the fact of its accomplishment.
Reconstruction's supporters involved themselves in family law in
order to abolish slavery and all of its constitutive elements. They extended
federal protection to certain basic family rights because they were convinced that those rights were essential to freedom and -equality. These
motivating principles, it almost goes without saying, survive the test of
time remarkably well. In contrast, the logic that drove arguments for
exclusive localism in family law during Reconstruction reflected concerns
that are now constitutionally illegitimate: maintaining social segregation
between the races and coverture within the marital relation. The reasoning that underlies the origins of the domestic relations exception to diversity jurisdiction, where the Supreme Court's localist discourse on family law
first appeared, is similarly unsatisfying. The Court created this exception
in Barber solely to provide jurisdictional support for the marital unity doctrine, and Barber makes no sense in a world without coverture.
Moreover, localists' subsequent reliance on claims from history has
suppressed the development of policy explanations for exclusive localism in
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family law that are meant to be fully persuasive. Ankenbrandt, for instance,
acknowledged that the domestic relations exception has no constitutional
basis,35 but assumed that the supposed history of exclusive localism in family law was itself sufficient to justify affirming the doctrine.353 Indeed, the
Chief Justice of the United States has argued that reason is actually an
inappropriate guide where family law's place in the federal system is concerned. As Rehnquist has explained, "[ilf ever there were an area in which
federal courts should heed the admonition of Justice Holmes that 'a page of
'
history is worth a volume of logic,' it is in the area of domestic relations."354
It should be clear that such thinking neither remains persuasive nor reflects
decisionmaking processes that we can reasonably endorse. The argument
from tradition for exclusive localism in family law fails the test of reason.
As a third consideration, the force of arguments for relying on history
to determine jurisdiction over family law might very well depend on the
frequency with which history is dispositive elsewhere and on the quality of
the rationale advanced for appealing to the past in some cases and not others. This standard of consistency relates to the rule of law as well: When
the same grounds for privileging history apply (or do not) in many cases,
then relying on past practice in one analogous situation but not others has
not been explained.
Although localists have implicitly asserted that history should control
family law's position in the federal system, history has not been consistently
used to understand the claims of federalism elsewhere, and has instead
often yielded to the weight of significant, principled exigencies. The common law, for instance, classified employment, with slavery, marriage, and
parenthood, as part of domestic relations. Blackstone drew no categorical
line between the law of "master and servant," "husband and wife," and "parent
and child." To the contrary, he discussed all three together as "[tihe three
great relations in private life. 355 Keeping in this tradition, nineteenth352. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695-97 (1992).
353. See id. at 694-95 ("[Wle are unwilling to cast aside an understood rule that has been
recognized for nearly a century and a half .... ); id. at 703 ("[Olur conclusion [is] rooted in
respect for this long-held understanding .... "); id. at 715 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(contending, without explanation, that "the unbroken and unchallenged practice of the federal
courts since before the War Between the States of declining to hear certain domestic relations
cases" justified federal abstention).
354. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 770 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting New
York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)).
355. BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at *410. Kent's Commentaries, which adapted Blackstone
for an American audience, similarly identified the three domestic relations as "husband and
wife," "parent and child," and "master and servant." 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON
AMERICAN LAW 75, 190, 248 (O.W. Holmes, Jr. ed., Boston, Little, Brown, and Co. 12th ed.
1873); see also ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT
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century legal treatises highlighted the regulatory commonalities between
employment, marriage, and parenthood, examining each alongside the
other. The subtitle of James Schouler's Treatise on the Law of the Domestic
Relations (1882) is typical and telling: Embracing Husband and Wife, Parent
and Child, Guardian and Ward, Infancy, and Master and Servant.356 This
legal regime, however, importantly reflected the economic centrality of
home production in our nation's early history.357
When modes of
production changed and important exigencies calling for national
involvement arose, the federal government massively intervened into
labor-management relations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, first in diversity cases granting injunctions to enforce employer
property rights5 and then through federal antitrust prosecutions,359 federal
RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 56 (1991) ("[In

colonial legal thought,] [rIesident servants were like wives and children because all were members
of the household and all were the legal dependents of the head.... Household dependents
were.., understood to come under the 'government' of the head of household.").
356. SCHOULER, supra note 136; see also TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME,
OF PARENT AND CHILD, GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS
OF THE COURTS OF CHANCERY (Albany, William Gould & Son 3d ed. 1867); Christopher
Tomlins, Subordination, Authority, Law: Subjects in Labor History, 47 INT'L LABOR & WORKINGCLASS HIST. 56, 70 (1995) ("The legal commonalities among the domestic relations during the

nineteenth century were commonalities of authorized power: of masters/employers over
slaves/servants/apprentices/employees, of husbands over wives, parents over children. They were
recognized, deplored, and defended as such."); Van Tassel, supra note 169, at 883 ("Dependent

statuses were arranged in a hierarchy under the rule of the husband/father/master. Wives occupied the step under husband, with the other statuses ranging in descending order to children,
wage laborers, indentured servants and apprentices, down finally to slaves .... ).
357.

See JEANNE BOYDSTON, HOME AND WORK:

HOUSEWORK, WAGES, AND THE

IDEOLOGY OF LABOR IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 30-98 (1990); NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF

WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 19-62 (2d ed. 1997).

358. William Forbath has described how federal courts in the early twentieth century used
injunctions to "repeatedly [tear] critical swaths of government authority over labor protest away
from more sympathetic local officials." "As one labor journalist remarked, the injunction did
Iaway with local grand juries, local petit juries, local officers [and elected officials] of all
kinds."'
William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109,
1179-80 (1989) (quoting NAT'L LAB. STANDARD, Aug. 15, 1901, at 1); see also WILLIAM E.
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 98-127 (1991); FELIX
FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 5, 15 (1930) ("[Federal courts] are

drawing unto themselves labor controversies with increasing measure .... [Tihe federal courts,
under the Supreme Court's lead, have dealt with labor controversies apart from the authority of
federal legislation and untrammelled by state decisions."); Sylvester Petro, Injunctions and LaborDisputes: 1880-1932, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 351-53 (1978) (reporting that federal
courts issued 182 labor injunctions between 1880 and 1932).
359.

See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at

207 (1991) ("After 1890 many organized labor activities were declared [by federal courts] unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act .... Some strikes in the railroad industry were
additionally condemned under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and a few were enjoined
directly under the commerce clause itself .... "); TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS:
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administrative agencies and boards, 36 and federal statutes setting wages and
hours.16' History was not thought to control the inherent character of
employment in a way that made such a change in jurisdiction impossible,
and now employment (like race) is no longer known as a relation that
history tells us is quintessentially for the states.
A converse phenomenon, where a long tradition of uninterrupted federal involvement has not been held to make a legal category intrinsically
national, characterizes arguments for restricting or eliminating diversity
jurisdiction. The Founders were convinced that national union depended
on the existence of a judicial forum that could combat prejudice against
out-of-state litigants. 6 Federal courts have heard diversity cases since the
ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA, 1880-1990, at 112 (1992) ("After the federal

government used the Sherman Act during the Pullman strike and elsewhere to prosecute unions
for actions courts found to be unlawful interference with trade, [labor leader Samuel] Gompers
denounced [federal antitrust laws as] .... 'the very instruments employed to deprive labor of the
benefit of organized effort .... "').
360. This process culminated in the creation of the National Labor Relations Board. See
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)). For the history of the Wagner Act's origins, see Mark
Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace Cooperation,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1993).
361. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)); GEORGE E. PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE FOR THE FORGOTTEN MAN:
THE QUEST FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS, 1933-1941, at 150-51 (1996) ("[Niational wage and
hour regulation became possible because millions of Americans were no longer willing to accept
labor as simply... subject to the iron law of the marketplace.... Since regulation of the
national marketplace was beyond state jurisdiction, the choice seemed to be either national
regulation or continuing industrial disorder.").
362. In the 1780s, there was widespread concern that discrimination against out-of-state
creditors would subvert interstate and international commerce. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and
Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 87-89 (1993); Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1453-58.
In the FederalistPapers, Alexander Hamilton made the unifying purpose of diversity jurisdiction clear:
It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that "the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." And if it
be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of executing its own
provisions by its own authority it will follow that in order to the inviolable maintenance
of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its
citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments, will
be likely to be impartial between the different States and their citizens and which,
owing its official existence to the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which it is founded.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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Judiciary Act of 1789.363 They long were the largest category of federal
cases,36 and currently account for approximately one-quarter of the federal
civil docket. 365 In contrast, Congress did not extend general federal question jurisdiction to federal trial courts until 1875.' 6 Nevertheless, the long
tradition of federal diversity jurisdiction, and the fundamentally national
concerns that motivate it, have not emerged as notable obstacles to diversity's critics.

367

They have already succeeded in significantly restricting

Similarly, John Marshall argued at the Virginia ratifying convention that diversity jurisdiction
would "preserve the peace of the Union." Speech of John Marshall (June 20, 1788), in 10 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1434 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993). James Madison elaborated, stating that:
It may happen that a strong prejudice may arise in some States, against the citizens
of others, who may have claims against them. We know what tardy, and even defective
administration of justice, has happened in some States. A citizen of another State
might not chance to get justice in a State Court, and at all events he might think himself injured.
Speech of James Madison (June 20, 1788), in id. at 1414.
363. See An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat.
73, 79-80 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a (1994)).
364. See John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the FederalJudicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 18 (1948) ("In the lower [federal] courts the business originated predominantly
in diversity and admiralty.... The whole federal judicial system from 1790 to 1815 gave almost
its entire attention to the settlement of the simplest types of commercial and property
disputes."); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141 (1973) ("[l]n
1789... diversity of citizenship was one of the major heads of federal judicial business .... Without diversity jurisdiction, the circuit courts created by the First Judiciary Act
would have had very little to do.") (citation omitted).
365. See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 1996 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 135-37,

tbl.C-2 (1996).
366. See An act to determine the jurisdiction of circuit courts of the United States, and to
regulate the removal of causes from State courts, and for other purposes, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat., pt.
3, at 470, 470 (1875) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)). In 1801, Congress did
grant federal trial courts jurisdiction over cases arising under the Constitution. See An Act to
provide for the more convenient organization of the Courts of the United States, ch. 4, § 11, 2
Stat. 89, 92 (1801). It withdrew this jurisdiction, however, a year later. See An Act to repeal
certain acts respecting the organization of the Courts of the United States; and for other purposes, ch. 8, § 1, 2 Stat. 132, 132 (1802).
367. Diversity's critics generally dispute the existence of in-state bias, arguing that the
notion is a relic from an age before the development of a national market and a national culture.
See, e.g., FRIENDLY, supra note 364, at 141 (noting that "[tlhere is simply no analogy between
today's situation and that existing in 1789"); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article Ill's Case/Controversy
Distinction and the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 522 (1994)
("lA]s the danger of state court prejudice is far less today than it was in 1789, federal judges may
justifiably limit diversity jurisdiction to parties who can show actual bias by the state tribunal.");
Dolores K. Sloviter, A FederalJudge Views Diversity JurisdictionThrough the Lens of Federalism, 78
VA. L. REV. 1671, 1687 (1992) ("[E]vidence of bias is now weak at best, and the nationalizing
role of diversity jurisdiction is no longer needed. It follows that there is no longer any valid basis
to justify the fundamental incompatibility of diversity jurisdiction with the most basic principles
of federalism.").
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diversity jurisdiction by pushing its amount in controversy requirement
ever higher.3 8 Even arguments for diversity's abolition have appeared
within the federal judiciary and the academic literature. 69
To some extent, localists' atypical reliance on history when family law
is discussed may simply reflect the misapprehension that family law's jurisdictional tradition is somehow less complicated or ambiguous than other
tales from the past. As Judith Resnik has recently observed, almost every
aspect of the federal/state balance has been in flux over the course of
American history, creating many historical records that do not support any
one particular modem allocation to the exclusion of all others.370 Yet the
history of diversity does not control discussion about its continued existence as part of federal jurisdiction, although it is hard to imagine a clearer
tradition. More fundamentally, it is extremely difficult to find a reason in
Alternatively, critics argue that federal and state courts indistinguishably share whatever
bias exists. See, e.g., SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES 453 (1990) (acknowledging that fed-

eral juries are drawn from wider pools than state juries, but dismissing distinction on assumption
that any bias in a state is equally distributed throughout); Carl McGowan, Federal Jurisdiction:
Legislative and Judicial Change, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 517, 531 (1978) (arguing that
"differential federal and state jury bias is not likely" because federal and state juries are drawn
from same state).
368. The Judiciary Act of 1789 limited diversity jurisdiction to cases in which more than
$500 was at issue. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. Congress has
repeatedly raised this bar, which now limits diversity jurisdiction to cases with more than
$75,000 in dispute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (codifying Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1996, Pub. L.No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat. 3847, 3850); see also Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373,
§ 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (raising amount in controversy from more than $500 to more than $2000);
Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (raising amount in controversy to more
than $3000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (more than
$10,000); Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201, 102
Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (more than $50,000). For arguments supporting the further reduction of
diversity jurisdiction, see, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL

COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 38 (1990) (recommending that diversity jurisdiction cover only
"complex multi-state litigation, interpleader, and suits involving aliens"); Louis H. Pollak, Amici
Curiae, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 823 (1989) (book review) (advocating elimination of diversity
jurisdiction over.cases brought by in-state plaintiffs against out-of-state defendants); William H.
Rehnquist, Address of the Chief Justice, 21 ST. MARY'S L.J. 5, 7-8 (1989) (same); Pushaw, supra
note 367, at 522 (supporting limitation of diversity jurisdiction to parties able to demonstrate
"actual bias by the state tribunal").
369. See FRIENDLY, supra note 364, at 140-42; Richard Allan, D~marche or Destruction of the
Federal Courts--A Response to Judge Friendly's Analysis of FederalJurisdiction, 40 BROOK. L. REV.
637, 655-56 (1974); Judge Howard C. Bratton, Diversity Jurisdiction-An Idea Whose Time Has
Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347, 349-51 (1976); Thomas D. Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for FurtherReforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963, 963-64 (1979).
370. See Resnik, supra note 12, at 472-74, 493-94; Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and
the FederalCourts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L.
REV. 171, 174-75, 217-18, 230 (1995).
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the actual record of family law and federalism for why historical arguments
for exclusive localism should be controlling here, but not elsewhere. This
record, remember, does not satisfy the tests of longevity and reason.
This Article is not a brief for the nationalization of all of family law.
As Lopez made clear, Congress may act where, but only where, it has a
constitutional basis for doing so. 7' The issue is not whether Congress can
constitutionally regulate families; it is how Congress can exercise its
commerce, Fourteenth Amendment, or other enumerated powers. The
localist argument has been that family law's history places some doctrinal
limit on the use of this constitutional authority or, less frequently but
implied in Lopez, that the historically exclusive localism of family law
somehow diminishes the federal government's constitutional power to act
in that sphere."' I have to conclude that the argument from history for
exclusive localism in family law, as presently articulated, has no weight in
either regard. This is not a judgment about the ultimate merit of federal
involvement in family law. It is also not a statement about the weight of
precedent generally, or about the potential value of using history for support elsewhere. It is a conclusion about what can count as a reason for
exclusive localism in family law and why. The history of family law and
federalism-which has long counted as the primary and controlling reason
explaining why family law is inherently and exclusively local-should not
be considered one.
One might add other criteria to my three means of evaluating the
power of tradition. But longevity, reason, and consistency are clearly
among the foremost grounds for giving deference to the past when one is
deciding what should be under local jurisdiction and what under national
control. The history that this Article brings to light satisfies none of these
standards. Indeed, it reveals that exclusive localism in family law seriously
misdescribes the historical record and that localists have failed to develop a
coherent account of what they mean by "family law" itself. Compare, for
instance, the opposition to the Violence Against Women Act, which
asserted that a bill that never turned on familial status or familial relationships constituted family law, and the volumes of decisions and treatises that
elucidate "commerce." "Commerce" is textual, 7 ' whereas the term "family
371.

See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995).

372. See id. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The [majority's] suggestion is either that a connection between commerce and [traditionally state] subjects is remote, or that the commerce

power is simply weaker when it touches subjects on which the States have historically been the
primary legislators.").
373. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3 ("[Congress shall have Power] To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
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law" never appears in the Constitution. But the contrast between the time,
energy, and thought that lawyers and judges have spent to define commerce and the complete lack of effort devoted to explaining why the
Violence Against Women Act is family law remains striking. Faith, and
not reason, controlled the controversy over the Violence Against Women
Act. If localists hope to defend doctrinal or constitutional limitations on
Congress's authority over family law, they will have to articulate their case
in radically different terms. The analysis that now controls debate over
family law's place in the federal system is grotesquely inadequate, unable
even to clarify the limits of its claims. In order to judge the merits of
exclusive localism in any given case, we would need to know far more than
what the assertions that appear in the VAWA dispute, or in Lopez, will
ever offer. If some cogent reason exists for why family law alone should be
impervious to federal involvement, we need a better understanding of what
"family law" is and why exclusive localism is appropriate, one that can be
reconciled with actual past practice and sustainable constitutional norms.
But does the actual record of federal regulation of the family, and the
historical association of localism with concerns to preserve illicit status
relations, constitute a burden to those arguing that family law is particularly and exclusively local? Do these advocates now have to overcome the
nature of their claim's origins? I would not go that far. After all, the whole
tenor of the modern debate over family law reveals that the past has been
obscured, from everyone concerned. At the same time, the history of family law and federalism should leave us with three abiding concerns, linked
to the reasons one might rely on the past. Each suggests how Congress
should exercise its constitutional authority when family law is at issue.
The record this Article has uncovered reveals, first, a time when family law's position in the federal system was the product of sustained thought
and careful contemplation, suggesting that it can be so again. The Reconstruction consensus that the federal government could exercise jurisdiction
over family law was not preordained, but a matter of critical reflection at a
moment when the lines of state and national power were redrawn for modernity. The legislative history of the 1866 Civil Rights Act and Fourteenth
Amendment contains a profound and wide-ranging debate about the
nature of national citizenship and the familial rights inherent in freedom.
Today, the same claims to tradition that have served to mask the historical
record have frequently also made the place of family law in federalism
a matter of rote recitation, a proposition so certain that it never needs
elaboration or qualification. Localism's advocates now use historical
arguments, and the implicit contention that they should control, to

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1395 1997-1998

1396

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1297 (1998)

suppress discussion and analysis, turning all other normative claims into
mere supplements. Although powerful enough to defeat cogent arguments
for national involvement like those presented in VAWA's support,
localists have never articulated a normative justification for their own
position that they expected to be independently persuasive. Localism is
incredibly undertheorized, dominated by incantatory reiteration at the
expense of normative deliberation. For too long, invoking history has
sufficed for invoking reason. The real legacy of family law and federalism
constitutes an invitation to intelligent inquiry, not a reason to avoid the
effort.
Second, this history does place a burden on all courts, Congressmen,
and commentators to avoid replicating, in modem form, the defense of
status relations that drove Reconstruction's critics. The arguments for
localism in family law during Reconstruction explicitly aligned private
control with local control, the preservation of white social supremacy and
coverture with federal noninvolvement and state autonomy. The concerns
of Reconstruction's critics are now constitutionally illegitimate under the
very Fourteenth Amendment that these men opposed, and are unlikely to
be publicly articulated--or understood-in such an obvious and explicit
form ever again. But history illustrates how localist policies keeping the
federal government out of family law can functionally protect racial or sexual hierarchy from public intervention, suggesting how this might be
accomplished in the name of state autonomy without any explicit appeals
to status. This should not preclude all arguments that link private and
local governance, but our past should make us all concerned enough about
the association that we are genuinely vigilant in exposing implicit or functional defenses of status relations and willing to consider the possibility
that they exist.
This is particularly true given the sheer longevity of the historical
connection between localism and substantive arguments for inequality,
which extends far beyond Reconstruction to span the first two centuries
of our nation's existence. Until at least the middle of the twentieth
century, the regional struggle over slavery, abolitionism, and civil rights for
African-Americans importantly shaped federalism traditions and debate.
Although never solely concerned with race, federalism arguments in
America were long entangled in the sectional battles over racial status that
were their most common context, and frequently developed and deployed
to bolster objections to abolition and civil rights.
These links are apparent from the nation's inception. The Founders
never conflated federalism with the status of slavery, and federalist con-
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cerns structured debate at the constitutional convention on many issues.

374

At the same time, the convention's discourse on structural principles and
regional rights also and inextricably reflected the fact, acknowledged then
and stressed consistently thereafter in debates over slavery, that the South
never would have agreed to national union without constitutional protection for its peculiar institution.3 75 Building on this tradition, John C.
Calhoun's argument in the early nineteenth century for the independent
sovereignty of each state offered a federalist vision that had implications far
beyond slavery, but was primarily presented, understood, and debated as a
theory permitting Southern states to nullify federal antislavery efforts.376
Only three decades later, Jefferson Davis reiterated Calhoun's claims to
justify the succession effort that Davis led, a cause as inseparable from the
preservation of slavery as it was from regionalism.
When President Harry
Truman proposed federal civil rights initiatives in 1948 that were more
substantial than anything seen since Reconstruction,7 the "Dixiecrats"
who left the Democratic Party in response inextricably intertwined their
374. See RAKOVE, supra note 91, at 33, 59-81 (discussing Founders' attempts to address sectional economic differences and myriad jealousies dividing large and small states); GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 524-32 (1969) (discussing
convention debates on role of states in federal government).
375. For an analysis of this understanding at the constitutional convention, see RAKOVE,
supra note 91, at 93 ("It was not a superiority at bluffing that gave the South the edge at
Philadelphia .... No bluff was needed to suggest that a Constitution that struck a serious blow at
slavery would never survive the hurdles of ratification."); id. at 73 ("There was no principled basis
ofl which the three-fifths rule could be fully justified, [James] Wilson [of Pennsylvania] observed
on July 11 .... 'These were difficulties however which he thought must be overruled by the
necessity of compromise."').
The recognition that union in 1789 had been premised on the North's agreement to protect
slavery in the Constitution remained a fundamental tenet of debate a third of a century later,
when Missouri's 1820 petition for admission as a slave state sparked the first major battle over
the extension of slavery to the West. See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 1097 (1820) (statement of Rep.
Cook) (arguing in favor of Missouri's admission as slave state on ground that constitutional
protection for slavery had secured "the blessings of a union of the States"); id. at 1135 (statement
of Rep. Hemphill) (opposing Missouri's admission because Constitution's "obligatory"
compromise on slavery, then "necessary to save us from domestic discord and foreign ambition,"
was no longer necessary now that America's "national strength bids defiance to any nation").
376. See JOHN NIVEN, JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE PRICE OF UNION 181-82, 191-92, 19699(1988).
377. Like Calhoun, Davis argued that the Constitution made each state, "in the last resort,
the sole judge as well of its wrongs as of the mode and measure of redress." In explaining why the
Confederate states had resumed "all their rights as sovereign and independent States and dissolved their connection with the other States of the Union," Davis stressed that the northerndominated Congress had "impair[ed] the security of property in African slaves," whose labor had
become "absolutely necessary for the wants of civilized man." 1 JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC

CORRESPONDENCE, 1861-1865, at 63-82 (James D. Richardson ed., 1966).

378. See V.0. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS INSTATE AND NATION 330 (1949).
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substantive objections into the language of federalism, explaining that they
would 'stand firmly for states' rights and therefore against any nominee for
president or vice-president of the United States who refuses to take an
open and positive stand against the 'civil rights' recommendations." 7 9 As
federal efforts to protect African-Americans mounted in the 1950s and
1960s, opponents continued to articulate their protests largely in federalist
terms. While these arguments were never reducible to a simple defense of
racial hierarchy, the voices raising Calhoun's theories to assert that the
Supreme Court lacked constitutional authority to desegregate schools,' s or
contending that Congress's commerce power did not reach the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,' predominately wielded these clai ms, as Calhoun himself had
done over a century before, to defend their substantive objections to civil
rights for African-Americans.
Although only one aspect of federalism's history in America, the
lasting power of this association between federalism and the defense of
379. Id. at 332 (quoting Mississippi Democratic executive committee). Along the same
lines, South Carolina Governor (now Senator) Strom Thurmond declared that "[aIll the laws of
Washington, and all the bayonets of the Army cannot force the negroes into their ([white]
southerners) homes, their schools, their churches and their places of recreation and amusement."'
Id. at 333 (quoting Thurmond). Charles Wallace Collins, the author of an influential treatise
intended to provide the intellectual basis for the Dixiecrat movement, bitterly opposed all
federal civil rights initiatives and defended white supremacy as "a practical doctrine" that
was needed "to enable the white people of the South to live in contact with large numbers of
Negroes without the loss of the identity of their ancient culture and their racial purity."
CHARLES WALLACE COLLINS, WHITHER SOLID SOUTH?: A STUDY IN POLITICS AND RACE
RELATIONS 40 (1947). In explaining why the nation had to respect this view, Collins stressed
that the United States was "a Federal union of States," in which the national government had
"limited delegated powers which have been conferred by written organic law." Id. at ix. He
argued that:
No study of the Negro legislative program [could] be at all adequate unless it [took]
into account the circumstance that it is a movement toward stateism in a broad scheme
for national planning which, if it became the law of the land, would nationalize all civil
rights and thus effectively deprive the States of their republican form of government ....IT]he whole Negro program is infected with the deadly virus of stateism.
Id. at x. For an analysis of the reception that Whither Solid South? received from its intended
audience, see Helen Fuller, The New Confederacy, NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 1, 1948, at 10, 12 ("A
second-rate book by an unknown author became the 'Mein Kampf' of a new movement because
it appeared at the strategic moment.... [In Governor Fielding Wright's inaugural address], the
voice was that of the Governor of Mississippi but the thoughts came from Whither Solid South?").
380. See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 146 (2d ed. 1994)
("[TIhe southern foes of the Desegregation doctrine ... mounted a counterattack against the
Court.... [T]he Calhounian slogan of 'interposition' was heard in the land once more, with
states earnestly proclaiming their sovereignty and impeaching the nation's, as if... the Civil
War [had] never [been] fought.").
381. See id. at 151 ("[M]any Southerners, led by Senator Ervin of North Carolina, argued
that Congress lacked the power to pass the Civil Rights Act [of 1964], that it was not the genuine 'regulation of commerce' that its supporters described it as being.").
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status should redouble our efforts to uncover such connections and our
openness to the possibility that they persist. For instance, Judith Resnik
has argued that the federal judiciary's current campaign to locate family law
cases in state court reflects a devaluation of "[w]omen and the families they
sometimes inhabit"-"hostility to seeing women as legitimate participants
in the national world" and the linked assumption that family law does not
raise issues of sufficient import to merit federal attention." 2 Naomi Cahn
has expanded on this critique, finding parallels between the Supreme
Court's "rhetoric confining family law to the states" and "earlier language
that confined women to the private sphere." 3" Like the common law that
inseparably associated women with the family in order to exclude both
from the privileged public realm, the modem Court, she concludes,
"accepts the existence of a just family in a private sphere" and is therefore
eager to relegate "the interdependency issues of family law" to the separate,
lesser world of the states.3s The history presented here does not establish
or disprove these particular interpretations of the modem debate and case
law, but it does add to their a priori plausibility.
As we have seen, gender, like race, can exert a profound imaginative
force, even over a body of thought never reducible to an ahistorical claim
about sexism or racism. Certainly, localists have not yet articulated a
coherent account of either their commitment to federal noninvolvement
in family law or their reliance on tradition. Particularly in light of the
absence of clear historical support for exclusive localism in family law, it
remains to be explained why family law has become the icon of federal
noninvolvement, so symbolically immune from the force of time that
courts and commentators identify it as the sole residuum of an allocation between state and nation otherwise clearly left in the past. Why, of
all the sites of possible regulatory interest, has family law sole among them
become the lodestar that history will not alter and that reasoned analysis
should not touch? Why does Lopez single out family law as indissolubly,
trans-historically equated with the states? Are we confident that we can
found a modem constitutional regime on the reasons that the Framers and
subsequent partisans had for protecting local control over family law? The
past shows us how the language of federalism can mask a discourse about
status and, as clearly, calls upon all of us to unearth whatever connections
persist.
382. Judith Resnik, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the FederalCourts,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1749-50, 1766 (1991).
383. Cahn, supra note 41, at 1105.
384. Id. at 1103, 1105.
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Finally, the history of Reconstruction cautions us about becoming too
faithful to any past. At a crucial moment, Reconstruction Congressmen
were willing to undertake a massive reorganization of state and national
jurisdiction. Certain that family rights were at the heart of freedom, they
refused to be bound by tradition when core issues of national identity and
principle were at stake. Such a critical and reflective stance toward history
aligns with the Founders' vision of the Constitution as a covenant that
would evolve along with the nation, remaining useful throughout its
course.385 It is emblematic of the entire project of Reconstruction and the
Fourteenth Amendment, which radically and self-consciously departed
from past practice and settled expectations.?86 The legacy of Reconstruction urges us to always be alive to the implications of law for freedom and
equality, and to be ever ready to revise the course of history once again.

385. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of OriginalIntent, 98 HARV.
L. REv. 885, 948 (1985) (explaining that Framers did not intend for their personal "purposes,
expectations, and intentions" to control Constitution's future meaning).
386. As Cass Sunstein has noted, modem equal protection doctrine under the Fourteenth
Amendment also frequently adopts a critical posture toward the past. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1988) ("The [equal protection] clause does not safeguard
traditions; it protects against traditions, however long-standing and deeply rooted.").
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